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Farmer controlled cooperatives contribute significantly to the growth of the rice sector in the 
Philippines – the country’s most important agricultural sector both in production and in 
consumption. These cooperatives are promoted and supported by the government as a way 
of empowering farmers as buyers, value-adders, and sellers in the supply chain. 
Unfortunately, despite ongoing financial support from various government agencies, many of 
the country’s rice farmer cooperatives struggle to remain viable. Cooperative failure is often 
attributed to poor management, inadequate capital, and the members’ unreliable 
patronisation to the cooperative. However, a growing body of literature views these problems 
as symptoms of much more fundamental flaws in the institutional arrangements that tend to 
characterise cooperatives in developing countries.  
 
This research examines the property rights and governance practices adopted by rice farmers 
cooperatives in the Davao del Norte province, and assesses their impact on cooperative 
performance. Four cooperatives were studied using a multiple case study approach. The study 
interviewed directors, managers, and members using semi-structured interview schedules 
designed to gather both qualitative and quantitative information. Pattern matching was used 
to test theory-based propositions about causal relationships between a cooperative’s 
performance and its institutional arrangements. This qualitative analysis was triangulated 
against the results of a quantitative hierarchical cluster analysis of the property rights, 
governance and performance attributes of the cooperatives studied.  
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The research found a strong relationship between good performance and the absence of 
institutional problems. In particular, the absence of a free-riding problem allows cooperatives 
to efficiently allocate resources and to establish and maintain their reputation. When 
institutional problems are present, cooperatives introduce policies to mitigate their effects. 
Strategies that promote proportionality of investments to patronage allows cooperatives to  
reliably generate internal capital. The Cooperative Code of the Philippines outlines specific 
governance practices that Philippine cooperatives must adhere to. Practices that embrace 
accountability and transparency are well-entrenched in the code. However, the research 
reveals that cooperatives have instituted practices that complement the existing law and 
alleviate the specific institutional problem they face. 
 
This research offers policymakers, government support agencies, and cooperative leaders a 
better understanding of the problems confronting rice farmer cooperatives in the Philippines 
and highlights changes that could be made to address performance problems created by weak 
institutional arrangements. 
 
Keywords: institutional arrangements, property rights structure, governance practices, 
pattern matching, hierarchical cluster analysis 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Philippine rice sector 
Rice is the single most important crop in the Philippine agriculture industry (Arnaoudov et al., 
2015; Boquet, 2017, p. 215; Bordado et al., 1996; Ponce & Inocencio, 2017). Eighty per cent 
(80%) of the 106.6 million strong Filipino population (Philippine Statistics Authority [PSA], 
2014) consider rice to be a primary staple food (Bordey, 2010, p. 1; Cororaton, 2004). Of the 
13.48 million hectares of the country’s land (PSA, 2014), 4.80 million hectares (35.6%) is 
dedicated to rice production (PSA, 2014; Suministrado, 2013). The rice sector also contributes 
the most, economically speaking (PhP 385 million), to the nation’s total crop production value 
(PhP 1 billion) (PSA, 2019). Furthermore, the rice sector employs 21.4% (2.53 million) of all 
the workers engaged in the agriculture industry (11.84 million) (Food and Agriculture 
Organization [FAO], 2014; PSA, 2014). 
 
Although the significance of the rice sector to the country’s social and economic landscape is 
undeniable (Bordey, 2010, p. 2), the sector is facing several major challenges. Farmers are 
struggling to meet the needs of the country’s growing population (Ponce & Inocencio, 2017, 
p. 7), and to compete with imported rice in an increasingly liberalised trade environment 
(FAO, 2014). Falling productivity and rising input costs have resulted in decreasing farm 
incomes (FAO, 2014). Low productivity gains have been attributed to stagnating yield 
potentials of widely-used varieties (David et al., 2018; Koirala et al., 2014) and to persistent 
farm fragmentation that has reduced the average farm size to a mere 1.2 hectares per farming 
household (Arnaoudov et al., 2015, p. 23). Production has also been adversely affected by the 
conversion of farmland for other uses to meet the needs of a rapidly growing urban 
population (Bordey, 2010, p. 3). 
 
The government has recognised these challenges and sought to remedy the issues through 
policy and investment. Post-Marcos regimes placed rice development at the forefront of 
agriculture development (Ponce & Inocencio, 2017, p. 9). The Republic Act (RA) 8435 of 1997 
and the Agricultural and Fisheries Modernisation Act (AFMA) emphasised rice self-sufficiency 
as a primary agricultural policy which resulted in higher government spending in the sector 
(Bordey, 2010, p. 47). Since 2005, the Department of Agriculture’s (DA) national rice 
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programme has consistently received a disproportionately larger share of the department’s 
budget (see Figure 1.1) (Department of Agriculture [DA], n.d.-a). In 2020 alone, PhP 10 billion 
of the department’s PhP 64.7 billion budget was solely allocated to the Rice Competitiveness 
Enhancement Fund (RCEF) (Department of Budget and Management [DBM], 2020). The 
national rice programme has largely focused on credit support, and grants for inputs, facilities, 
and machinery. Programme proponents argue that these grants aid low-income farmers by 
reducing their reliance on monopolistic input- and service-supply markets (Ponce & 
Inocencio, 2017, p. 19).  
 
Figure 1.1 
Rice Programme share to the DA Appropriation from 2015-2019 
 
Note: Adapted from The Philippine Department of Agriculture’s  Annual Financial Reports (2015-2019). 
(https://www.da.gov.ph/transparency/). Information available in the public domain. 
 
1.2 Role of cooperatives in the rice sector 
Farmer organisations play a significant role in facilitating government interventions. Farmers 
only obtain access to capacity-building and training, grants for input, machinery and facilities, 
and credit and marketing assistance through membership in either cooperatives, registered 
under the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA), irrigators’ associations, registered 
under the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or farmers’ associations, registered 
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2015, p. 23). Machinery and facilities donated under the rice mechanisation programme are 
distributed to farmer organisations, not individual farmers (OECD, 2017). Likewise, input 
grants from the newly established RCEF are accessible to organised farmers (DA, n.d.-b). 
Publicly-funded technologies were developed for village-level management and operations, 
as evidenced by the PhilRice-adapted flatbed dryer and the communal pumps of the pump 
irrigation programme (Bautista & Javier, 2008). The management, operation and 
maintenance of irrigation systems and the corresponding infrastructure were also transferred 
by the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) to organised irrigators’ associations 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010). Likewise, farmers can access four of the six agricultural and 
credit financing programmes administered by the DA’s Agricultural Credit Policy Council 
(ACPC) only through farmer organisations (ACPC, n.d.). Farmer organisations also channel 
farmers’ feedback about policies and interventions to the government and lobby the 
policymakers for beneficial terms (Librero & Tidon, 1996a; Parliament et al., 1990; Shepherd 
& Cadilhon, 2008). 
 
Among farmer organisations, cooperatives stand out because of the other benefits they 
provide to their members. Aside from acting as channels of financial (Librero & Tidon, 1996b) 
and technical assistance (Bordado et al., 1996), farmers join cooperatives because of the 
assured output market, the communal acquisition of costly assets, and the expected increase 
in income. Leveraging the collective power afforded by cooperatives, farmers are able to 
influence market functions, such as price and other transaction terms, to their advantage 
(Librero & Aquino, 1996; Manalili et al., 2008). On behalf of the farmers, cooperatives 
negotiate better deals with downstream buyers and upstream suppliers (Araullo, 2006), 
Moreover, they countervail trading partners’ potentially opportunistic behaviour (Valentinov, 
2007). When negotiating with an Missouri-based processor, a Davao-based cooperative 
guaranteed a premium price for its members’ produce (Quilloy, 2015a).  
 
Inherent limitations in farming such as small farm size, capital-intensive operations and 
temporal price variability make rice farming prohibitively costly (Castillo, 2003) and inherently 
risky (Valentinov, 2007). Inadequate access to storage and drying facilities diminishes a 
farmer’s bargaining power, especially during peak harvest months (Villano et al., 2015). 
Farmers have limited capacity to solely finance these lumpy production and post-production 
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assets. By organising themselves into a group, farmers can pool their resources to provide 
custom services and defray expenses for costly farm functions (Narrod et al., 2009).  
 
1.3 Cooperative policies in the Philippines 
Legislation and statutory restrictions influence the practices adopted and implemented by 
cooperatives (Amongo & Larona, 2015; Bijman et al., 2014; Cook & Iliopoulos, 2016; Royer, 
1992). Legislations pertaining to cooperative development will either deter or encourage the 
viability of these organisations within a particular jurisdiction. In the Philippines, farmer 
cooperatives were first legislated in 1915 upon the enactment of Act 2508 (Rural Credit Law) 
which promoted rural financing through cooperatives and saw the establishment of 
agricultural credit cooperative associations. To complement these rural credit associations, 
the government encouraged the formation of marketing societies via Act 3425 of 1927 
(Cooperative Marketing Law) (CDA, n.d.; Ferrer, 1956).  
 
The Commonwealth Act 565 of 1940 (Cooperative Law) and the RA 821 of 1952 (Agricultural 
Credit and Cooperative Financing System) saw the formation of regulatory bodies for 
cooperatives, the National Cooperative Administration (NCA) (Ferrer, 1956) and the 
Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) (Official Gazette, n.d.-
a), respectively. ACCFA provided rural credit to farmers organised as Farmer’s Cooperative 
Marketing Associations (FACOMAs). These acts defined cooperatives as any organisation 
governed by the principles of voluntary and open membership, democratic voting, limited 
interest on capital, and benefits distributed according to patronage.  
 
Subsequent laws, including the RA 6389 of 1971 (Agricultural Land Reform Code), the RA 7607 
of 1991 (Magna Carta of Small Farmers), the RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law 
of 1988), and the RA 8435 of 1997 (Agricultural and Fisheries Modernisation Act), emphasised 
the importance of cooperatives in empowering farmers and improving their socio-economic 
conditions (Chan Robles, n.d.; LawPHil Project, n.d.; Official Gazette, n.d.-b, n.d.-d). Under 
these laws, nothing has been done to enhance the cooperative definition nor modify the 
principles that govern them. 
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It was only in 2008 that policy concerning cooperatives was modified. The RA 9520 (Philippine 
Cooperative Code of 2008) amended the RA 6938 of 1990 (Cooperative Code of the 
Philippines) and became the principal law governing the cooperative movement in the 
country (Official Gazette, n.d.-c, n.d.-e). It expanded the definition of a cooperative by 
including autonomy, independence, and concern for the community. It also aligned the 
legislation to the principles adapted by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA). Despite 
these legislative amendments, the structure and practices of the cooperative remained 
largely the same. 
 
1.4 Problem statement and purpose 
Although farmer cooperatives can and do play an important role in the growth and 
development of smallholder agriculture in the Philippines (Araullo, 2006; Castillo, 2003), there 
is little evidence relating to their performance as product and service providers in the rice 
sector. The country has a long history of cooperative failure and a poor record of developing 
their institutional capacity (FAO, 2001). Laws pertaining to the cooperative movement and 
development were built upon the failure of previous pieces of legislations. While cooperative 
activity intensified in the immediate years after the passing of legislations, the passion 
eventually wanes. After the passing of seminal cooperative laws in 1915 and 1927, active 
agricultural credit cooperative associations and marketing societies went down, to only 10% 
and 20% in 1935 and 1939, respectively (CDA, n.d.). Within a decade, two-thirds of the credit 
provided by ACCFA was unpaid (Tadem, 2002). Most agricultural cooperatives assisted by the 
government defaulted on their loan repayments and some have ceased operations altogether 
(Arnaoudov et al., 2015). Cooperatives failed to sustain the DA’s postharvest development 
programmes. They were deemed weak and not competitive in providing marketing services 
due to their inability to provide storage facilities, which would have ensured their long-term 
success (Balgos & Digal, 2017).  
 
Studies have identified several factors which led to the failure of farmer cooperatives. Among 
these are a poor understanding of cooperative principles and purposes, conflicting interests 
between members, poor cooperative leadership and management (Castro, 2003; Manalili et 
al., 2015), inadequate capital, and opportunistic behaviour on the part of members whose 
patronage vacillates between the cooperative and other organisations that temporarily offer 
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them better terms (Araullo, 2006; Balgos & Digal, 2017; CDA, n.d.; Ferrer, 1956; FAO, 2001; 
Tadem, 2002). Further analysis that explains why farmer cooperatives struggle to raise capital, 
to retain quality management, and to build long-term trading relationships with premium 
buyers is largely absent.  
 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) views cooperative “problems” such as weak management 
and insufficient capital as symptoms of more fundamental problems created by the 
institutional arrangements that characterise traditional cooperatives (Cook & Chaddad, 2004; 
Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998, 1999). These arrangements influence the cooperative’s ability to 
access capital, to retain good managers (Cook, 1995) and to fully engage members in 
supporting the cooperative’s business (Esnard et al., 2017); these factors ultimately affect a 
cooperative’s efficiency and performance (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000).   
 
To address constraints that undermine the performance of rice farmer cooperatives, it is 
necessary to have a clear understanding of the institutional arrangements these cooperatives 
adopt. The overarching purpose of this research is to examine the property rights structure 
and governance practices that characterise rice farmer cooperatives in the Davao del Norte 
province in the Philippines, and to establish whether these arrangements hinder their 
performance. The research provides up-to-date information about the institutional 
arrangements of rice farmer cooperatives in the Davao del Norte and tests theory-based 
propositions about the relationships between these arrangements and indicators of 
cooperative performance. The results of this research offer policymakers, government 
support agencies, and cooperative leaders a better understanding of the problems 
confronting rice farmer cooperatives in the province. This research also identifies changes 




Though there have been several studies which examine Philippine cooperatives (Araullo, 
2006), their role in empowering farmers and improving their position in the market (Manalili, 
2003; Quilloy, 2015a, 2015b; Sarmiento et al., 2014; Sumalde & Quilloy, 2015), and their 
performance (Castillo, 2003; Matienzo, 1968), only a few have mentioned the influence of 
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institutional arrangements in the performance of cooperatives (Manalili, Campilan, & Garcia, 
2008). This research advances the cooperative literature on the Philippines by scrutinising the 
effects of institutional arrangements on cooperative performance.  
 
Further, the research’s results provide valuable insights which cooperative leaders can use for 
strategic and development planning. By clearly identifying the institutional arrangements that 
affect their performance, cooperative leaders can formulate strategies and policies that 
address, in the long-term, the primary causes of organisational failure.  
 
Lastly, by identifying the characteristics of well-performing cooperatives, the research will be 
of great assistance to policymakers seeking to develop programmes and interventions 
targeted at farmer organisations. By having a deeper understanding of the linkage between 
institutional arrangements and cooperative performance, policymakers will be able to 
formulate policies and legislation that not only address the symptoms of cooperative failure 
but, more importantly, its causes. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the research 
This chapter has discussed the importance and challenges of the rice sector in relation to the 
Philippine socio-economic environment, and the role and failings of the cooperative 
movement. Over the years, legislation has been introduced and amended to strengthen the 
movement; however, the “causes of failure” – poor management, insufficient capital, and 
opportunistic behaviour – still remain. Chapter 2 thus examines literature that treats these 
“causes” as symptoms of failure, and that attributes these symptoms to weak institutional 
arrangements. This chapter concludes with a set of research questions that the study seeks 
to address. Chapter 3 describes the research method used to gather relevant data and to 
analyse it in ways that answer the research questions. Chapter 4 provides the case 
descriptions for each of the studied cooperatives, Chapter 5 compares the institutional 
arrangements between the four cooperatives. Chapter 5 also examines the results of the 
hierarchichal cluster analysis of the performance, property rights, and governance attributes. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions and recommendations. The conclusions were drawn 
from the results of both the qualitative and quantitative analyses. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
While the previous chapter has shown the significant role that farmer cooperatives play in 
advancing the Philippine rice sector, it also highlighted the failings of the cooperative 
movement due, in part, to the lack of better understanding of the effects of institutional 
arrangements on the performance of a cooperative. This literature review focuses on the 
institutional arrangements typical in traditional cooperatives, the problems arising from these 
arrangements, and the effect of these problems on cooperative performance. The chapter 
begins with a review of the unique nature of the cooperative and its distinct property rights 
structure. This structure, formed from the interpretation of the adopted cooperative 
principles, gives rise to institutional problems described in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 then 
discusses how governance practices mitigate or exacerbate these institutional problems, 
Section 2.5 reviews how performance is typically measured. 
 
2.1 Distinguishing features of a cooperative 
Cooperatives are economic organisations formed and designed to operate through collective 
action, where ownership rights are vested into the user-patrons (members) (Vitaliano, 1983). 
User-orientedness is a distinguishing feature of cooperatives  (Bijman et al., 2014; Dunn, 
1988). Essentially, user-orientedness means that cooperatives are user-owned (the owners 
and financiers of the cooperative are the major users of the cooperative’s business); user-
controlled (control rests in the hands of the users, usually via a democratic governance 
structure, that is, each member has one vote); and user-benefitted (benefits accrued and 
distributed are derived primarily from transacting with the organisation) (Borgen, 2001; Cook 
& Burress, 2009; Dunn, 1988; Staatz, 1987).  
 
As user-owned, property rights are owned by the members (users). Cook and Tong (1990, p. 
114) have defined property rights as the “socially and legally enforced right to select uses of 
an economic good”. The owners of the property rights are the claimant to the residual rights 
to returns and residual rights of control of the cooperative. Residual rights of control are 
partly exercised through the election of directors from and by the members (Vitaliano, 1983). 
In theory, interests are aligned when ownership and usage of the cooperative’s business are 
unified. Market contracting costs are reduced, member benefits – both as users and owners 
– are maximised, and economic decisions are more efficient (Iliopoulos, 1998, p. iv). 
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However, New Institutional Economics (NIE) literature has demonstrated that traditional 
cooperatives’ property rights are generally vaguely defined (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000); in 
short, property rights are not fully assigned, fully enforced, or priced (Royer, 1999). This 
results in the misalignment of residual claim rights to returns and residual rights of control 
(Cook, 1995). Institutional arrangements arising from vaguely-defined property rights pave 
the way for organisational inefficiencies. As decision-makers do no bear the full impact of 
their decisions (Cook & Tong, 1990), internal transaction costs (that is, search and information 
costs, decision costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs) (Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999) and, 
consequently, ownership costs are aggravated. These costs are borne solely by the users who 
are also the owners of the cooperative, thus, diluting their benefits. As a result, members are 
discouraged from resolutely patronising and fully investing in the cooperative (Cook & 
Iliopoulos, 1998; Iliopoulos, 1998, p. 57). 
 
2.2 Typical property rights arrangements  
How the property rights of most traditional cooperatives are defined, allocated and 
distributed is heavily influenced by the cooperative principles adopted and dictated by 
legislation (Cook & Burress, 2009; Cook & Tong, 1990). The property rights structure of 
traditional cooperatives are distinct to them because these organisations adopt similar 
cooperative principles. This section discusses the property rights structure common to 
traditional cooperatives, and the principles behind it. 
 
2.2.1 Ownership rights and ownership horizon are restricted by patronage 
Unique to cooperatives, ownership rights are limited to members of the cooperative’s 
products and services (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013; Vitaliano, 1983). In most traditional 
cooperatives, the primary membership qualification is the ability to patronise the products 
and services of that cooperative. When a member stops patronising the cooperative’s 
business/es, ownership validity expires. Hence, the ownership horizon – the time period 
where the residual claim rights to returns are valid (Iliopoulos, 1998, p. 62) – is also 
constrained by patronage. The second property rights arrangement discussed in Section 2.2.2 
reinforces the first. Benefits accrued are contingent on the degree of patronage; hence, 
ownership benefits expire when patronage ends (Borgen, 2004; Vitaliano, 1983). 
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The ICA’s cooperative principle of voluntary and open membership shaped this arrangement. 
The principle implies that, although anyone can join the cooperative, the individual must be 
able to voluntarily and actively perform the responsibilities of membership; this primarily 
involves patronising the business of the cooperative (Hoyt, 1996). In emphasising patron 
ownership as a basic cooperative principle, Abramhansen (1976), as cited by  Royer (1992), 
has argued that cooperatives operate best when both ownership and control rests in the 
hands of those who benefit the most from patronising the cooperative’s business.  
 
In short, a cooperative’s ownership base is limited to those who are able and willing to 
patronise its business at a given point in time (Ernst & Young, 1995), regardless of one’s ability 
and willingness to finance the business activities of that cooperative. However, members’ 
investment decisions are likely to be influenced by the time horizon they can optimally use 
and benefit from the cooperative’s assets. An individual’s appetite to invest is usually only up 
to the point that will allow access to the cooperative’s services and products, that is, the bare 
minimum required. Patronage restriction of ownership rights also means that, regardless of 
their contribution to the equity of the cooperative, non-patronising members may lose or 
dilute their residual rights of control, that is, lose their voting rights, as stated in the 
cooperative bylaws. This disenfranchisement makes their membership susceptible to 
termination (Royer, 1992).  
 
2.2.2 Residual claim rights to returns are proportional to patronage not to investment, 
and patronage is not proportional to investment 
As a result of patronage restriction on ownership (Ernst & Young, 1995), patronage not only 
restricts the claimants of the residual rights to returns, but also the degree of benefits enjoyed 
by the claimants (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). Unlike investor-owned firms (IOFs) wherein 
residual claims are distributed to investors in proportion to their investment, residual claims 
received by members of most traditional cooperatives are based on the extent of their usage, 
that is patronage, of the cooperative’s services or products (Royer, 1999). Further, patronage 
is not contingent on investment. Hence, levels of ownership, in the form of investment, do 
not affect the benefit claims (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000).  
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Ernst & Young (1995) have explained that the user-oriented nature of cooperatives means 
that a member’s residual claim rights to returns is relative to their level of use of the 
cooperative’s business/es. The ICA’s cooperative principle of member economic participation 
(Hoyt, 1996) stresses that cooperatives are primarily designed to meet their members’ needs, 
not to accumulate wealth for investors (Bijman et al., 2014; Hoyt, 1996). While the principle 
maintains that cooperatives should compensate capital and labour fairly, it does not compel 
members to equitably contribute to the cooperative’s capital. The determination of how 
much should be contributed to the cooperative’s capital falls under the discretion and 
preference of the member.  
 
Members will tend to maximise benefits at minimum investment, resulting in the 
misalignment of patronage and investment. The lack of proportionality between the 
patronage and investment levels, means that there is no impetus to invest commensurate to 
the patronage level. Members do not have any incentive to invest beyond the required 
minimum because their investments do not affect their residual claim rights to returns. 
Instead, a member’s individual economic interests and needs will determine their level of 
patronage to the cooperative’s products or services; this decision will consequently influence 
the benefits enjoyed by that member.  
 
2.2.3 Residual claim rights to returns are redeemable and non-appreciable 
In most traditional cooperatives, residual claim rights to returns are typically redeemable and 
non-appreciable (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013; Staatz, 1987). Iliopoulos (1998, p. 49) has 
defined redeemability as a member’s ability to claim from the cooperative the return of the 
equity originally invested to gain residual claim rights to returns. When residual claim rights 
are redeemable, members can sell their stake back to the cooperative at any point in time. 
However, the redeemed residual claim rights to returns only carry the accumulated value of 
the rights up to the date in which they want to redeem them. In short, the cooperative is not 
required to consider the future earning potential of the claim rights (Iliopoulos, 1998, p. 61). 
This is because residual claim rights to returns are non-appreciable. When residual claim 
rights to returns are non-appreciable, members do not capture the accrued value or the 
earning potential of their investment since the equity value remains the same.  
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This is associated with the principle of voluntary and open membership. The principle means 
that individuals who desire to join the cooperative are not discriminated against (Hoyt, 1996). 
If residual rights to returns were appreciable, new members would be required to pay a 
different joining equity value that reflects the current market value of the equity. When new 
members are expected to pay more or less than existing members, cooperative practitioners 
argue that membership is no longer open, but is discriminatory. Further, the cooperative 
principle of user-benefitted states that the primary objective of the cooperative is not profit 
but the delivery of services and products at rates most beneficial to the members. This means 
that the cooperative should operate at cost (Royer, 1992). Appreciation of shares means that 
the cooperative needs to operate at profit which runs contrary to the principle of user-
benefitted. 
 
There are no capital gains to be derived from investments made to the cooperative because 
the value of the equity than can be redeemed does not fully represent the actual market value 
of the share. Further, there is no inducement to trade claim rights due to their non-
appreciable nature (Burress et al., 2008). Like the property rights arrangements discussed in 
Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, this arrangement does not encourage members to invest more 
equity capital into the cooperative than what is required. Because members do not invest 
more, there is also no incentive to consistently patronise the cooperative’s business/es. 
 
2.2.4 Limited transferability of residual claim rights to returns. 
Transferability refers to the ease of transferring the residual claim rights to returns from one 
person to another (Iliopoulos, 1998, p. 58). Ownership rights are transferable when shares 
are freely traded in a secondary equity market. The value the shares are traded in reflects the 
actual market value and perceived earning potential of the shares. In traditional cooperatives, 
transferability of residual claim rights to returns is limited (Ernst & Young, 1995). Share 
transfer is restricted either to other members or to the member’s next of kin. 
 
Limited transferability did not directly ensue from prevailing cooperative principles; but 
rather it is an endogenous effect of two other property rights arrangements – restriction of 
the ownership rights to patrons and non-appreciable residual claim rights to returns. As 
ownership rights are restricted to patrons, transferability of residual claim rights to returns is 
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limited to only those who patronise the cooperative (Royer, 1999). Potential investors who 
do not and will not patronise the cooperative’s business/es are disqualified from investing in 
the cooperative. To ensure members maintain ownership, there is no secondary equity 
market that will facilitate the trading of shares (Royer, 1992; Vitaliano, 1983). Furthermore, a 
secondary market to trade shares is unlikely to develop because residual rights of returns are 
non-appreciable and redeemable (Staatz, 1987). Hence, there is no incentive to trade shares 
since the value that the residual claim rights to return can be traded in is not the actual market 
value of the rights. Members are better off redeeming their share if they decide to exit the 
cooperative rather than going through the trouble of transferring it to someone else at the 
same value.  
 
As residual claim rights to returns are not tradeable or freely transferrable, members tend to 
underinvest in the cooperative (Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001a). The inability to trade shares 
also deters the efficient use of resources because these resources are unlikely to “end up with 
those who can make best of use of them and so value them most” (Cook & Tong, 1990, p. 
114). Members are unable to determine the perceived worth of the cooperative (Ernst & 
Young, 1995) because there is no market that appraises the cooperative’s value. Hence, the 
cooperative is unable to capitalise on the improved perception of the cooperative’s value 
(Royer, 1999) because any increase in net worth is not reflected on the share value. 
 
2.2.5 Residual rights of control are equally distributed among patron-members  
Residual rights of control encompass all rights to the control and use of an asset that are not 
stipulated in the contract. These are retained by the asset’s owner even when the use of that 
asset is granted to another (Grossman & Hart, 1986). In traditional cooperatives, residual 
rights of control are distributed equally among members on a per membership basis (Ernst & 
Young, 1995). In the established electoral and decision-making processes, each member is 
granted a single vote, regardless of their level of investment or patronage (Ernst & Young, 
1995; Royer, 1992). Voting rights are not apportioned according to the risks assumed by the 
members, nor according to the amount of business transacted by the members. 
 
The principle of democratic member control that is adopted by most traditional cooperatives 
is the foundation behind this arrangement. The principle is hinged on the belief that no 
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member should have a greater voice, through greater voting power, than any other member 
(Hoyt, 1996). Robotka (1947), as cited by Royer (1992), has stressed that, by design and 
purpose, cooperatives are meant to be focused on the users’ interests not on the owners’ 
profits. Distributing voting rights equally amongst members ensures that the members’ 
interests as users take precedence over their interests as investors. 
 
Members who have disproportionate patronage and investment are likely to support policies 
with minimal risks and short-term rewards. Hence, policies relating to long-term investments 
might change drastically, or shift the benefits away from what was originally decided on. Long-
term rewards are unattractive for members because they know that their influence is diluted. 
Diluted control rights fosters apathy among members (Nilsson, 2001). Members feel that their 
diluted voice will not make an impact on the decision-making processes (Borgen, 2004).  
 
2.3 Institutional problems due to property rights structure 
Literature has shown that the property rights structure distinct to traditional cooperatives is 
a result of the influence of the principles governing cooperatives as a whole (Royer, 1992; 
Staatz, 1987). Royer (1999) has noted that these distinctive arrangements create 
inefficiencies and limits a cooperative’s ability to effectively compete in the market. 
Specifically, these property rights arrangements result in the development of institutional 
problems which affect members’ inducement to invest in the cooperative (Cook & Iliopoulos, 
1998, 1999). 
 
Section 2.2 outlined the typical property rights arrangements prevalent in traditional 
cooperatives. Scholars have identified five institutional problems arising from the constraints 
to property rights. The first three property rights constraints – free-rider problem, horizon 
problem and portfolio problem – inhibit a cooperative’s ability to raise capital (Borgen, 2004; 
Cook, 1995; Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). The remaining two property rights constraints – control 
problem and influence problem – affect a cooperative’s decision-making processes (Borgen, 
2004; Nilsson, 2001). 
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2.3.1 Free-riding problem 
A notable effect of the prevailing property rights structure is the free-rider problem. Free-
riding occurs when patrons, either member or non-members, do not bear the full cost of their 
usage of the cooperative’s products or services. This means that owners do not receive the 
full benefits of their investments (Cook, 1995; Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998, 2000; Royer, 1999). 
Herein, costs incurred, and benefits reaped from such costs are not aligned; instead they are 
disparate (Borgen, 2004; Evans & Meade, 2005, p. 21). Free-rider problems can either be 
internal or external. An internal free-rider problem occurs when new members acquire 
ownership rights held by current members at costs that are not approximately representative 
of the market value of these rights (Vitaliano, 1983). An external free-rider problem occurs 
when members and non-members alike partake of the cooperative’s products or services at 
the same costs or when members do not possess transaction-based advantages over non-
members in the use of the cooperative’s products or services (Rosairo et al., 2012). In short, 
external free-riders do not contribute to the necessary capital to make the products or 
services available in the first place. The cost incurred to deliver the products or services are 
borne solely by the members.  
 
This problem occurs because the residual claim rights to returns are not proportional to 
investment and the investment level is not proportional to patronage. Since the basis for the 
gains of the residual claim rights to returns is the level of patronage (Royer, 1999), a high-user 
member receives a bigger share of the cooperative’s investments returns without the 
corresponding proportionality in the contribution to said investments. The non-appreciable 
and non-tradeable nature of the residual claim rights to returns further encourages the free-
rider problem (Borgen, 2004; Cook, 1995). Changes in the value of the cooperative’s future 
cash flows are not reflected in the current equity value (Cook & Tong, 1990); hence, new 
members obtain the same patronage rights and residual claim rights to returns as existing 
members through the same nominal equity contribution (Royer, 1999; Vitaliano, 1983). New 
members free-ride on the gains made by the equity contributions of existing members; this 
practice dilutes the existing members’ ability to fully enjoy the rewards of their contributions.  
As a result, existing and more tenured members’ appetite to invest is severely diminished 
(Cook, 1995; Ernst & Young, 1995; Royer, 1999).  
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Consequently, generating internal equity becomes tedious and costly for the cooperative. As 
a result of the dilution of benefits, members are discouraged from investing more than the 
required minimum. Instead, members opt to free-ride on any expansion through the 
contributions of other members. Members’ investment behaviour, especially for the more 
senior members, would also tend to favour decisions that would increase current cash flows 
for the member, rather than retaining earnings (Vitaliano, 1983). This practice results in 
inefficiency (Borgen, 2004) which will ultimately affect performance. It also results in apathy 
in the membership which consequently give rises to weak membership commitment to 
patronise (Borgen, 2004; Nilsson, 2001). The free-rider does not equitably contribute to the 
acquisition of assets and does not equitably bear the losses of cooperative 
underperformance. As a member’s investment is usually just the required minimum, there is 
no compulsion for the member to resolutely patronise the cooperative’s business/es.  
 
2.3.2 Horizon problem 
The horizon problem occurs when prevailing property rights arrangements regarding residual 
claim rights to returns discourage members from investing in the cooperative’s long-term 
projects (Cook & Iliopoulos, 2000). This is because the horizon period of the residual claim 
rights to returns to an asset is “shorter than the productive life of that asset” (Porter & Scully, 
as cited by Cook, 1995, p. 1156). Valentinov (2007) has pointed out that a member’s claim 
over their investment is bounded by the time horizon of their expected membership, rather 
than the useful life of the investment. Hence, the claim on the net cash flow generated by an 
asset is expected to terminate before the end of the asset’s useful life, resulting in a net gain 
captured by the claimant that is less than the potential gain generated by the asset (Royer, 
1999).  
 
As the ownership rights and horizon are limited by patronage, the benefits that members 
enjoy from individual investments in the cooperative are only valid when they are able and 
willing to patronise the cooperative’s businesses (Royer, 1999; Vitaliano, 1983). Since the 
residual claim rights to returns are not appreciable and redeemable, the value of these 
benefits does not reflect the potential future gains of these investments. Consequently, the 
horizon problem is bound to occur. The limitations on the transferability, that is, non-
tradability, and the absence of a secondary market to trade residual claim rights to returns at 
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market prices also contributes to the horizon problem (Cook, 1995). Non-tradability of 
residual claim rights to returns inhibits the member from disposing their claim rights at 
market value, reflecting accrued and future value, thus discouraging long-term investments 
and growth. 
 
As a result, members are likely to underinvest on assets with long-term payoffs. Instead, 
members are more inclined to invest in short-term projects (Borgen, 2001; Vitaliano, 1983). 
This is because short-term projects enable them to capture a greater portion of the gains of 
the project compared to long-term assets. Members’ short-sighted perspective also means 
that they are less concerned about the cooperative’s long-term success and more concerned 
about their immediate profit, either through transacting with the cooperative or its 
competitors. Moreover, members are more likely to demand that a higher proportion of the 
earnings be distributed rather than retained (Cook, 1995). Management are also encouraged 
to prioritise equity retirement over equity build-up (Royer, 1999). Cooperatives are less likely 
than other firms to undertake long-term investments, particularly in intangible assets, 
because members do not have the incentive to contribute to growth-oriented but risky 
investments (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). This prevents cooperatives from choosing the optimal 
mix of inputs and results in allocative inefficiency (Royer, 1999). 
 
2.3.3 Portfolio problem 
A portfolio problem exists when the property rights prevents members from freely adjusting 
their investment levels in the cooperative to reflect their risk preferences (Cook, 1995; Ernst 
& Young, 1995). Members have different risk and reward profiles due to their different 
investment and patronage horizons in the cooperative (Borgen, 2004). However, members 
do not diversify their individual investment portfolios according to risk capacity and 
preferences because of the property rights constraints in the cooperative. 
 
The benefits gained by members rely on their level of patronage; hence, an increase in the 
level of investment, regardless of usage level, will not be reflected in a proportional increase 
in the benefits gained. Members who have a greater risk appetite and who may have surplus 
capital are reluctant to invest more than what is required due to the inability to capture the 
gains of additional investments. Restrictions on appreciation, transferability, and liquidity of 
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the ownership rights contributes to this portfolio problem (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999) because 
these property rights arrangements further disable members from capturing accrued and 
future gains in their preferred investment portfolios. Being unable to trade their shares means 
that members are limited in their ability to diversify, upgrade or downgrade freely, their 
portfolios at any given time (Borgen, 2004; Ernst & Young, 1995; Hendrikse & Veerman, 
2001a). The restriction of ownership rights to patrons also prohibits financially able and 
greater risk appetite non-patrons from investing in the cooperative. Investment risks, which 
could be high, are borne solely by members, resulting in members’ further reluctance to 
invest purely based on risk appetite (Royer, 1999). Instead, members are more likely to favour 
decisions with lower levels of risk (Borgen, 2004; Vitaliano, 1983). 
 
2.3.4 Control problem 
The fourth institutional problem, the control problem, is present in all organisations where 
there is separation of ownership and control. Separation of ownership (principal) and control 
(agent) paves the way for risks and inefficiencies (Ernst & Young, 1995) resulting from the 
principal and the agent’s divergent interests (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). When agents control 
the decision management, then they are more likely to focus on improving their gained value 
at the expense of the principal’s interests. Consequently, the principal, represented by the 
board, will try to exercise control over the decisions made by the agents to regulate the latter 
and to ensure that the interests of residual claimants are protected (Vitaliano, 1983). This 
incurs costs because resources are directed towards monitoring and controlling the agent 
(Borgen, 2004). 
 
Although the control problem is common to all forms of organisations, this problem is more 
serious in traditional cooperatives because of the prevailing property rights arrangements 
(Royer, 1999). The absence of secondary markets to trade equity deprives members of an 
external channel to measure the value of the cooperative and to reflect their satisfaction, or 
dissatisfaction, with the cooperative’s performance (Cook, 1995; Ernst & Young, 1995; Royer, 
1999). As a result of the restrictions on transferability, a cooperative is also unable to 
introduce performance-based incentives that would align management interests with the 
shareholders’; that is, allocation of shares in the cooperative as rewards for performance 
(Ernst & Young, 1995). In effect, this limits their ability to attract and retain quality 
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management (Royer, 1999). Cooperatives are also hypothesised to be technically inefficient 
because of the transferability problem. As a cooperative share is both non-transferable and 
non-appreciable, cooperatives are unable to rely on share prices as a barometer of 
performance (Ernst & Young, 1995). As ownership is generally dispersed over many members, 
individual members have limited incentives to monitor performance (Royer, 1999). In 
addition, as the ownership rights are limited to patrons, the principal’s representatives 
(board) are more likely to lack the specialist skills needed to effectively manage the 
cooperative in a competitive environment (Royer, 1999). 
 
This institutional problem increases transaction costs, in particular, agency costs, within the 
organisation (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). These costs are incurred due to the need to monitor 
and control the management to reduce opportunistic behaviour and to align management 
objectives. As a result, efficiency and performance are greatly affected. The lack of clear 
control mechanisms can encourage managers to shirk their obligations and pursue interests 
inconsistent with members’ interests (Royer, 1999). 
 
2.3.5 Influence problem 
The influence problem occurs because members’ interests in the cooperative’s business will 
always be aligned with their self-interests; they may, in fact, diverge from the interests of 
other members. Differing sets of objectives amongst members may lead to diverse influence 
activities. As decisions made could have a favourable effect for one group of members and an 
adverse effect on another group, members are expected to engage in activities designed to 
sway the decisions towards their preferences and what will benefit them the most (Cook, 
1995; Royer, 1999; Valentinov, 2007). 
 
Equal distribution of residual rights of control affects the magnitude of the influence problem 
(Mwayawa et al., 2018). Democratic voting means that each member has an equal 
contribution in the decision-making processes of the cooperative, regardless of the level of 
patronage; that is, engagement with the cooperative’s business, or level of investment; that 
is, risks assimilated. The influence problem increases the transaction costs within a 
cooperative because there is a coordination cost associated with influencing divergent 
members’ decision-making (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998).  
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2.4 Governance practices in traditional cooperatives 
Section 2.3 discussed how the property rights structure that arose from ill-defined ownership 
rights gave rise to institutional problems in traditional cooperatives. These institutional 
problems have tangible effects on a cooperative’s performance. This section discusses how 
governance practices in cooperatives mitigate or exacerbate the effects of the institutional 
problems on a cooperative’s performance.  
 
Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2013) found that, rather than market contracting cost, ownership 
costs primarily influence the choice of governance in a cooperative. Bijman et al. (2014, p. 
641) have defined governance as the “system of decision-making, direction and control of an 
organisation”. In short, governance is the allocation and regulation of the formal and effective 
decision authority (Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001a). In defining governance structure, Yin and 
Zajac (2004), not only included the system of decision-making, but also operational control 
and incentives. Governance covers who makes the decisions, who implements the decisions 
made, who monitors and controls the decision-makers and decision-implementers, how the 
decisions are made, and how the decision-makers and implementers are monitored and 
controlled. Good governance is characterised with structuring practices with transparency, 
and accountability (Chibanda et al., 2009). 
 
2.4.1 Allocation of decision rights – the governance model 
The basic model of cooperative governance features two decision bodies – the General 
Assembly (GA) and the Board of Directors (BOD) (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). The GA, 
comprised of all members of a cooperative, hold the residual rights of control. Due to their 
diverse and diffuse membership, participation in decision control is often costly, time-
consuming and inefficient (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and can result in slow reactions to dynamic 
market movement (Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001b). Hence, the GA only performs crucial 
decision control functions. Decision control, typically exercised by the GA, are primarily ex 
post and include the election of the directors and the ratification of cooperative bylaws, 
annual reports, and other major organisational changes (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013).  
 
Effective and formal control of the cooperative is delegated primarily to the BOD (Hansmann, 
1996). Traditionally, the directors are democratically elected by and from the membership 
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(Bijman et al., 2014; Bijman et al., 2012). In other words, the BOD’s composition is limited to 
members only. This is in accordance with the cooperative principle of being user-controlled 
and the ICA principle of autonomy and independence (Hoyt, 1996). As elected representatives 
of the GA, the BOD holds both formal and effective authority in the cooperative. The directors 
collectively exercise ex ante decision control on operational and strategic decisions (Chaddad 
& Iliopoulos, 2013) with the key objectives of safeguarding the interests of members as users 
of the cooperative’s business (Bijman et al., 2014; Bijman et al., 2012) and driving 
organisational performance (Cornforth, 2004).  
 
When decision management is delegated to managers, the basic model of governance is 
expanded to three decision bodies. Decision-making powers, such as initiation and  
implementation (Fama & Jensen, 1983), are transferred from members to managers (Bijman 
et al., 2012). Although strategic and policy decisions are determined by the BOD, it is the 
manager who makes operational decisions and carries out the BOD’s decisions. In a traditional 
cooperative, adding more decision bodies complicates the existing control problem. 
Additional costs are incurred in aligning the interests of the members, BOD, and the 
management team (Bouamra-Mechemache & Zago, 2015). There are also costs involved in 
monitoring the actions of the decision bodies and in acquiring information across decisions 
bodies. 
 
2.4.2 Board of directors – composition and effectiveness 
Safeguarding members’ interests, which are divergent and misaligned with the 
management’s profit-based goal, is a key function of the BOD because profit maximisation is 
not the members’ only objective (Bouamra-Mechemache & Zago, 2015). Furthermore, there 
is no share market that will monitor management performance (Cornforth, 2004). As there is 
no external mechanism to assess performance, the introduction of strategies and policies that 
will promote efficient operations rests heavily on the BOD (Fulton, 2001). 
 
Given the critical role that the BOD plays in governing the cooperative, it is important to 
qualify who can govern the cooperative. The partnership model of governance contends that 
the selection of directors should be based on expertise and contacts that will enhance the 
organisation’s value rather than monitor management (Cornforth & Edwards, 1998). The 
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director’s skills and experience determine the performance of the organisation. Without 
these qualifications, the BOD will be ill-equipped to monitor and assess management 
behaviour, and advise and support management decisions. Board quality is affected by the 
director qualification requirements, board selection processes (Grashuis, 2018), and board 
processes (Cook & Burress, 2013; Cornforth, 2004). 
 
2.4.3 Mechanisms to monitor and control 
Not only does a secondary share market measure the current and future value of the 
cooperative, but it also acts as a measure of the management’s quality (Ernst & Young, 1995). 
The absence of a secondary share market means that members do not have a straightforward 
measure to appraise performance (Bijman et al., 2014; Cornforth, 2004). There is also no 
explicit and extrinsic way for the cooperative to reward or sanction good or bad management 
(Bouamra-Mechemache & Zago, 2015). Internal control systems serve as the primary 
mechanisms to discipline or reward decision-makers and decision-implementers in the 
cooperative. There are a variety of internal monitoring and control mechanisms that the 
members can use to regulate decision-makers and decision-implementers in the cooperative 
(Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001a) as follows. 
 
The right to elect the BOD provides the GA a mechanism to exercise decision control. It 
provides members with a sense of ownership (Benson, 2014). Members can hold officials to 
account for unsatisfactory performance by voting against them or by removing them from 
office. Voting via secret ballot in the election of directors is a hallmark of good governance 
(Rosairo et al., 2012) because confidentiality vested by secret ballots allows members to vote 
with minimal influence or pressure from powerful individuals (Chibanda et al., 2009).  
 
Access to information about the cooperative’s operational and financial standing is another 
method that members can use to monitor and control cooperative decision-makers. 
Information is made accessible and available when Annual General Assemblies (AGMs) are 
conducted and when members can access and assess the minutes of board meetings and 
other documents at a convenient time. When these activities are conducted regularly and 
easily for members, there is transparency (Rosairo et al., 2012). Governance practices that 
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promote transparency enhance members’ trust in the cooperative processes. These also 
improve members’ loyalty to the cooperative. 
 
Regular financial audits are objective mechanisms to ensure that cooperative leaders and 
staff can be held accountable for the decisions they make, particularly in relation to the 
cooperative’s finances. With financial audits, cooperative officials and staff are compelled to 
act prudently and use resources efficiently and to the best interests of the members (Benson, 
2014). 
 
Likewise, the BOD have the power to select and replace managers, formulate and enforce 
internal performance measures, authorise special audits, and appraise and endorse 
investment and operating proposals by the manager (Hendrikse & Veerman, 2001a). The BOD 
process of appointing and removing managers promotes accountability (Rosairo et al., 2012). 
It provides the BOD with a mechanism to retain quality management and to discipline an 
underperforming manager. However, the relationship between the BOD and management is 
dynamic, fluctuating between control and collaboration; hence, there is a need to regularly 
review the relationship between the two (Cornforth, 2004) to ensure that the appropriate 
behaviour prevails according to the decision requirement.  
 
Governance practices that embrace accountability and transparency improve a cooperative’s 
performance. Weak governance structures will have negative implications since managers 
can pursue activities that do not serve the best interests of the members (Bouamra-
Mechemache & Zago, 2015). Without measures of accountability and transparency, members 
cannot reliably trust the information provided to them and thus, cannot make informed 
decisions.  
 
2.5 Performance measures  
As a user-oriented organisation, a cooperative is perceived to be successful if its members 
access products and services better than if acquired individually, outside the cooperative 
(Soboh et al., 2009), or through other market channels (Sexton & Iskow, 1993). This means 
that the net benefits gained by the cooperative’s members is greater compared to other 
alternative means. A cooperative’s performance is measured to assess if it is achieving its 
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objectives or not. As cooperatives have varied objectives, including, but not limited to, profit 
maximisation, and performance measurement is linked to its objectives (Soboh et al., 2009), 
cooperative scholars have used different means to measure performance (Benos et al., 2016). 
This research uses financial ratios, which is a commonly used measure to evaluate 
cooperative performance (Bond, 2009; Soboh et al., 2009), and growth trends to measure the 
examined cooperatives’ performance.  
 
Profitability ratios, such as the return on equity, assess a cooperative’s ability to generate 
profit from its capital. Since cooperatives are assumed to have a zero-profit objective, 
profitability is expected to be lower than IOFs in the same industry (Evans & Meade, 2005, p. 
53; Soboh et al., 2009).  
 
Leverage, solvency, and liquidity reveal how a cooperative is financed and how well it meets 
its financial obligations (Evans & Meade, 2005, p. 53). Leverage refers to the proportion of 
debt used to finance the cooperative’s operations. Solvency indicates a cooperative’s ability 
to service its long-term liabilities and ability to accomplish long-term growth. Liquidity reflects 
a cooperative’s ability to meet its current obligations (Evans & Meade, 2005, p. 53; Parliament 
et al., 1990; Rosairo, 2010; Soboh et al., 2009). In traditional cooperatives, property rights 
constraints limit their ability to generate internal capital. Hence, cooperatives are expected 
to have higher leverage ratios than IOFs. Resulting from moral hazard, cooperative managers 
perceive that, in the event of financial stress, cooperative mergers rather than bankruptcy are 
the likely outcome (Gentzoglanis, 1997). Due to a higher reliance on debt capital and moral 
hazard problems, solvency and liquidity ratios are expected to be lower in traditional 
cooperatives than in IOFs (Evans & Meade, 2005, p. 53; Parliament et al., 1990; Soboh et al., 
2009). Further, due to the cooperatives’ zero-profit objective, net earnings are also expected 
to be low relative to IOFs; hence solvency is also low (Parliament et al., 1990).  
 
2.6 Research questions 
NIE theory predicts that the ‘weak’ property rights and governance practices characterising 
traditional cooperatives will diminish a cooperative’s ability to raise equity and debt capital, 
to comply with supply contracts through stable and reliable operations, and to retain good 
managers or sanction bad managers. The restrictions on ownership, on ownership transfers, 
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and on benefits, and the disproportionality of patronage, investment, and benefits, dissuade 
members from actively participating – through fully investing, and consistently and reliably 
patronising – in the cooperative’s business.  
 
Poor governance practices further exacerbates the institutional problems for three reasons. 
First, it limits the GA’s and BOD’s ability to monitor and control performance. Second, it 
reduces members’ trust and loyalty to the cooperative processes and operations. Third, it 
increases coordination costs due to increased costs in accessing and distributing accurate 
information. In turn, poor governance practices further constrain the cooperative’s ability to 
finance value-adding assets, to build long-term trading relationships with premium buyers, 
and to grow the value of the cooperative’s equity. 
 
Given the oscillating path of the cooperative movement in the Philippines, and the traditional 
cooperative principles entrenched by its current legislation, this research asks the following 
questions: 
1. What institutional arrangements characterise rice farmer cooperatives in the Davao del 
Norte province? 
2. How do the institutional arrangements impact the performance of these cooperatives? 
3. Why do these institutional arrangements impact the performance of these cooperatives? 
4. What changes in these arrangements would help to improve the performance of rice 
farmer cooperatives?  
 
Having reviewed the relevant literature, Chapter 3 describes the research methods used to 
gather and analyse relevant data in ways that answer these research questions. 
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Chapter 3 Methods 
Chapter 2 reviewed the literature and found that there is a relationship between a 
cooperative’s property rights, its governance practices, and its performance. The 
fundamental purpose of this research is to examine the institutional arrangements of rice 
farmer cooperatives in the Davao del Norte province, located in the Philippines, and to 
determine if and how these arrangements affect the performance of these cooperatives. This 
chapter discusses how multiple case studies and the chosen methods answered the research 
questions posed in Section 2.6. 
 
3.1 Study area 
The research was confined to the Davao del Norte province, mainly because rice is relatively 
important in this province, ranking amongst its top three crops, and partly because the 
research team already had social and professional networks in the province necessary to 
support the research. Familiarity with the local community, culture, and practices proved 
advantageous. The researcher and research team easily established rapport and trust with 
government offices, farmer cooperatives, and respondents.  
 
Davao del Norte is one of the 83 provinces in the Philippines. Talaingod, a mountainous 
municipality on the province’s border, and the island municipality of IGaCoS (see Figure 3.1) 
were excluded from the study area to help control for the effects of different agro-climatic 
conditions on cooperative performance. 
 
3.2 Research design 
The case study approach is an appropriate research method to answer explanatory ‘how’ and 
‘why’ research questions (Yin, 2018, p. 10). It involves the contextual examination of complex 
and bounded, single or multiple cases to provide an holistic analysis using observational data 
(Gerring, 2017, pp. 28-30; Tight, 2017, p. 17). It is thus well suited to this research which posed 
both descriptive, ‘what institutional arrangements characterise rice farmer cooperatives’, and 
explanatory, ‘how and why do these arrangements affect a cooperative’s performance’ 
questions.  
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Figure 3.1 
Map of the Philippines with an Expanded View of the Davao del Norte province. 
Note: From Author, 2020 
 
Multiple cases were studied to facilitate robust and compelling answers to the research 
questions (Burns, 2000, p. 464). Multiple cases strengthen research interpretations, by either 
having similar observations amongst cases or yielding contrasting findings with predictable 
  28 
reasons (Yin, 2003, p. 47). The presence of similar arrangements in several cases with similar 
performance levels strengthens the assumption that institutional arrangements affect 
performance. Rice farmer cooperatives are the units of analysis, cases, to be studied.  
 
The cases were purposely selected to give the researcher some scope to compare cases that 
differed on the issues under investigation while controlling for the effects of other factors 
(Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Thus, cases with similar performance levels were selected to 
predict similar results, literal replication. Cases with variable performance levels were also 
selected to provide contrasting but predictable observations, theoretical replication (Burns, 
2000, pp. 463-464; Yin, 2003, p. 47). This method improves design validity and reduces the 
chances of accepting or rejecting a proposition erroneously (Tight, 2017, pp. 162-164). 
 
3.3 Quality of the research 
To establish the quality of the research, validity and reliability tests were integrated into the 
research design.  
 
Validity refers to research that has properly collected and interpreted its data so that the 
conclusions accurately reflect the real world that was studied. To improve the research 
validity, the research followed the recommendations made by Yin (2003, pp. 34-37). First, we 
collected evidence from different sources (see Section 3.5). Doing so enabled data 
triangulation, a strategy recommended to improve the construct validity of case study 
research (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2019, p. 193; Burns, 2000, pp. 419-420; Flick, 2007, pp. 43-44). 
Second, during analysis, the research used pattern matching to ensure internal validity. Third, 
the researcher ensured external validity by comparing findings with NIE theories and by 
observing replication of findings in multiple cases.   
 
The research also considered reliability tests to minimise biases and errors. If another study 
is conducted using the same methods, then they should achieve similar results and come to 
similar conclusions (Yin, 2011, p. 78). To address this, the research used a comprehensive 
interview schedule (see Appendices 1-3). The researcher also used a case study database to 
collate and organise the collected field data. 
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3.4 Replication design 
The research used replication logic rather than sampling design. As Yin (2003, pp. 48-51) has 
explained, the use of sampling design is not appropriate for case studies. The researcher kept 
the logic of replication in mind when selecting the cases and the respondents. Each case is 
considered a whole study in itself, which provides convergent evidence for the research’s 
propositions. As such, conclusions from one case are expected to be replicated by the other 
cases.  
 
3.4.1 Selection of the cases 
The population was defined as all rice farmer cooperatives operating in the Davao del Norte 
province. A list of these cooperatives was compiled from records maintained by the Provincial 
Agriculture Office (PAGRO) and the CDA. While neither of these organisations had a complete 
list of all cooperatives in the province, it was possible to cross reference their lists and identify 
a total of nine rice farmer cooperatives, all of which, at the time of data collection, operated 
under similar agro-climatic conditions and benefited from similar levels of government 
support.  
 
Four of these nine cooperatives were selected and studied between July and December 2020. 
The selection was purposeful in that prior information about each cooperative’s performance 
and membership were used to ensure differences in performance across cooperatives of 
similar and different sizes. This prior information came from PAGRO and CDA estimates of 
cooperative asset values and membership size, and the subjective assessment of 
performance made by a key informant at PAGRO. Influence problems are a common cause of 
failure in farmer-owned organisations and are more likely to occur in organisations with larger 
membership, particularly if their governance practices do not adequately separate ownership 
from control (Rosairo et al., 2012). Size of membership was thus also a consideration in the 
selection process. The research also considered the cooperative’s willingness and ability to 
participate in the study. 
 
3.4.2 Selection of respondents 
Respondents selected for interviews were chosen from within each of the four case studies. 
The selection process was purposeful because the researcher recognised that not all 
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members of the cooperative would be able to provide the full range of data required. The 
researcher also intended to triangulate the data provided from all types of respondents, 
patrons, directors and managers. It was assumed that cooperative officials,  the directors and 
manager, would have better knowledge of their organisation’s institutional arrangements. 
Likewise, the researcher believed that patrons would provide better information about 
incentives to invest and patronise, and the benefits associated with being a member. The 
cooperative’s manager and chairperson were prioritised for interviews and were asked to 
nominate a small number of members who could be approached for personal interviews. The 
researcher also used snowball sampling in the selection of members; respondents in the first 
round of interviews were asked to identify other potential respondents capable of providing 
rich data (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2019, p. 385).  
 
3.5 Sources of data 
Through converging lines of inquiry, information from multiple sources can be triangulated 
(Burns, 2000, p. 419). As discussed in Section 3.3, this research employed data triangulation 
to ensure the findings’ validity and reliability. When data from one source corroborates data 
from another source, the conclusions are considered more robust and convincing. To achieve 
this, the research considered two sources of evidence – primary data from interviews and 
secondary data from documents. Data collection was conducted using the help of hired and 
trained research assistants.  
 
3.5.1 Interviews 
Burns (2000, p. 467) has noted how valuable interviews are because “most case studies are 
about people and their activities”. It is paramount to capture the insights and perspectives of 
the individual respondents who have first-hand experience of the practices within a specific 
cooperative. In-depth information required to describe and explain phenomena are ideally 
elicited using techniques such as personal observation and personal interviews with key 
informants. Researcher-respondent interaction is highest when interviews are conducted 
face-to-face, rather than virtually. Likewise, the elicited information is rich and detailed 
(Bloomberg & Volpe, 2019, pp. 193-194; Rea & Parker, 2005, p. 19). However, because the 
researcher was living overseas, hired research assistants conducted the face-to-face 
interviews. Video conferences were also organised for the interviews of selected key 
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informants, the directors and managers. During the later stages of data collection, new 
COVID-19 guidelines in the Philippines restricted the research assistants’ movement and 
meant that they could not conduct face-to-face interviews. To resolve this, later interviews 
were conducted over the phone.  
 
Every effort was made to hire and train experienced research assistants who were familiar 
with the study area and the respondents (Rea & Parker, 2005, p. 20). These circumstances 
favoured the use of semi-structured interviews to elicit both qualitative and quantitative data. 
This mix of data types helps to improve the research’s internal validity as one type of data 
substantiates the other (Yin, 2011, p. 291). Semi-structured interview schedules were 
developed for each type of respondents – directors, managers, and patrons (see Appendices 
1-3). Interview schedules were drafted and pre-tested, first with the research assistants and 
then with respondents in the first case study. Pre-testing was designed to improve the clarity, 
acceptability and comprehensiveness of the final interview schedules.  
 
3.5.2 Documents 
The research assistants gathered additional primary data through personal observation of 
each case study’s physical assets, and secondary data from each case study’s own documents 
– annual reports, articles of cooperation, bylaws, and AGM minutes. The use of documents 
was vital to further corroborate the evidence derived from the interviews. This additional 
information broadened the scope for data triangulation, improving the quantity and quality 
of information and its interpretation (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2019, p. 193). The review of these 
documents further corroborated the evidence derived from the interviews (Burns, 2000, p. 
467). Greater and more specific details about practices and events discussed during the 
interviews were gleaned during the review of the documents.  
 
3.6 Data analysis 
Data was analysed in three consecutive steps. First, elements of the qualitative and 
quantitative data were used to describe each case study, focusing on indicators of  
performance and the property rights structure and governance practices. The researcher used 
case descriptions to uncover causal patterns in the data (Yin, 2003, p. 114), which in turn, 
made qualitative and quantitative analysis easier. Second, the researcher analysed qualitative 
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data using the pattern matching technique recommended by Yin (2018, pp. 175-178). Third, 
the researcher analysed quantitative data using hierarchical cluster analysis of variables, 
rather than the cases themselves. 
 
As Yin (2003, pp. 116-118) has explained, in pattern matching, theoretical propositions 
relating to a cooperative’s performance and its property rights structure and governance 
practices were tested against the data. Where more and less successful cooperatives exhibit 
contrasting attributes consistent with NIE theory, the proposition is confirmed. Otherwise, 
the argument is questioned, and the analysis enters its ‘explanation building’ phase to 
account for the inconsistency or to refine the theory. Together, these processes identified the 
institutional arrangements that could be used to group cooperatives or distinguish them from 
one another. 
 
The opportunity then arose to supplement and triangulate the results quantitatively using 
hierarchical cluster analysis. This technique was used to identify relationships between these 
attributes and variables measuring cooperative performance. In general terms, cluster 
analysis is a multivariate technique that aims to group entities from a data set into 
homogenous clusters (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984, p. 7). Entities in the same clusters are 
expected to be similar with each other in some respect and unlike those from other clusters 
(King, 2015, p. 2). This technique is used to confirm the presence of clusters, or relationships, 
hypothesised by theory. Hierarchical cluster analysis is a version of cluster analysis that can 
be used to group positively related variables, when all the variables are binary, measuring the 
presence or absence of ‘good’ attributes. In this instance, the variables measured the 
presence of ‘good’ performance, property rights, and governance attributes. Propositions are 
accepted if the clusters produced by the analysis group performance variables with 
institutional and governance variables. Rosairo et al. (2012) used this mixed methods 
approach to triangulate the results of a similar study investigating the failure of famer 
companies in Sri Lanka.  
 
3.7 Human ethics consideration 
Within this study, the researcher considered two levels of confidentiality: that of the 
organisations involved and that of the organisations’ members. The researcher provided each 
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organisation with written assurance that the study would be conducted in a non-invasive 
manner, and that any publications emanating from the research would not disclose the 
organisation’s name. The interviewees were also assured that their names would not be 
recorded or disclosed in any database, report, or publication.  
 
No application was made for Human Ethics clearance as the questions posed to the 
respondents were of a non-personal nature and related to matters within the respondent’s 
professional competence. This exemption is offered in article 6.2.3 of Lincoln University’s 
policy on human ethics. As the researcher and research assistants come from the study area, 
they were aware of what the respondents would perceive to be sensitive information.  
 
In the interests of best practice, the researcher and research assistants informed the 
cooperatives about the nature of the study, its objectives, expectations, and data to be 
collected in both English and Cebuano. This same information was provided to the 
respondents before the interviews commenced. All respondents were informed that 
participation was voluntary, confidential, and anonymous and that verbal informed consent 
would be sought prior to the start of each interview. Respondents were informed of their 
right to withdraw from the interview during or after data collection. 
 
The methods outlined in this chapter paved the way for the collection of data analysed in the 
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Chapter 4 Case Descriptions 
This chapter provides a description of the four selected rice farmer cooperatives. Each case 
description includes a brief history and background of the selected case, its vision, mission, 
goals, objectives, and its business segments. It discusses the current performance status, 
property rights structure, and governance practices of each case.  
 
4.1 Case 1: Cooperative A 
4.1.1 Background 
Cooperative A is a multi-purpose cooperative for farmers and irrigators. It was originally 
founded by 15 Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme (CARP) beneficiaries as a 
farmers’ organisation in 1990. It was registered under the CDA as a cooperative on the 10th 
of February 1992. The founding purpose was to comply with the Department of Agrarian 
Reform (DAR) requirement for CARP beneficiaries to organise. Hence, founding and most 
current members of the cooperative are residents or have farms within a specific geographic 
location (barangay) which is covered by CARP. Seven of the 12 interviewed members joined 
the cooperative because of the said DAR requirement. The cooperative’s office and business 
coverage are also within the same barangay. The cooperative’s boundaries are outlined in its 
amended bylaws (Article II Section 2).  
 
In the late 1990s, the cooperative’s membership grew to more than 300 members. The 
cooperative took out a PhP5.6 million loan from the government-owned and -operated 
Landbank of the Philippines (LBP) to finance planned expansion into banana production. 
However, this business failed within a year due to unfavourable weather conditions, 
exacerbated by officials and members’ lack of management and technical knowledge. As a 
result, the cooperative incurred heavy losses and defaulted on its loan obligations. This failure 
affected membership morale and confidence, and a considerable number of disillusioned 
members withdrew from the cooperative.  
 
The cooperative reorganised in 1999 with assistance from the DA and DAR. The LBP also 
relaxed the cooperative’s loan repayment schedule. These changes encouraged former 
members to rejoin the cooperative. To date, the cooperative has 182 members, two-thirds of 
whom are farmers. Table 4.1 presents Cooperative A’s key features. 
  35 
Table 4.1 
Key Historical and Operational Information of Cooperative A 
Characteristics Details 
Year founded 1990 
Date of registration February 10, 1992 
Facilitating organisation Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) 
Nature of assistance provided Capacity-building 
Purpose of foundation Compliance to DAR CARP requirements 
Founding membership size 15 
Current membership size 182 (according to Roster of Members, 2020) 
Membership qualification and major 
responsibilities 
1. Natural person 
2. Residency within a specific geographic territory 
3. Subscription of at least 50 shares 
Key business segments 1. Supply of non-farm inputs 
2. Marketing of farm outputs  
3. Provision of machinery services  
4. Provision of financing services  
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative A. 
 
4.1.2 Vision, mission, goals, and objectives 
The cooperative has clearly defined its vision, mission, and goals of promoting a progressive 
and peaceful community by improving its members’ socio-economic condition. Since its 
inception in 1992, the cooperative has maintained the following objectives: 
1. Create funds to grant loans to its members for productive and personal purposes. 
2. Supply members and non-members production inputs and market their products. 
3. Retail commodities to members and non-members. 
4. Lease out post-harvest facilities to members and non-members. 
 
The cooperative’s goals have evolved since its inception. The original 15 goals stipulated in 
the Articles of Cooperation were scaled down to nine. These nine goals were identified and 
developed by the BOD during the 2013 fiscal year with the participation of the management 
team and the support from the Davao Federation of Fishers and Farmers’ Cooperative 
(DACOFARM) – a secondary cooperative of which Cooperative A is a member. The new goals 
were presented to and ratified by the GA in 2014. The goals supported the cooperative’s 
objectives. They also included additional goals that mandate monthly member contributions 
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and increase the membership size. These goals emphasise the cooperative’s need for 
additional capital.  
 
Despite the recent amendments, none of the goals addressed objective 2, supply of 
production inputs. Interview responses show that current operations and intended 
expansions also do not address this objective. An obvious explanation for this apparent 
omission is that the government provides seasonal inputs such as seeds and fertilisers to 
members free of charge.  
 
4.1.3 Business segments 
Cooperative A’s current business segments fall into four categories only: supply of non-farm 
inputs (objective 3), marketing of farm outputs (objective 2), provision of machinery services 
(objective 4), and provision of financial services (objective 1). Seeds, fertilisers, and chemicals 
are provided gratis by government agencies (DA, DAR, and the local government) to 
Cooperative A. The cooperative subsequently distributes these inputs to its members free of 
charge. Eight of the 12 interviewed members accessed these government donations through 
the cooperative.  
 
From 2016 to 2018, business segment 1, non-farm input supply, was Cooperative A’s primary 
source of revenue. It contributed more than a third of each year’s total revenue (see Figure 
4.1). Interviewed members buy their consumer goods from the cooperative; with three-
fourths of the members claiming that they do so to increase their patronage refund. 
Patronage-based benefit claims are reserved for members; however, members and non-
members can shop at the store on the same terms.  
 
Except for 2018, business segment 2, farm output marketing, did not contribute significantly 
to Cooperative A’s total revenue. Although this business is part of the cooperative’s original 
goals, three factors hampered its growth. First, the cooperative’s rice mill has a small capacity 
which limits the volume of paddy that can be milled at any given time. Second, the 
cooperative does not have sufficient capital to competitively buy paddy during the peak 
harvest period. Third, a sizeable portion of the membership are contracted to traders who 
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finance their rice production. None of the interviewed members market their farm produce 
through the cooperative.  
 
Figure 4.1 
Total Income and Income Source Distribution for FY 2016-2019, 2019=100 
 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative A’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
 
The combine harvester donated by the government in late 2018 more than doubled the 
cooperative’s revenue for 2019. Business segment 3, provision of machinery services, became 
Cooperative A’s primary income source in 2019; it contributed 65.79% of the cooperative’s 
total income which was significantly higher than its 21.78% contribution for 2018 (see Figure 
4.1). While both members and non-members can use this service, membership has added 
benefits. The use of production machinery, which is the floating tiller, 4WD tractor, or hand 
tractor, are free-of-charge to members provided they use the cooperative’s post-production 
machinery, which is the thresher or combine harvester. The member’s service fee, 8% of their 
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generated in 2019 encouraged Cooperative A to acquire another combine harvester. 
Cooperative A intends  
to develop its machinery services and farm output marketing businesses. A third of the 
interviewed members were aware of the planned expansions and said that these align with 
their farming goals.  
 
The members’ greater reliance on external financiers, traders, for rice production is also 
reflected in business segment 4, provision of financial services, low share (less than 15%) of 
revenue generation. While all of the interviewed members borrowed money from the 
cooperative, only four did so to finance their production. To encourage members’ patronage, 
in 2019, the loan retention fee was reduced from 5% to 3%. 
 
4.1.4 Level of performance 
As shown in Table 4.2, the growth of Cooperative A’s assets (0.04%) has been slow for the 
past four years. Cooperative A has struggled to generate capital to finance growth. Net equity, 
which includes the members’ share capital reported at par value, retained annual earnings, 
and donated capital, has experienced a downturn of -1.08% resulting in a -19.14% contraction 
in the per share book value (PhP333.88). Growth in members’ share capital (PhP771,420.37) 
was low at 0.16% per annum. However, this allocated equity capital accounts for only a third 
of the cooperative’s 2019 net equity (PhP2.58 million). A substantial share of the net equity 
comes from government donations, part of the unallocated equity. It can be surmised that 
the level of government support enjoyed by the cooperative is high.   
 
Table 4.2 
Cooperative A’s 2019 Financial Position and Percentage Growth per Annum, 2019=100 
Financial Indicators 2019 value in PhP % Growth per Annuma 
Total assets (in millions) 2.94 0.04 
Total liabilities (in millions) 0.36 0.40 
Net equity (in millions) 2.58 -1.08 
Members’ share capital (in millions) 0.77 0.16 
Book value/share (PhP) 333.88 -19.14 
Revenue (in millions) 1.08 55.87 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative A’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
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Cooperative A is not heavily reliant on debt financing to fund its operations. Only a fifth of the 
cooperative’s growth is financed by debt (see Table 4.3). Solvency ratios, debt-to-assets and 
debt-to-equity, are below the acceptable range. The low debt-to-equity ratio indicates that 
the cooperative is borrowing conservatively. For the past four years, the cooperative did not 
report any long-term debt financing. Cooperative A was able to maintain its liquidity ratios, 
current ratio and quick ratio, just slightly higher than the acceptable range. This means that 
the cooperative is liquid. However, more than half of the cooperative’s current assets are loan 
receivables. If there is high incidence of past due loans, the cooperative may struggle to 
convert its assets to cash and risk its liquidity position. Both profitability ratios, return on 
assets and return on equity, show signs of growth. This has been brought about by the 
sizeable growth of revenue at 55.87% which resulted in a higher net surplus. Though it is 
improving, return on assets, has remained below the acceptable range; however, the return 
on equity for 2019 grew to acceptable levels. It is also better than the rates offered by the 
bank (4.1%).  
 
Table 4.3 
Cooperative A’s Predicted Financial Performance for 2016 and 2019a 
Financial Ratios Acceptable Range 2016 2019 
Net profit margin (net income/revenue) (%) 15-25b 5.86 5.09 
Return on assets (%) 4-8b 0.17 1.50 
Return on equity (%) 3-10b 1.06 6.35 
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.6-0.3b 0.05 0.19 
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.5-0.43b 0.06 0.23 
Current ratio 1.3-2.0b 3.54 1.64 
Quick ratio (cash + receivables) 1c 2.85 1.15 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative A’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
b Based on the University of Minnesota Extension’s recommended values. 
c Based on the FAO’s recommended values (1991). 
 
4.1.5 Property rights structure 
As stated in the amended bylaws (Article II Sections 3 Item d and 7 Item b), cooperative 
membership, and hence ownership rights, are limited to users of the cooperative’s 
businesses. Membership is also limited to natural persons, as required by the law (RA 9520 
Articles 14 Section 1 and 23 Section 2i) and as specified in the cooperative’s amended bylaws 
(Article II Section 2). There is also a geographic limitation to membership: the members reside 
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within a specific barangay within the Davao del Norte province. However, if a member moves 
from this area they can retain their membership. Thirty-eight members (20.8%) are 
considered inactive because they no longer patronise the cooperative’s businesses owing to 
distance. To become a member, an applicant must subscribe to at least 50 shares and pay for 
at least ten shares upfront (Amended Bylaws Article II Section 6). Cooperative A is authorised 
to issue 40,000 shares valued at PhP100.00 per share. These shares are redeemable and non-
appreciable. There is no requisite proportionality between a member’s shareholding to their 
level of patronage. 
 
Interviewed cooperative officials agreed that the foremost hurdle in pursuing expansion is 
the limited capital: that is, their inability to generate internal capital. Member share capital 
contributions fund 70%-80% of their annual budget. Cooperative A introduced measures to 
improve capital accumulation. First, the cooperative mandated its members to contribute 
monthly to their share capital regardless of their level of patronage or investment 
preferences. Second, 3% of any amount borrowed by a member is automatically retained; 
half of it is added to the member’s shareholdings. Third, the minimum share capital 
subscription was increased from 40 to 50 shares. Although members can readily exit and 
redeem their shares, over the past two years, the cooperative has recorded zero share 
redemptions. The cooperative does not allow partial redemption of shares. Profits are 
distributed mostly in the form of cash. Fifty per cent of these payments are based on an 
individual’s patronage level. The remaining half is a dividend on their share capital, which is 
not proportional to patronage. Both the dividend on share capital and patronage refund were 
consistently declared and distributed during the annual General Assembly meeting for the 
past five years. For members with unpaid share capital subscription, profits from dividend on 
share capital and patronage refund were withheld by the cooperative and used to offset 
unpaid obligations. 
 
Cooperative A’s residual rights of control are distributed equally. Each member, regardless of 
their patronage or investment level, is entitled to only one vote. This arrangement is 
mandated by the country’s prevailing cooperative law (RA 9520 Article 4 Section 2) and 
emphasised by the cooperative’s amended bylaws (Article II Section 9). As only members have 
this right, they are the only ones who can nominate and elect directors. However, non-
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members, representatives from the DACOFARM, DA, and DAR, attend AGMs and counsel the 
GA when asked to.The property rights attributes of Cooperative A are presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
Cooperative A’s Property Rights  
Attributes Arrangement 
Claim to ownership Restricted to patrons only upon entry 
Investment proportional to patronage No 
Benefits proportional to investment Yes (Short-term through dividend which is 50% of 
distributed profits. No capital gains) 
Redeemable and non-appreciable rights Yes 
Control rights are equally distributed Yes 
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative A. 
 
4.1.6 Governance practices 
Cooperative A follows the extended traditional governance structure of most cooperatives: it 
has a General Assembly (GA), a Board of Directors (BOD) and a management team.  
 
The GA, composed of all members entitled to vote (Amended Bylaws Article III Section 1), 
convenes annually (Amended Bylaws Article III Section 4). During the annual General 
Assembly Meeting (AGM), major strategic plans and decisions were presented to and 
discussed with the GA including presentation and ratification of the annual development plan. 
This includes the proposed budget for the incoming year and the targeted operational 
expansions. Respondents attested that major decisions made by the cooperative, such as the 
ratification of amendments to the constitution and bylaws, policies, strategies, and external 
party contracts, still rest on the GA. However, depending on the amount, decisions relating 
to the purchase of substantial assets and operational expenses rest in the hands of the BOD 
and manager. Respondents can easily discuss and recommend strategies with the directors 
and operations with the manager. They also have no trouble accessing cooperative 
documents such as BOD meeting minutes and financial reports. Independently audited 
financial reports, AGM minutes, and BOD and committee reports are also presented and 
distributed during the AGM. 
 
Interview results and cooperative documents showed that the cooperative has held AGMs for 
the past five years. Members receive prior notice, usually a week before the AGM, via 
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registered mail, mobile messages, social media posts, and word of mouth. Operational and 
strategic policies presented to and ratified by the GA during the AGM were formulated by the 
BOD during the monthly BOD meetings. The BOD, together with the elected committee 
members, are elected by, and from, the GA. Directors and committee members voluntarily 
vie for the position by lodging their candidacy at least two months before the AGM. When 
the number of candidates is less than the position contested, filing for candidacy during the 
AGM is considered valid. The GA cast their vote for directors and committee members via 
secret ballot. As shown by the AGM minutes and attested by the interviewed members, the 
electoral process has been considered fair and robust for the past three years. Over this 
period, a sizeable number of members stood for elections for various positions; six to nine 
candidates applied for three BOD positions and votes were well-distributed. The GA has the 
power and ability to remove non-performing directors. In the past, an underperforming 
director resigned after being advised to do so by the BOD. 
 
The cooperative’s day-to-day operations are supervised and managed by the manager and 
the management team. In Cooperative A, only active members can apply for the manager 
position. The manager is selected and appointed by the BOD. The manager regularly attends 
BOD meetings to provide proposals and information to the BOD about how the cooperative 
operations meet the needs of their members and clients. Consequently, 11 of the 12 
interviewed members believed that the manager is qualified to manage the cooperative. The 
amended bylaws (Article IV Section 4 Item b) prohibit sitting directors from intervening in the 
cooperative’s management. A few years ago, a director was appointed to, and served in an 
appointive committee, for six months; however, this appointment violated the amended 
bylaws (Article IV Section 4 Item b). When the violation was uncovered, the director 
immediately stepped down from the committee.  
 
4.2 Case 2: Cooperative B 
4.2.1 Background 
Cooperative B is a multi-purpose cooperative for rice seed producers. It was founded as a 
seed growers’ association in 1978 by 30 rice farmers with farms within the Davao del Norte 
province. It was converted into a cooperative in 1983 and formally registered under the CDA 
on the 7th February 1992. The cooperative’s primary purposes are to provide inputs and 
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services to ensure that members produce quality rice seeds and to market the seeds produced 
by its members. Although not stipulated in the cooperative’s bylaws, membership has been, 
and still is, restricted to rice seed producers farming within the province or the adjacent Davao 
de Oro province, which was formerly part of Davao del Norte. Current members produce rice 
for seed purposes only. Marketing of farm outputs, rice seeds, through the cooperative is one 
of the reasons why the interviewed members joined the cooperative.  
 
During its early years, the PAGRO allowed the then association to use an idle government 
facility as a temporary office, drying, and storage building. Cooperative B’s improved financial 
standing allowed them to acquire land and construct their own building and warehouse. It 
also improved confidence in the cooperative resulting in increased membership. In 2019, the 
cooperative had 104 members. Key features of Cooperative B are summarised in Table 4.5. 
 
Table 4.5 
Key Historical and Operational Information of Cooperative B 
Characteristics Details 
Year founded 1978 
Date of registration February 07, 1992 
Facilitating organisation No 
Purpose of foundation Market members’ produce 
Founding membership size 30 
Current membership size 104 (according to Roster of Members, 2020) 
Membership qualification and major 
responsibilities 
1. Natural person 
2. Rice seed producer 
3. Subscription of at least 100 shares 
Key business segments 1. Supply of farm inputs 
2. Marketing of farm outputs  
3. Provision of machinery services  
4. Provision of financing services  
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative B. 
 
4.2.2 Vision, mission, goals, and objectives 
For the last four decades, Cooperative B’s goals and objectives have consistently upheld the 
cooperative’s vision and mission of enabling members to produce quality rice seeds to be 
marketed by the cooperative. The cooperative’s six objectives are listed below: 
1. Create funds and savings to provide members productive and personal loans. 
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2. Procure and market paddy seeds. 
3. Engage in paddy and rice trading. 
4. Engage in the sale of fertilisers and chemicals. 
5. Engage in pre- and post-harvest services. 
6. Engage in building a hostel with function hall/room. 
 
While the first five objectives focus on the production and marketing of paddy seeds, 
objective 6, ratified by the GA in 2019, reflects a divergence in the cooperative’s business 
portfolio. The last objective was introduced to use idle land purchased by the cooperative. As 
the property is not considered agricultural, the GA agreed to use it for other profit-generating 
purposes.  
 
4.2.3 Business segments 
As the end of 2019, Cooperative B had four business segments: supply of farm inputs 
(objective 4), marketing of farm outputs (objectives 2 and 3), provision of machinery services 
(objective 5), and provision of financial services (objective 1). These four business segments 
complement each other in meeting the cooperative’s vision of producing high quality seeds.  
 
Business segments 1, farm inputs supply, and 2, farm outputs marketing, are managed and 
operated jointly by the cooperative. Farm inputs are supplied by the cooperative exclusively 
to its members to ensure that the latter produce and deliver high quality seeds to the former. 
Members can acquire farm inputs such as seeds, fertilisers, and chemicals on credit. The total 
costs of the farm inputs procured by a member are deducted from the sale of farm outputs 
by the member. Only members can exclusively market their farm outputs through the 
cooperative. Cooperative B exclusively cater to its members, that is, the cooperative buys rice 
seeds from members only. This decision was made because the cooperative wanted to 
safeguard the reputation it established as a provider of high-quality rice seeds. This entails 
quality monitoring and control, not only during post-production including delivery, sorting, 
and grading, but also during production in the planting and plant care stages. Accepting 
produce from non-members removes the cooperative’s ability to monitor the production 
stages. Figure 4.2 shows the considerable contribution of this joint business segment to the 
cooperative’s total income. For the past four years, marketing of farm outputs, together with 
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supply of farm inputs, has contributed approximately three-quarters of the cooperative’s 
income. 
Figure 4.2 
Total Income and Income Source Distribution for FY 2016-2019, 2019=100 
 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative B’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
 
Business segment 3, provision of machinery services, has contributed less than 5% of the 
cooperative’s total revenue. As explained by a cooperative official, this business segment was 
initially introduced to provide its members with custom services, mechanised farm 
operations. However, non-members can also pay for these services during off-peak periods. 
In 2019, this part of the business incurred a 5.70% loss (see Figure 4.2). According to the 
manager, there was an unexpected large supply of farm outputs, seeds, compared to the 
projected and actual market demand. As such, the cooperative had to mill the paddy and 
retail it as consumer rice to avoid further losses through wastage. 
 
Like business segment 3, business segment 4, provision of financial services, does not 
contribute much to the cooperative’s total revenue. This business segment is available only 
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interest rate of 24%. Despite the high interest rate, a quarter of the interviewed members 
borrow from the cooperative to finance their rice production. 
4.2.4 Level of performance 
Over the past four years, Cooperative B’s per annum asset growth at 0.21% and net equity 
growth at 6.30% have been considerable (see Table 4.6). Growth is driven by intensified 
investing activities and positive net cash flow from operating activities. It appears that the 
cooperative’s operation is financially viable, and that the cooperative’s financial health is 
stable. Unallocated equity, largely consisted of donated tangible assets, make up 29.22% of 
the cooperative’s net equity. Depreciation of these assets resulted in the contraction of the 
per share book value. 
 
Table 4.6 
Cooperative B’s 2019 Financial Position and Percentage Growth per Annum, 2019=100 
Financial indicators 2019 value in PhP % growth per annuma 
Total assets (in millions) 120.98 0.21 
Total liabilities (in millions) 63.23 0.45 
Net equity (in millions) 57.75 6.30 
Members’ share capital (in millions) 40.87 0.10 
Book value/share (PhP) 1,413.04 -7.47 
Revenue (in millions) 12.42 -6.80 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative B’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
 
The cooperative’s financing behaviour appears to be consistent with its investing activities. 
Financing activities were positive for the entire period. Although the per annum growth of 
share capital is only 0.10%, it contributed 70.77% to the cooperative’s net equity (see Table 
4.6). This figure indicates that Cooperative B is not heavily reliant on donations from 
government offices. Cooperative B’s growth is largely sustained by internally-generated 
capital. This could be attributed to the per-unit retaining mechanism imposed by the 
cooperative. For every bag of paddy delivered to the cooperative, PhP100.00 is retained as 
an additional share capital contribution.  
 
Aside from equity, debt at 47% has also helped to finance cooperative growth (see Table 4.7). 
Cooperative B’s debt-to-equity ratio is also within the acceptable range, at 0.90. It can be 
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surmised that short-term creditors trust the cooperative’s performance; hence, the latter was 
able to improve its leverage position. Table 4.7 shows that the cooperative’s liquidity has 
declined over the past four years. This could be attributed to the more pronounced change in 
the cooperative’s short-term debts compared to the change in cash and receivables. 
However, at the end of 2019, the cooperative remained liquid. Cooperative B has kept its 
profit margin either within or above the acceptable range. However, the operating losses 
incurred in 2019 resulted in a sharp contraction in their profitability. Their return on assets at 
2.09% fell below the acceptable range while return on equity also dropped from 25.18% in 
2016 to 5.66% in 2019. Notwithstanding these declines, the cooperative’s return on equity is 
still slightly better than that of the banks.  
 
Table 4.7 
Cooperative B’s Predicted Financial Performance for 2016 and 2019a 
Financial ratios Acceptable range 2016 2019 
Net profit margin (net income/revenue) (%) 15-25b 44.18 16.58 
Return on assets (%) 4-8b 13.02 2.09 
Return on equity (%) 3-10b 25.18 5.66 
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.6-0.3b 0.17 0.47 
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.5-0.43b 0.21 0.90 
Current ratio 1.3-2.0b 4.42 1.50 
Quick ratio (cash + receivables) 1c 3.50 1.09 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative B’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
b Based on the University of Minnesota Extension’s recommended values. 
c Based on the FAO’s recommended values (1991). 
 
4.2.5 Property rights structure 
Cooperative B’s property rights structure is the same as most traditional cooperatives. 
However, as revealed by the cooperative’s documents and confirmed by interviews, 
Cooperative B introduced mechanisms to reduce the effects of these arrangements.  
 
Article II Section 7 Item b of the Cooperative B’s amended bylaws requires members to 
patronise the cooperative’s businesses. Hence, membership and ownership rights is limited 
to the cooperative’s patrons. Although not stated in the amended bylaws, Cooperative B also 
restricts membership to the next of kin of existing members only. As explained by the 
chairperson, the cooperative wanted to limit membership to those who have the necessary 
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technical skills and experience to meet the cooperative’s quality standards. In doing so, the 
cooperative is able to safeguard its established reputation. Members must also be natural 
persons as required by the law and as indicated in the cooperative’s amended bylaws (Article 
II Section 2). At least two institutions expressed interest in patronising and investing in the 
cooperative. The cooperative thus introduced a policy that allows institutional partners to 
register provided that an identified representative, who is a natural person, will complete any 
transaction in lieu of that institution. Qualified applicants must subscribe at least 100 shares 
(PhP100,000.00) from the 50,000 shares valued at PhP1,000.00 per share that the 
cooperative is authorised to issue.  
 
Although membership is restricted to usage, existing members who no longer patronise the 
cooperative’s businesses are not dismissed. The cooperative acknowledges that, despite an 
absence of patronage, these members’ share capital contributes to the cooperative’s 
sustainability and growth. Moreover, according to the manager, these members want to 
retain membership due to the dividend on share capital gained annually. Members’ share 
capital gives them claim rights to 60% of the net profits. Their patronage gives them claim 
rights to 40% of the net profits. In short, claim rights are not restricted to patronage. However, 
patronising members receive a better share of the profits than non-patronising members. 
 
Although members can invest as much or as little as they want, the cooperative is slowly 
introducing proportionality of investment to patronage. Since 2018, the cooperative has 
retained PhP100.00 from the sale of each sack of paddy seeds delivered by members to the 
cooperative. This per unit retained monies is added to the members’ share capital and builds 
the cooperative’s internal equity. Although shares are redeemable and non-appreciable, the 
cooperative does not allow partial redemption.  
 
All members who have paid for 25 shares (Php25,000.00) enjoy equal voting rights in the 
cooperative’s decision-making processes. They can also stand for and vote for elected 
positions. This is in accordance with the law (RA 9520 Article 4 Section 2) and Cooperative B’s 
amended bylaws (Article II Section 8). Table 4.8 summarises the property rights attributes of 
Cooperative B. 
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Table 4.8 
Cooperative B’s Property Rights  
Attributes Arrangement 
Claim to ownership Restricted to patrons only upon entry 
Investment proportional to patronage Yes (Partly through per unit retains) 
Benefits proportional to investment Yes (Short-term through dividend which is 60% 
of distributed profits. No capital gains) 
Redeemable and non-appreciable rights Yes 
Control rights are equally distributed Yes 
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative B. 
 
4.2.6 Governance practices 
Cooperative B has adopted an extended traditional governance model, the GA, the BOD and 
the management team, to allocate control rights. The GA, the highest governing body of the 
cooperative, consists of all members entitled to vote (Amended Bylaws Article III Section 14). 
The GA has the right to ratify amendments to the bylaws; and review, reject, or approve 
development plans, and any substantial financial and operational changes, such as the 
acquisition of land or the construction of buildings. Members can exercise these rights during 
the AGM. Half of the members interviewed said that they were consulted on cooperative 
matters during the AGM. AGM minutes also show how the GA put to a vote certain resolutions 
and recommendations decided upon by the BOD.  
 
Cooperative B’s documents reveal practices designed to promote transparency and 
accountability. AGMs have been held evey year for the past five years. Average AGM 
attendance is above 60% which is more than enough to satisfy the quorum requirements of 
25% (Amended Bylaws Article III Section 22). Notices for the AGM are circulated to the GA 14 
days prior using registered mail and mobile messages. Historically, independently audited 
financial reports, previous AGM minutes, and BOD and committee reports were distributed 
together with the AGM notice. However, the cooperative found that members do not review 
these reports prior to the AGM and do not bring these reports with them to the AGM. Hence, 
the BOD opted to distribute the reports during the AGM and only distribute them prior to this 
when requested by the members. 
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The GA also elect directors and committee members via secret ballot elections during the 
AGM. Members who wish to be elected must file for candidacy at least a month before the 
AGM. According to interviewees, Cooperative B’s election process is fair and robust. AGM 
minutes showed that there are historically more candidates vying for elective positions than 
the total number of vacant positions. However, at least half of these candidates are 
incumbent directors. Current directors all have tertiary qualification even though the 
amended bylaws do not require this qualification. 
 
The nine-member BOD plan, set, and formulate the cooperative’s strategy, direction, and 
policy which is subsequently presented to the GA for ratification. However, in lieu of the GA, 
the BOD decides on the purchase of substantial assets, except for land and buildings, and 
contracting with external parties. The BOD is also responsible for the selection and 
recruitment of the management team. According to the chairperson, a selection sub-
committee within the BOD was created to assess applicants for the manager position. A 
university degree is required for the manager role. The chairperson explained that this 
qualification is important to ensure that the hired manager has the appropriate technical skills 
to manage the business. The manager is also not required to be a member of the cooperative. 
Cooperative leaders felt that restricting the manager role to active members would limit the 
cooperative’s ability to hire a qualified manager. The manager is responsible for the 
cooperative’s day-to-day operations. The BOD also entrusts final decisions on daily operations 
and expenses to the manager. Interviewed members believe that the current manager is 
qualified for the role. 
 
4.3 Case 3: Cooperative C 
4.3.1 Background 
Cooperative C was established in 1978 as a satellite unit of an existing cooperative. It was 
designed to cater to rice farmers in a specific geographic location (barangay) within the 
province. Eight directors represented 34 rice farmers that enrolled in the satellite 
cooperative. The cooperative’s founding members are rice farmers residing within the 
barangay. Its head office and scope of business operations are also limited to within the  
barangay. The cooperative’s original objectives were to provide its member with lending 
services to finance their rice production and to procure and process its members’ farm 
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outputs. As Cooperative C’s operation and assets grew, it sought to have greater autonomy. 
On 10th January 1995, it formally separated from the original cooperative to become an 
independent primary multi-purpose cooperative. Upon re-establishment, the cooperative 
also expanded its membership criteria to include all residents of the Davao del Norte 
province, whether farming or not, as stipulated in its amended bylaws (Article II Section 2). 
As a result of this re-structuring, the cooperative’s membership rose significantly. In 2019, the 
cooperative had 138 members. 
 
Since 2000, the DA has donated physical assets, a rice mill, a hand tractor, and a harvester, to 
the cooperative to help the latter achieve its goal of procuring and processing members’ 
paddy rice. LBP has also allowed Cooperative C to borrow PhP11.5 million to finance 
members’ rice production. The cooperative also self-financed their buildings and land, 
including a 1-ha rice field, a warehouse, an office, a machinery shed, and a solar dryer. A 




Key Historical and Operational Information of Cooperative C 
Characteristics Details 
Year founded 1979 
Date of registration January 10, 1995 
Facilitating organisation No 
Purpose of foundation Provide financing services to members and market 
members’ produce 
Founding membership size 34 
Current membership size 138 (according to Roster of Members, 2020) 
Membership qualification and major 
responsibilities 
1. Natural person 
2. Residency within a specific geographic territory 
3. Subscription of at least 120 shares 
Key business segments 1. Supply of farm inputs 
2. Supply of non-farm inputs 
3. Marketing of farm outputs  
4. Provision of machinery services  
5. Provision of financing services  
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative C. 
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4.3.2 Vision, mission, goals, and objectives  
Cooperative C’s vision, mission, goals, and objectives advocate for the improvement of both 
members and non-members’ quality of life within the specific geographic location it operates. 
To achieve this purpose, the cooperative reduced the number of goals from 15 developed in 
1994 to just five in 2018.  These five goals are directed towards the achievement of the 
following objectives: 
1. Generate funds and extend credit to members for productive and personal purposes.  
2. Procure and distribute commodities to members and non-members. 
3. Engage in the supply of production inputs to members and market their products. 
4. Operate and manage farm machinery. 
5. Engage in the grains business. 
 
Amendments to the cooperative’s strategic and policy direction are developed during the 
annual planning workshop attended by the BOD, the management team, various committees, 
and five GA members. The results of the planning workshop including any proposed changes 
to the cooperative’s bylaws, strategies, and policies are then presented to the GA during the 
succeeding AGM for ratification.  
 
4.3.3 Business segments 
Cooperative C operates five business segments: supply of farm inputs (objective 3), supply of 
non-farm inputs (consumer goods) (objective 2), marketing of farm outputs (objectives 3 and 
5), provision of machinery services (objective 4), and provision of financial services (objective 
1). Although objectives 1 and 3 are meant exclusively for members, interviews with 
cooperative officials revealed that these business segments are also accessible to non-
members. It appears, then, that all five business segments of the cooperative are open to 
both members and non-members.  
 
Business segments 2, farm input supply, and 3, farm output marketing are managed and 
operated concurrently. Between 2016 and 2019, these joint business segments supplied 
approximately 20%-45% of the cooperative’s total revenue (see Figure 4.3). A sizeable share 
of the cooperative’s income is still reliant on rice production. This is significant considering 
that only two of the 12 members interviewed reported delivering their produce to the 
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cooperative. This finding indicates that the cooperative is actively procuring paddy for 
processing from non-members. According to the manager, there is no membership advantage 
associated with marketing farm products through the cooperative.  
 
Figure 4.3 
Total Income and Income Source Distribution for FY 2016-2019, 2019=100 
 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative C’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
 
At most, business segment 1, non-farm input supply, contributes 5% to the cooperative’s total 
revenue (see Figure 4.3). This segment is accessible to both members and non-members. Like 
business segments 2 and 3, there is no price variation for members and non-members. 
However, the cooperative allows members to purchase products on credit to encourage them 
to patronise the business.  
 
Although accessible to non-members, business segments 4, provision of machinery services, 
and 5, provision of financial services, provide membership advantages in the form of cheaper 
service fees and interest rates, respectively. While non-members are charged 5% interest on 
any money they borrow from the cooperative, members only pay 3% interest. As shown in 
Figure 4.3, machinery services contributed 15%-35% and financial services contributed 20%-
50% to the cooperative’s total income, respectively. 
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4.3.4 Level of performance 
The cooperative’s total asset value, net equity, and book value per share has contracted in 
the past four years (see Table 4.10). External financing declined at -0.09% per annum and 
there was no significant growth in members’ share capital, which accounted for almost two-
thirds (PhP5.48 million) of the cooperative’s 2019 net equity (PhP9 million). As a result, the 
cooperative struggled to finance its operations and revenue declined at -0.32% per annum. 
This was also likely to discourage members from further investing with the cooperative. Over 
the previous four years, per share book value slumped significantly at -4.64% per annum. This 
contraction reflects insignificant growth in members’ share capital and depreciation of the 
cooperative’s tangible assets. These tangible assets are primarily physical assets donated by 
government organisations, and which account for a large share of the cooperative’s 
unallocated equity. A quarter of the cooperative’s assets are donations. 
 
Table 4.10 
Cooperative C’s 2019 Financial Position and Percentage Growth per Annum, 2019=100 
Financial Indicators 2019 value in PhP % Growth per Annuma 
Total assets (in millions) 19.94 -1.36 
Total liabilities (in millions) 10.95 -0.09 
Net equity (in millions) 9.00 -0.72 
Members’ share capital (in millions) 5.48 0 
Book value/share (PhP) 820.73 -4.64 
Revenue (in millions) 4.52 -0.32 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative C’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
 
From 2016 to 2018, Cooperative C’s profitability, return on assets and return on equity, had 
declined significantly due to decreasing revenue and net surplus. The predicted return on 
equity for 2019 at 3.42% was lower than the rates offered by the bank (4.1%) (see Table 4.11). 
Cooperative C is heavily reliant on debt finance, with debt accounting for more than 50% of 
its asset value. The cooperative’s debt is mostly long-term bank loans. However, solvency 
ratios had come down to the acceptable range for the past four years. Liquidity ratios also 
declined during this period but the cooperative remained highly liquid. This is largely 
attributed to cooperative’s loan receivables, that is, short-term loans issued by the 
cooperative. 
  55 
Table 4.11 
Cooperative C’s Predicted Financial Performance for 2016 and 2019a 
Financial Ratios Acceptable Range 2016 2019 
Net profit margin (net income/revenue) (%) 15-25b 13.92 3.89 
Return on assets (%) 4-8b 2.90 0.94 
Return on equity (%) 3-10b 12.43 3.42 
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.6-0.3b 0.61 0.55 
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.5-0.43b 1.57 1.24 
Current ratio 1.3-2.0b 5.50 2.95 
Quick ratio (cash + receivables) 1c 4.14 2.43 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative C’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
b Based on the University of Minnesota Extension’s recommended values. 
c Based on the FAO’s recommended values (1991). 
 
4.3.5 Property rights structure 
Membership, as required by the law, and emphasised by the cooperative’s amended bylaws 
is restricted to natural persons who reside within the Davao del Norte province (Article II 
Section 2) and can patronise the cooperative’s businesses (Article II Section 7 Item b). Thus, 
membership is restricted to patronage. However, the cooperative has a diverse business 
portfolio which caters to the various needs of the community. A considerable number of the 
members are non-farmers.  
 
The cooperative is authorised to issue 20,000 shares, with a nominal share price of PhP500.00. 
These shares are non-appreciable and redeemable. Applicants for membership must 
subscribe to at least 120 shares (PhP60,000.00) and pay for 10 shares upfront (PhP5,000.00). 
When a member’s shareholding exceeds PhP120,000.00, the cooperative automatically 
redeems the excess shares. A director explained that this policy was designed to avoid 
excessive gaps in the shareholding sizes between members, with only a few holding a sizeable 
share of the cooperative’s equity. Aside from this policy, the cooperative also allows for the 
partial or total redemption of share capital at par value, at any time, on a case-by-case basis, 
provided that pending obligations are settled. To date, more than half of the membership 
have share capital contributions above the minimum requirement.  
 
Patronage is also the basis for the net profits distributed to the members. Forty per cent of 
the net profits are allocated for patronage refunds. The remaining 60% is allocated as 
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dividends for each members’ share capital. This means that members who have stopped 
patronising the cooperative’s business can still enjoy short-term rewards as long as they do 
not withdraw their investments. The level of investment does not determine the level of 
patronage a member is obliged to meet. Members can access services and products at 
quantities that suit their needs. The cooperative reported that 5% of its members are inactive. 
According to interviewed officials, members typically stop patronising the cooperative for one 
of two reasons. First, some have unpaid obligations that deter them from doing further 
business with the cooperative. Second, others have relocated far away from the cooperative. 
 
Cooperative C’s amended bylaws (Article V Section 10) specify that each member is entitled 
to one vote, regardless of the size of shareholding. Voting rights, and the right to be elected, 
in the cooperative are also restricted to paid up members only. The property rights 
characteristics of Cooperative C is presented in Table 4.12. 
 
Table 4.12 
Cooperative C’s Property Rights Structures 
Attributes Arrangement 
Claim to ownership Restricted to patronage upon entry 
Investment proportional to patronage No 
Benefits proportional to investment Yes (Short-term through dividend which is 60% 
of distributed profits. No capital gains) 
Redeemable and non-appreciable rights Yes 
Control rights are equally distributed Yes 
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative C. 
 
4.3.6 Governance practices 
Cooperative C’s governance structure consists of the GA, the BOD, and the management 
team. The GA is composed of all members entitled to vote; that is, those who have paid for 
at least ten shares. The cooperative’s amended bylaws (Article III Section 1) identify the GA 
as the cooperative’s highest policy-making body. It determines and approves any 
amendments to the cooperative’s bylaws and approves the development plans and 
programmes formulated by the BOD. Significant asset purchases, amounting to more than 
PhP100,000.00, require the GA’s approval. Moreover, it is the GA who elects the BOD via 
secret ballot. This occurs during the AGM. Members who wish to stand for elections must  file 
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candidacy a month before the AGM. Interviewed members considered the electoral process 
to be fair. AGM minutes show that the number of candidates nominated was the same as the 
number of vacant positions. Despite that, the AGM proceeded with voting via secret ballot.  
 
The GA has been consistently convening for the past five years. AGM attendance is high, more 
than 90%. Interviewed officials attribute this to the penalty imposed on members who miss 
the AGM which is PhP1,000.00 per member. As membership is individual, proxies are not 
allowed to attend in lieu of the members. Members are notified about the AGM through 
registered mail, mobile message, and word of mouth at least 14 days before the AGM. The 
cooperative also holds quarterly meetings wherein the AGM schedule is announced. Thus, 
the cooperative’s AGMs tend to be short and straight to the point as most topics have already 
been discussed during the quarterly meeting.  
 
The BOD is composed of five elected directors from the membership. Reviewed documents 
and interview responses show that the annual and multi-year development plan ratified by 
the GA were prepared by the BOD with input from the management team. The management 
team participates in the development of these plans because the team is responsible for the 
implementation of these plans. The manager oversees the daily operations of the 
cooperative. The manager is required to be an active member and to have a tertiary 
qualification. Interviewed cooperative leaders stated that technical competencies in 
managing a business are critical for ensuring that the cooperative’s objectives are meet. 
Further, the manager should not be related to any of the BOD within the first degree by 
consanguinity or affinity. This policy was implemented to ensure that no minority group can 
wield considerable authority in the cooperative.  
 
4.4 Case 4: Cooperative D 
4.4.1 Background 
Cooperative D is a multi-purpose cooperative for farmers and irrigators. It was originally 
organised by 36 farmers in 1961 to establish an irrigation system to service their farms. The 
group was then restructured as an irrigators’ association in 1970 with DAR assistance. During 
this time, beneficiaries of the Davao Settlement Project of Sto. Tomas were admitted to the 
association. In 1980, the association formally registered under the SEC. 
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The association was re-organised into a cooperative on the 7th of July 1999. The cooperative’s 
leadership recognised that by becoming a cooperative they would have better access to 
tangible and financial assistance from government and non-government organisations. At this 
time, the cooperative’s purpose had shifted from solely providing irrigation services to the 
provision of financial services and the sale of farm and non-farm inputs to its members. 
Originally restricted to rice farmers and irrigators, membership was opened up to natural 
persons residing in a specific municipality in the province, as stipulated in the cooperative’s 
amended bylaws (Article II Section 2). Cooperative D operates and maintains an office within 
the same municipality. In 2019, the cooperative had a total of 189 members.  
 
To a large extent, the cooperative’s operation was initially financed by grants from the local 
government and loans from DAR and LBP. DAR and DA also donated physical assets such as a 
solar dryer, a rice mill, and a seed bank. DOLE donated a water refilling station, both a building 
and equipment, and CDA donated an electric rice mill. The land where these facilities stand 
was purchased by the cooperative. To expand its operation and augment its income, 
Cooperative D bought various form of machinery, including a hand tractor, a floating tiller, a 
thresher, and a hauling truck. Table 4.13 shows the key features for Cooperative D. 
 
Table 4.13 
Key Historical and Operational Information of Cooperative D 
Characteristics Details 
Year founded 1961 
Date of registration July 7, 1999 
Facilitating organisation No 
Purpose of foundation Establish irrigation system 
Founding membership size 36 
Current membership size 189 (according to Roster of Members, 2020) 
Membership qualification and major 
responsibilities 
1. Natural person 
2. Residency within a specific geographic territory 
3. Subscription of at least 250 shares 
Key business segments 1. Supply of farm inputs 
2. Supply of non-farm inputs 
3. Marketing of farm outputs  
4. Provision of machinery services  
5. Provision of financing services  
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative D. 
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4.4.2 Vision, mission, goals, and objectives 
Cooperative D’s vision and mission are directed towards providing satisfactory and quality 
services to its constituency. In 2018, the GA ratified 15 goals that will allow the cooperative 
to achieve its five objectives: 
1. Engage in lending services.  
2. Engage in rice milling services. 
3. Engage in paddy and rice trading services. 
4. Engage in land preparation and post-harvest services such as water supply, 
agricultural inputs, and farm machinery. 
5. Engage in water refilling services. 
 
Of the five objectives, three are related to the rice sector. This indicates that the cooperative’s 
core business is centred on meeting the needs of rice farmers even though it admits non-
farmers as members. 
 
4.4.3 Business segments 
The Cooperative D’s operations can be divided into five business segments: supply of farm 
inputs (objective 4), supply of non-farm inputs (meat products and water refilling station) 
(objective 5), marketing of farm outputs (objectives 2 and 3), provision of machinery services 
(objective 4), and provision of financial services (objective 1). Except for business segment 4, 
provision of machinery services, all of the cooperative’s business segments are accessible to 
both members and non-members.  
 
Business segments 1, farm inputs supply, and 2, non-farm inputs supply, are jointly managed 
and operated. While this joint segment used to provide a low share in the total revenue of 
the cooperative (see Figure 4.4), the water refilling station donated by DOLE has significantly 
increased the business’ share to a quarter of the cooperative’s total income. Of the 12 
members interviewed, only six buy their farm inputs from the cooperative. However, 11 of 
them sourced their potable water from the cooperative. According to them, the superior 
quality and convenience afforded by the business explains their decision to patronise it. 
Members and non-members access this business on the same terms.  
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Figure 4.4 
Total Income and Income Source Distribution for FY 2016-2019, 2019=100 
 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative D’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
 
The average contributions of business segments 3, farm outputs marketing, and 5, financial 
services, are each less than a fifth of Cooperative D’s total revenue. Machinery services, 
business segment 4, accounts for more than 20% of the cooperative’s total income. This 
segment includes the irrigation fee collected for the original irrigation system established by 
the then association.  
 
4.4.4 Level of performance  
Table 4.14 shows the growth in Cooperative D’s total assets at 0.02% and net equity at 3.51%. 
These growths can be attributed to the members’ increased share capital contribution at 
0.07%, and reduced reliance on debt financing of -0.07%. There has also been growth in the 
cooperative’s unallocated equity. More than 60% of the cooperative’s net equity is from 
donations from government agencies. Members’ share capital contributions accounts for less 
than 30% of the net equity. The book value per share is contracting at -7.86% because of the 
depreciation of donated assets, which accounts for almost 70% of the cooperative’s net 
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Cooperative D’s 2019 Financial Position and Percentage Growth per Annum, 2019=100 
Financial Indicators 2019 value in PhP % Growth per Annuma 
Total assets (in millions) 8.15 0.02 
Total liabilities (in millions) 2.14 -0.07 
Net equity (in millions) 6.01 3.51 
Members’ share capital (in millions) 1.74 0.07 
Book value/share (PhP) 344.10 -7.86 
Revenue (in millions) 2.04 -1.08 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative D’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
 
The predicted profitability measures for 2019 are negative (see Table 4.15). The cooperative 
has reported net losses for the past two years. However, the cooperative is solvent. Debt-to-
assets and debt-to-equity ratios, at 0.25 and 0.39, respectively, have stayed below the 
acceptable range. The cooperative is borrowing conservatively. The cooperative’s debt 
financing is a mixture of both short-term and long-term debt. The cooperative has exceedingly 
high liquidity ratios. This indicates that the cooperative is holding too much cash, and thus, is 
not maximising its resources. 
 
Table 4.15 
Cooperative D’s Predicted Financial Performance for 2016 and 2019a 
Financial Ratios Acceptable Range 2016 2019 
Net profit margin (net income/revenue) (%) 15-25b 6.92 -26.98 
Return on assets (%) 4-8b 1.87 -6.57 
Return on equity (%) 3-10b 10.31 -31.44 
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.6-0.3b 0.34 0.25 
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.5-0.43b 0.54 0.39 
Current ratio 1.3-2.0b 3.71 5.44 
Quick ratio (cash + receivables) 1c 3.54 5.38 
Note: Obtained from Cooperative D’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
b Based on the University of Minnesota Extension’s recommended values. 
c Based on the FAO’s recommended values (1991). 
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4.4.5 Property rights structure 
Membership for Cooperative D is restricted to natural persons residing in a specific 
municipality in the Davao del Norte province (Amended Bylaws Article II Section 2). Members 
must commit to patronise the cooperative’s business (Amended Bylaws Article II Section 7 
Item b). Member respondents all patronise at least two of the cooperative’s business 
segments. However, around 16% of the members have outstanding financial obligations to 
the cooperative and are thus unable to use the cooperative’s services.   
 
Except for financing services, both members and non-members can access the cooperative’s 
business segments on the same terms. However, at the end of the year, members claim 
benefits proportional to patronage. Profits for distribution at the end of the year are allocated 
to patronage refund (40%) and to dividends to share capital (60%). Hence, members also 
claim benefits proportional to their investment in the cooperative. However, the level of 
investment is not dependent on the members’ level of patronage. Members' investment 
portfolio are not restricted by their level of usage of the cooperative’s business segments. 
This policy does not hold true for the financial services. Five per cent of every loan released 
to a cooperative member is retained upfront by the cooperative to add to the member’s share 
capital.  
 
Aside from retaining a portion of the loan, the cooperative builds up its capital using 
mandatory member contributions of PhP1000.00 per year or PhP500.00 per cropping for rice 
farmer members regardless of their individual level of patronage. Members are required to 
subscribe to at least 250 shares and pay upfront for 20 of these shares. The cooperative is 
authorised to issue 120,000 shares. These shares are non-appreciable and redeemable. 
During the interviews, key informants revealed that the cooperative has struggled to retain 
internal capital. In 2018, the cooperative amended their membership classification to include 
associate members. Associate members are members who have not fully paid for their 
required 20 shares. Associate members are not entitled to vote, stand for elections, or receive 
a dividend on their share capital.  
 
In the past, Cooperative D encountered high redemption; thus, they introduced measures to 
reduce the risk associated with redemption. Members cannot readily exit the cooperative. 
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Only one member can redeem their shares and leave the cooperative each year. Members 
who wish to exit outside the allowed threshold may do so if they can find a new entrant who 
will take over their membership. Partial redemption of shares is also not allowed. However, 
these measures contradict recent amendments to the cooperative’s bylaws. As per the new 
amendments, members who failed to increase their shareholdings for two consecutive years 




Cooperative D’s Property Rights  
Attributes Arrangement 
Claim to ownership Restricted to patronage upon entry 
Investment proportional to patronage No 
Benefits proportional to investment Yes (Short-term through dividend which is 60% 
of distributed profits. No capital gains) 
Redeemable and non-appreciable rights Yes 
Control rights are equally distributed Yes 
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key 
informants from Cooperative D. 
 
4.4.6 Governance practices 
Cooperative D has an extended traditional model of governance structure. This model 
consists of the GA, the BOD, and the management team. The GA is comprised of all members 
entitled to vote (Amended Bylaws Article III Section 1). The GA exercise ex-post powers such 
as the approval of amendments to the cooperative’s articles of cooperation and bylaws, and 
approval of development plans and programmes. These powers are exercised during the 
AGM. AGM minutes indicate that proposed amendments to cooperative bylaws were 
presented to the GA for ratification. The purchase of substantial assets such as land and 
buildings also require the GA’s approval. The amended bylaws (Article III Section 4) specify 
that the GA convene annually, within 90 days of the close of the calendar year. For the last 
five years, Cooperative D has consistently held its AGM on the last Friday of March. Written 
notices of the AGM are sent out at least 14 days prior to the meeting, either through house 
delivery by cooperative staff or personal pick-up at the office by the individual members. 
Mobile messages are also sent out days before the meeting to remind members about the 
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AGM. Average membership turnout for AGM is between 70%-80% which is higher than what 
is required to declare a quorum at 50%. 
 
During the AGM, the GA elect the directors through secret ballot. Eleven of the 12 members 
interviewed view the election procedure as fair. Any qualified members can voluntarily and 
freely stand for elections. Only active members who have paid for at least 150 shares 
(PhP15,000) are qualified to apply for the directorship. A certificate for candidacy must be 
lodged a month before the AGM. For the last two elections, the number of candidates has 
been equal to the number of positions contested. Likewise, at least half of the candidates 
were incumbent directors. 
 
The BOD, composed of seven elected directors, meet monthly to formulate the cooperative’s 
strategis and policies. There is no specialisation of roles among the BOD. The BOD deliberates 
on matters concerning the cooperative. Each director has an equal voice during deliberations 
and only one vote during decisions. Decisions made by the BOD are presented to the GA, 
either through the AGM or through a quarterly meeting regularly held with the GA. Members 
may query and make recommendations on the proposed policies and strategies. The 
recommendations are noted and considered by the BOD during policymaking.  
 
The BOD’s operational policies are implemented by the management team, headed by the 
hired manager. The BOD selected and recruited the manager. Cooperative D requires that the 
manager be an active member with at least 100 paid-up shares (PhP10,000). The manager 
makes decisions regarding the daily operations including any expenses of less than 
PhP10,000.00. The manager regularly attends the monthly BOD meetings and reports on the 
status of the cooperative’s finances and operations. Although directors are discouraged from 
managing the cooperative, they will if the BOD deems it necessary. One such case was 
reported where a manager, some ten years earlier, had claimed cooperative property as his 
own. The BOD took over the management of the cooperative’s operations for the following 
two years for two reasons. First, the cooperative did not have funds to pay for a management 
team’s services. Second, the cooperative officials wanted to directly manage the 
cooperative’s recovery.  
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter described the four rice farmer cooperatives studied. It presented in-depth 
discussions about the history, the objectives, and the current positions of the cooperatives in 
question. It also discussed the property rights and governance practices observed in each 
cooperative.  
 
The cooperatives studied had been operating for a considerable period of time and had 
evolved through various organisational forms. Officials, with the support of the members, 
reconfigured these organisations to adapt to changes in market conditions and to better 
positions themselves in the sector. Nevertheless, the cooperatives remained true to their 
original objectives of providing products and services to improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the members. While only two of the four cooperatives were established with 
the help of government facilitators, all four received government support in the form of 
capacity-building, credit, and grants for machinery and facilities.  
 
The cooperatives shared many of the property rights that characterise a traditional 
cooperative. First, the shares are redeemable and non-appreciable. Second, members are 
required to hold some minimum number of shares regardless of their level of patronage. 
Third, each member has only one vote regardless of their level of shareholding. The 
cooperatives were also similar in their governance structure (GA, BOD, management team) 
and followed governance practices that embrace transparency and accountability. First, the 
directors were elected from and by the membership through secret ballot. Second, AGMs 
were held regularly. Third, financial reports were prepared by external auditors. 
 
Despite these similarities, meaningful differences were observed in the institutional 
arrangements practiced by these four cooperatives. Differences were also observed in their 
performance. Chapter 5 compares observed indicators of performance, property rights and 
governance practices across the four cooperatives to confirm or reject theory-based 
propositions relating a cooperative’s performance to its underlying institutional 
arrangements.   
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Chapter 5 Comparative Case Study Results 
The previous chapter reported measures of performance and described the institutional 
arrangements observed in the cooperatives studied. This chapter presents a qualitative 
comparative analysis of the cases to test propositions relating a cooperative’s performance 
to its property rights and governance practices. It also presents a quantitative cluster analysis 
of variables measuring performance and the quality of propery rights and governance 
practices observed in the case studies to triangulate and broaden the results of the qualitative 
analysis. The chapter starts with a brief review of the contexts within which the cooperatives 
operate. 
 
5.1 Contextual similarities and differences among the cooperatives 
Several external factors may affect a cooperative’s performance. The study endeavoured to 
select cooperatives that have minimal differences on the influencing external factors. In that 
way, differences in the cooperatives’ performances are more likely to be attributed to 
observed differences or similarities in their institutional arrangements. 
 
All of the cooperatives studied operate within the Davao del Norte province. Farming 
members from all four cooperatives practice lowland irrigated rice production on land that 
has similar topographical and geological features. All farms included in the study experience 
similar climatic conditions. All the farmers also deal with similar market forces and dynamics. 
Spot market traders operating with the same methods and practices are present within the 
geographic locations covered by each cooperative. The cooperatives’ core business activities 
are associated with rice production. Products and services provided under the cooperatives’ 
business segments, farm input supply, farm output marketing, machinery services, and 
financial services, are either solely or largely related to rice production. Farm products 
marketed are either paddy or milled rice. Likewise, machinery and facilities for lease are used 
solely for rice production, for example, floating tillers, hand tractors, transplanters, rice mills, 
mechanical and solar dryers, and combine harvesters. A large share of the farm inputs 
supplied, and financial services offered are for rice production. 
 
The cooperatives accessed similar levels of support from various government agencies. The 
CDA provided them with technical and capacity-building assistance, and they received similar 
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donations of farm machinery and inputs from the DA and DAR (see Table 5.1). It follows that 
the technology available to rice farmers does not vary much between cooperatives. All of the 
cooperatives can borrow from the LBP to finance their business operations, and they operate 




Physical Assets Donated to Cooperatives A, B, C and D  
Physical assets Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
Solar Pump Yes No No No 
Floating Tiller Yes No Yes Yes 
Hand Tractor No No Yes No 
4WD Tractor No Yes Yes Yes 
Transplanter No No Yes No 
Combine Harvester Yes Yes Yes No 
Hauling Truck Yes No No No 
Solar Dryer Yes No No No 
Flatbed Dryer Yes No No No 
Recirculating Dryer No Yes No No 
Rice Mill Yes No Yes Yes 
Note: Information obtained from interviews with key informants of Cooperatives A, B, C, and D 
 
Cooperative B differs slightly from the other cooperatives. First, its members produce rice for 
seed. In contrast, the other three cooperatives produce rice for consumption. Although 
production and post-production practices are similar for both purposes, there are slight 
differences in plant care operations and post-production operations (the drying, grading, and 
storage). Seed paddy must also be certified by the Bureau of Plant Industry (BPI). Certification 
is costly but the price paid for seed paddy is higher than the price paid for paddy that is 
processed into rice. Second, although all of the cooperatives studied serve rice farmers, 
Cooperatives A, C and D admit non-farming patrons whereas Cooperative B admits only 
farmers who specialise in seed production. The interests of Cooperative B’s members are 
therefore more homogenous compared to the interests of members in the other three 
cooperatives. Table 5.2 summarises the key characteristics of the four case studies. 
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Table 5.2 
Summary of Key Characteristics of Cooperatives A, B, C and D 
Characteristics Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
Years since foundation 30 42 41 59 
Years in operation as cooperative 28 29 25 21 
Founding membership size 15 30 34 36 
Current membership size 182 104 138 189 
Percentage of inactive members 21% 19% 7% 16% 
Foundation externally assisted Yes No No No 
Assistance provided Capacity-building Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
     
Member’s contribution      
Nominal share value (in PhP) 100.00 1,000.00 500.00 100.00 
Minimum share subscription per member 40 100 120 250 
Average share subscription per member, as of 2019 42 393 79 92 
Members’ contribution, as of 2019 (in million PhP) 0.71 40.9 5.67 1.77 
     
Business segments      
Farm input supply No Yes Yes Yes 
Non-farm input supply Yes No Yes Yes 
Farm output marketing Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Machinery services Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Financing services Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Information obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key informants of Cooperatives A, B, C, and D. 
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5.2 Performance levels 
The study cases had been operating for at least 30 years as different types of farmer 
organisations. All converted to multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives around the time the 
Cooperative Code of the Philippines was enacted in 1990. Despite receiving similar levels of 
government support, a review of each cooperative’s financial documents highlighted 
differences in their performance levels. Growth in assets over the past four years was highest 
in Cooperative B at 0.21%. Positive, asset growth in Cooperatives A and D was small by 
comparison. Cooperative C performed poorly with negative asset growth of -1.36% (see Table 
5.3).  
 
Cooperative B was also the only cooperative that achieved equity growth (6.30%). The other 
three cooperatives’ net equity diminished over the past four years (2016-2019). This could be 
explained by two reasons. First, the members’ allocated equity accounts for more than 50% 
of Cooperative B’s total net equity. Members’ share capital contributions was also growing 
(0.10%). Thus, growth in share capital contributions propelled growth in the net equity. 
Although Cooperative C’s members’ share capital contributions was more than 50%, they 
have not experienced any significant growth in the allocated equity. Even when the share of 
allocated equity is higher than unallocated equity, a lack of growth in the allocated equity 
meant that net equity growth is driven primarily by changes in the unallocated equity. Second, 
the unallocated equity, which is primarily composed of donated capital, is depreciating. 
Unallocated equity accounts for more than 50% of Cooperatives A and D’s net equity. 
Shrinkage in the unallocated equity significantly impacts a cooperative’s net equity especially 
if the share of unallocated equity is greater than allocated equity. 
 
The shrinkage in the cooperatives’ unallocated equity has also contributed to contractions in 
the book value per share. Additional assets acquired by the cooperatives were not enough to 
offset the depreciation of donated physical assets. All four cooperatives’ book value per share 
have declined. The cooperatives are also issuing more shares. The issuance of more shares 
results in the dilution of the per share book value.  
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Table 5.3 
Financial Position of Cooperatives A, B, C and D for 2019 and Percentage Growth per Annum, (2019 = 100) 
Financial indicators Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
 PhP % p.a.1 PhP % p.a.1 PhP % p.a.1 PhP % p.a.1 
Total assets (in millions) 2.94 0.04 120.98 0.21 19.94 -1.36 8.15 0.02 
Total liabilities (in millions) 0.36 0.40 63.23 0.45 10.95 -0.09 2.14 -0.07 
Net equity (in millions) 2.58 -1.08 57.75 6.30 9.00 -0.72 6.01 3.51 
Members’ share capital (in millions) 0.77 0.16 40.87 0.10 5.48 0 1.74 0.07 
Book value/share (PhP) 333.88 -19.14 1,413.04 -7.47 820.73 -4.64 344.10 -7.86 
Revenue (in millions) 1.08 55.87 12.42 -6.80 4.52 -0.32 2.04 -1.08 
Note: Information obtained from Cooperatives A, B, C, and D’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
1 Values measured on a trend line. 
 
Table 5.4 
Predicted Financial Performance of Cooperatives A, B, C and D for 2016 and 2019 
Financial ratios Acceptable 
range 
Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
 2016 2019 2016 2019 2016 2019 2016 2019 
Net profit margin (net income/revenue) (%) 15-25b 5.86 5.09 44.18 16.58 13.92 3.89 6.92 -26.98 
Return on assets (%) 4-8b 0.17 1.50 13.02 2.09 2.90 0.94 1.87 -6.57 
Return on equity (%) 3-10b 1.06 6.35 25.18 5.66 12.43 3.42 10.31 -31.44 
Debt-to-assets ratio 0.6-0.3b 0.05 0.19 0.17 0.47 0.61 0.55 0.34 0.25 
Debt-to-equity ratio 1.5-0.43b 0.06 0.23 0.21 0.90 1.57 1.24 0.54 0.39 
Current ratio (cash) 1.3-2.0b 3.54 1.64 4.42 1.50 5.37 3.28 3.71 5.44 
Quick ratio (cash + receivables) 1c 2.85 1.15 3.50 1.09 4.14 2.43 3.54 5.38 
Note: Information obtained from Cooperatives A, B, C, and D’s 2017-2019 audited financial statements. 
a Values measured on a trend line. 
b Based on the University of Minnesota Extension’s recommended values. 
c Based on the FAO’s recommended values (1991). 
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Trends in the financial ratios further strengthen Cooperative B’s position as the most 
successful cooperative among the four studied cooperatives. Trendline predicted returns on 
equity for 2019 were positive (5.66%) despite a significant drop in revenue for the year (see 
Table 5.4). Likewise, Cooperative B reached healthy positions in leverage and liquidity in 2019. 
These positions do not hold true for Cooperative D. Profitability, leverage and liquidity are 
outside the acceptable ranges indicating that, in 2019, Cooperative D’s position was not 
promising. Meanwhile, Cooperative A and C stand in the middle of the four cooperatives. 
Cooperative A has a good liquidity position and is not highly leveraged. Cooperative C is 
solvent but is unhealthily liquid. 
 
Even though the level of government support has been much the same for all four 
cooperatives (see Table 5.1), the government’s donated capital, in the form of physical assets, 
forms a large part of Cooperative A and D’s net equity. It can be surmised that both 
cooperatives are heavily reliant on government support. In contrast, donated capital 
contributes less than 30% of Cooperative B and C’s total equity. In addition, only Cooperative 
B has established and is maintaining a market reputation (see Table 5.5). This intangible asset 
means that Cooperative B has established market leadership and, therefore, has a guaranteed 
market for its products, so long as it maintains it reputational criteria. 
 
Table 5.6 presents a summary of the financial and non-financial indicators that determine the 
cooperative’s individual level of performance. An affirmative response means that a positive 
performance indicator is observed in the cooperative. The cooperatives are ranked according 
to the decreasing number of affirmative responses to the indicators. Based on the ranking, 
Cooperative B appears to be the best performing cooperative among the four, both in terms 
of the financial and non-financial criteria. Cooperative A and C are positioned in the middle 
with four and three positive indicators, respectively. With only two positive indicators, 
Cooperative D appears to be the worst performing cooperative in the studied cases. 
 
5.3 Institutional problems resulting from property rights structure 
This section discusses the presence, or absence, of institutional problems observed in the 
studied cooperatives. It also identifies the existing propery rights arrangements that are likely 
to  cause these institutional problems.  
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Table 5.5 
Non-financial Measures of Performance of Cooperatives A, B, C and D in 2019 
Criteria Indicator  Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
Outreach Average annual membership growth (size) 8.68% 3.00% 3.48% 4.23% 
Level of government supporta  High Low Low High 
Presence of relevant linkages Intangible assets (reputation) No Yes No No 
 Significant downstream linkages No Yes No No 
Directors are qualified  Percent positive response by members 91.7% 100% 100% 83.3% 
Manager is qualified Percent positive response by members 91.7% 100% 91.7% 83.3% 
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, audited financial statements, AGM minutes, and interviews with key informants of Cooperatives A, B, C, and 
D. 
a Low means less than 30% of the assets are from donated capital, moderate means 30% - 60% of the assets are from donated capital, and high means more than 60% of 
the assets are from donated capital. 
 
Table 5.6 
Summary of Performance Indicators for Cooperatives A, B, C and D 
Performance indicator Cooperative B Cooperative A Cooperative C Cooperative D 
Performance measures      
Net equity growth Yes No No Yes 
Asset growth Yes Yes No Yes 
Low contraction (<10%) in book value per share  Yes No Yes Yes 
Profitability (2019 ROE) Yes Yes Yes No 
Profitability growth (ROE trend) No Yes No No 
Leverage (2019 debt-to-equity ratio) Yes No Yes No 
Liquidity (2019 current ratio) Yes Yes No No 
Low level of government support Yes No Yes No 
Presence of intangible assets (reputation) and significant markets Yes No No No 
Note: Adapted from Tables  5.3-5.5.
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5.3.1 Free-riding problem 
Cooperatives A, C, and D face external free-riding problem. Except for Cooperative A and D’s, 
financial services, Cooperative A, C and D’s businesses are accessible to non-members. An 
external free-riding problems exists when non-members enjoy the same transactional 
benefits as members without bearing the full costs of transacting with the cooperative (Cook 
& Iliopoulos, 2000). This is the situation with some of the business segments of the three 
cooperatives: non-farm input supply for Cooperative A; farm input supply, non-farm input 
supply, and farm output marketing for Cooperative C; and farm input supply, non-farm input 
supply, farm output marketing, and machinery services for Cooperative D. The situation is 
worse in Cooperative D because free-riding occurs in four of its five business segments. Both 
members and non-members can access these businesses at the same prices and terms. 
Providing members with exclusive incentives such as better prices alleviates the external free-
riding problem (Giannakas et al., 2016). Cooperative C offers members better terms, that is, 
cheaper service fees and interest rates for its machinery and financial services businesses, 
respectively. Among the three cooperatives, Cooperative A minimises the effects of external 
free-riding problem the most. Three of its four business segments offer transactional 
advantages to its members. 
 
Unlike the other three cooperatives, Cooperative B caters only to its members. Thus, 
Cooperative B does not face external free-riding problem. Although Cooperative B has 
multiple business segments, all of them cater to one core business – marketing of paddy 
seeds. Farm input supply, machinery services, and financial services are all directed towards 
optimising the quality and quantity of their members’ paddy which will subsequently be 
delivered to the cooperative. Although interviews with officials indicate that they are open to 
service (machinery) and supply (farm input) non-members, this is a rare occurrence since the 
cooperative’s business operations are designed to meet the specific and immediate farming 
needs of its members. Moreover, Cooperative B has a reputation for the quality of the paddy 
seeds that they market. As such, Cooperative B does not process non-members’ paddy since 
the cooperative does not have the means to monitor the quality of the non-members’ paddy. 
Cooperatives A, C and D do not distinguish between the paddy delivered by members and 
non-members.  
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All four cooperatives suffer from internal free-riding problem. New members benefit from 
the use of the cooperative’s existing assets without the proportionate investment required to 
access those assets (Vitaliano, 1983). For all the studied cooperatives, entry requirements are 
the same. New entrants and existing members are required to subscribe similar levels of share 
capital regardless of their usage level. Members of all four cooperatives pay the same nominal 
share price, enjoy the same criteria to claim benefits, and redeem shares at their nominal 
(par) value regardless of length of membership. However, benefit claims for all of the four 
cooperatives are not only based on patronage. The level of investment is also considered in 
the distribution of benefit claims. This somewhat alleviates the internal free-riding problem 
because there is proportionality between a member’s level of investment and level of benefits 
they can claim. 
 
Cooperative B addressed internal free-riding by introducing per unit retains in their farm 
output marketing business segment. Cooperative B retains a specific amount per sack of 
paddy delivered by members. This retained amount is added to the member’s share capital. 
Thus, a member’s level of investment is at least proportional to that member’s level of 
patronage, the volume of paddy delivered. Patronage for other business segments are also 
affected by the policy since the level of usage is proportional to the volume of paddy 
delivered, that is, farm inputs purchased, machinery hired, and production loans applied for 
are proportional to the members’ farm area and expected volume of paddy delivered.  
 
Cooperatives A, C, and D have also imposed proportionality of investment and patronage in 
one business segment – financial services. The amount members can borrow from the 
cooperative is dependent on their level of investment. Further, Cooperatives A and C have 
introduced a loan retention policy wherein the cooperative retains a percentage of the loaned 
amount and adds it to the member-borrower’s share capital contributions. This policy creates 
some proportionality between the level of patronage and investment. A member who 
borrows more from the cooperative is expected to have a higher share capital contribution 
than a member who borrows less. Aligning patronage with investment addresses the internal 
free-riding problem (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). Table 5.7 presents the observed attributes of 
the four cooperatives that are believed to contribute to the free-riding problem.
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Table 5.7 
Property Rights that affect Free-Rider Problems in Cooperatives A, B, C and D 
Attributes Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
External free-riding problem     
Non-members can patronise cooperative products and services 
Farm input supply Not applicable No Yes Yes 
Non-farm input supply Yes Not applicable Yes Yes 
Farm output marketing Yes No Yes Yes 
Machinery services Yes No Yes Yes 
Financing services No No Yes No 
Members and non-members patronise business on same terms 
Farm input supply No No Yes Yes 
Non-farm input supply Yes No Yes Yes 
Farm output marketing No No Yes Yes 
Machinery services No No No Yes 
Financing services No No No No 
     
Internal free-riding problem     
Benefits claim is not proportional to investment No, 50% proportional No, 60% proportional No, 60% proportional No, 60% proportional 
Members earn benefit claims without patronising Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Investment is proportional to patronage     
Farm input supply Not applicable Yes No No 
Non-farm input supply No Not applicable No No 
Farm output marketing No Yes No No 
Machinery services No Yes No No 
Financing services Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Information obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key informants of Cooperatives A, B, C, and D.
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5.3.2 Horizon and portfolio problems 
As shares are redeemable and therefore cannot be traded at market value, it can be surmised 
that horizon and portfolio problems are present in all four cooperatives. The dismal growth 
in the allocated equity and the lack of attempt to increase the retained earnings from the 
minimum (30%) required by the law indicate that members’ investment appetite is dampened 
by the lack of capital gains. Members most likely prefer to maximise short-term benefits, in 
the form of annually distributed profits, than to retain their earnings. There is no incentive to 
retain and reinvest earnings into multi-year projects (Cook, 1995) because they will not 
receive capital gains when exiting the cooperative. 
 
The absence of capital gains may also explain why members who no longer patronise the 
cooperative’s businesses do not leave the cooperative. Non-patronising members prefer to 
retain membership, especially in the profitable cooperatives (Cooperatives A, B and C) 
because dividends on share capital are reliably distributed annually. Non-patronising 
members prefer to earn dividends on their shares than to redeem at their nominal (par) value.  
 
Members who wish to leave the cooperative must redeem their shares at par value. This 
exposes the cooperative to redemption risk, a threat felt most acutely by cooperatives that 
are not performing well. Cooperative D imposed severe restrictions on share redemption; 
only one member can exit the cooperative in a year. Members who want to leave may do so 
only if they can find a non-member who is willing to take over their membership and buy their 
shares at par value. Cooperatives A, B and C allow members to exit and redeem shares at any 
time. Moreover, Cooperative C allows members to redeem some of their shares without 
exiting the cooperative, and regularly redeems shares held by members in excess of maximum 
levels specified by the cooperative. 
 
All four cooperatives alleviate the portfolio problem by allowing members to use some 
services at levels that are not linked to their level of investment. They also allow members to 
continue investing even if their patronage does not warrant or require further investment. 
Voluntary investment is influenced by expectations about annual dividends, and not by 
expectations about patronage. Property rights affecting horizon and portfolio problems in the 
case studies are summarised in Table 5.8.  
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5.3.3 Control and influence problems 
All four of the cooperatives studied separated ownership from control. Strategic business 
decisions are taken by directors elected by the cooperative’s members (principal). These 
decisions are executed by the management team (agent). Leaving management in the hands 
of specialists is important, but it does expose organisations to a control problem. This problem 
is compounded in cooperatives where shares cannot be traded because there is no market 
price to signal management’s performance (Cook, 1995), and shareholders cannot easily 
sanction poor management by disinvesting. In addition, cooperatives cannot reward good 
managers with shares to align their interests with those of patron-shareholders because the 
cooperatives do not have performance-based share options. 
 
Like most other cooperatives, the four cases studied in this research assigned equal voting 
power to members (one-member, one-vote) and are therefore exposed to an influence 
problem because control resides with majority patrons rather than majority investors.  
Democratic control is a legal requirement of cooperatives in the Philippines (RA 9520 
Philippine Cooperative Code, Chapter 1, Article 3, Item 2). Cooperative C, however, limits the 
maximum number of shares that members may own. This creates a degree of equality in 
member investment, which helps to align voting power with investment thereby alleviating 
the influence problem. The Code also prevents non-members from holding elected positions 
in the cooperative and from voting during the cooperative’s decision processes. This rule was 
intended to prevent non-member patrons and other outsiders from influencing decisions 
made by the cooperative.  
 
Influence costs are presumably higher in Cooperatives A, C and D than in Cooperative B 
because membership in the first three cooperatives is more heterogeneous (Cook, 1995). 
However, there is little evidence that the influence costs are actually more pronounced in the 
three cooperatives. Table 5.8 shows that the propery rights affecting control and influence 
problems are the same in all four case studies. Despite this commonality, there were 
significant differences in governance arrangements that affected exposure to control and 
influence problems. These governance practices are discussed in Section 5.4.   
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Table 5.8 
Property Rights that affect Horizon, Portfolio, Control and Influence Problems in Cooperatives A, B, C and D 
Attributes Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
Horizon and portfolio problems     
Membership is restricted to patrons Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Shares are redeemable and not appreciable Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Retained earnings share from net earnings is at minimum Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Policies on share redemption     
Members can readily exit and redeem all shares Yes Yes Yes No 
Members can redeem some shares without exiting No No Yes No 
Periodic redemption of excess member capital No No Yes No 
     
Control and influence problems     
BOD and management are independent of each other Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Share-related performance rewards are absent Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Voting rule is one-member, one-vote  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Presence of interest group within the membership No No No No 
Non-members can be elected/appointed as directors No No No No 
Note: Obtained from articles of cooperation, amended bylaws, AGM minutes, and interviews with key informants of Cooperatives A, B, C, and D.
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5.4 Governance practices 
The four cooperatives’ governance practices are defined by the governing law and the 
standard procedures practiced by cooperatives in the country. The studied cooperatives 
adhere to the minimum required good practices. A cooperative’s failure to comply with the 
required good practices will result in the revocation of their registration as a cooperative; a 
cooperative needs a valid certificate of registration in order to enjoy tax exemptions. 
 
Governance practices that promote transparency are present in the four cooperatives. In all 
of the cooperatives, AGMs were regularly held for the last five years. Attendance exceeded 
the required number to constitute a quorum. The cooperatives introduced measures to 
ensure that attendance is satisfactory. All four cooperatives distributes gifts during the AGMs 
to reward attendees. Cooperative C also imposes a PhP1000.00 fine to absent members. 
Membership in Cooperative D will be revoked if a member misses three consecutive AGMs. 
Members interviewed for the four cooperatives had regularly attended AGMs. The members 
stated that they have adequate time to prepare for, and attend, the AGM because the 
meeting is advertised at least a week prior to the AGM. AGM announcements are primarily 
made through registered mail. Members were also reminded of the meeting through mobile 
messaging, through other forms of social media or via personal communications.  
 
During the AGMs, the members receive copies of relevant reports. Except for a handful of 
members from Cooperative D, those interviewed said that the circulation time was sufficient 
for them to review the reports. The BOD and committees present their prepared reports 
during the AGM. Financial reports are prepared and presented by a government-registered 
independent auditor. Except for Cooperative A, AGM minutes indicate that the approval of 
an independent auditor’s appointment rest upon the GA. Members find the reports easy to 
understand. Questions relating to the reports are promptly addressed; members can easily 
discuss reports and other cooperative matters with the BOD during the AGM. Members can 
also readily access the BOD meetings minutes and easily approach cooperative leaders to 
discuss BOD or management decisions. In the four cooperartives, decision-making is designed 
to be centralised. Amended bylaws required members to ratify the BOD’s decisions and 
proposals during the AGM. If questions or contentions are raised, the decision is put on hold 
for review and further discussion by the BOD. AGM minutes of the Cooperatives A, C and D 
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showed that when the GA disagreed with a decision made by the BOD, the BOD put the 
decision aside for review and reconsideration. The BOD presented the results of their review 
and their final decision to the GA for ratification. However, AGM minutes of Cooperative B 
showed that the GA deliberated and voted to overturn some of the BOD’s decisions. In short, 
Cooperative B displayed collective decision-making behaviour. This practice can exacerbate 
the influence problem because coordination costs imposed by collective decision-making are 
higher than those impose by centralised decision-making  (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013; Cook 
& Iliopoulos, 2016).  
 
BOD elections are held annually during the AGM. Candidates for elective positions file their 
candidacy at least a month prior to the AGM. Once candidacy is filed, Cooperative B educates 
the candidates about the expectations and responsibilities of the contested positions. 
Cooperative B officials explained that orientation is designed to prepare candidates for the 
role for which they are vying for. Only members can stand for elections. Likewise, only 
members can vote during the elections. All four cooperatives practice voting through secret 
ballot during the election of cooperative officials. In doing so, members vote in confidentiality 
and according to their preferences. This practice embraces good governance (Chibanda et al., 
2009) and reduces influence problems (Rosairo et al., 2012). For other matters that require 
the GA’s approval, members vote by raising their hands. Interviewed members felt that the 
current electoral procedures are fair. Although respondents from Cooperatives A, C, and D 
acknowledged that non-members’ advice was sought during the AGMs, only members from 
Cooperative C said that their decisions were influenced by non-members’ counsel. The 
minimal influence of non-members on cooperative affairs means that control of the 
cooperative’s strategic direction rests with the GA and the BOD. 
 
The cooperatives’ amended bylaws indicate that the GA has the ultimate power to remove 
an underperforming director. Among the four cooperatives, only Cooperative C exercised this 
power. The BOD recommended that an underperforming director be removed and a special 
general assembly meeting was conducted for this specific reason. Cooperatives A and B 
claimed that they did not need to use this power. Underperforming directors were advised to 
resign and they did so voluntarily. 
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As the appointed representatives of the GA, the BOD plays a critical role in shaping the 
direction of the cooperatives’ growth. For the four cooperatives, the BOD is the authority that 
screens and appoints the manager. Cooperative B formed a BOD sub-committee with the sole 
purpose of evaluating applicants for the manager position. The manager directly reports to 
the BOD. Unlike the other three cooperatives, Cooperative B does not require the hired 
manager to be a member of the cooperative. According to a cooperative official, imposing 
such a restriction would limit the pool of potential managers that the cooperative can recruit 
from. Cooperatives B and C requires that the manager should have tertiary qualifications in 
business or agriculture. Thus, the manager is expected to have the technical skills needed to 
manage an agricultural enterprise. Cooperative C also imposes the same requirement.  
 
In all cases, the cooperatives’ managers regularly attend monthly BOD meetings to report on 
the cooperative’s performance and operations. The managers are also expected to provide 
inputs during BOD discussions on cooperative matters; however, the managers do not vote 
on policy and strategic decisions. As the appointing authority, the BOD can remove 
underperforming managers. Cooperative B did just that when members of the management 
team mismanaged the cooperative’s funds. However, it appears that firing a manager whose 
interest conflicted with those of the cooperative was difficult for Cooperative D. When 
conflict arose between the manager and the BOD a decade ago, the BOD ended up taking 
over the management without officially firing the manager.  
 
The studied cooperatives’ amended bylaws discourage directors from managing the 
cooperative. However, Cooperative D had a history of appointing directors to manage the 
cooperative. Officials in Cooperatives A, B, and D felt that directors could and should 
intervene in the operations of the cooperative in times of crisis, as happened in Cooperatives 
A and D when they faced financial difficulties. However, Cooperative C’s officials emphasised 
that the separation of authority between the BOD and management means that the BOD 
should not intervene in the management of the operations. In fact, the qualifying 
requirements for the manager’s role is the absence of any relationship (by consanguinity or 
affinity) with any member of the BOD. Table 5.9 presents the governance practices observed 
in the four studied cooperatives while Table 5.10 summarises the property rights 
arrangements and governance practices that vary among the studied cooperatives. 
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Table 5.9 
Governance Practices that affect Transparency and Accountability in Cooperatives A, B, C and D  
Practices Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
Transparency     
AGMs held regularly Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adequate notification of upcoming AGMs  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
GA can readily access BOD meeting minutes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Annual financial statements are independently audited  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Members have sufficient time to review reports Yes Yes Yes No 
The BOD and management accountability     
The BOD elections held regularly Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Only members nominated and elected directors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Directors are elected via secret ballot Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Members consider election to be fair Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The GA can remove director from office Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The GA removed an underperforming director from office  No No Yes No 
The BOD selected and appointed the manager Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager reports directly to the BOD Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Manager attends BOD meetings Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The BOD can fire manager or member of management team Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The BOD failed to fire an unsuitable manager  No No No Yes 
The BOD and management qualities and processes     
Members participate in policy & strategic decision-making No Yes No No 
Non-members advise during AGMs Yes No Yes Yes 
Non-members’ advice influences members No No Yes No 
Directors can be appointed to management positions No No No Yes 
Directors can participate in management decisions Yes Yes No Yes 
Directors intervened in daily operations Yes No No Yes 
Manager must be an active member Yes No Yes Yes 
Manager must have tertiary qualification No Yes Yes No 
Current manager has a university degree Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Information obtained from articles of cooperation, bylaws, audited financial statements, AGM minutes, and interviews with key informants of Cooperatives A, B, C, 
and D. 
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Table 5.10 
Summary of Institutional Arrangements that differ between Cooperatives A, B, C and D  
Attributes Cooperative A Cooperative B Cooperative C Cooperative D 
Property rights structure      
Only members can patronise the cooperative No Yes No No 
Members patronise the cooperative on better terms than non-members Yes Yes No No 
Investment is proportional to patronage No Yes No No 
Members can readily exit and redeem all shares Yes Yes Yes No 
Members can redeem some shares without exiting the cooperative No No Yes No 
Periodic redemption of excess member capital No No Yes No 
     
Governance practices     
Members have sufficient time to review reports Yes Yes Yes No 
GA removed a director from office No No Yes No 
Members do not participate in policy & strategic decision-making Yes No Yes Yes 
Only members advise during AGMs No Yes No No 
Non-members’ advice did not influence members Yes Yes No Yes 
The BOD fired a manager No Yes No No 
Directors should not be appointed to a managerial position  Yes Yes Yes No 
Directors are not allowed to participate in management decisions  No No Yes No 
Director did not intervene in daily operations No Yes Yes No 
Manager does not have to be a member No Yes No No 
Manager must have tertiary qualification No Yes Yes No 
Note: Adapted from Tables 5.7-5.9.
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5.5 Quantitative analysis of determinants of cooperative performance 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4 reported a qualitative comparative analysis of financial performance and 
institutional arrangements (property rights structure and governance practices) observed in 
the four cooperatives studied. Apart from providing evidence supporting NIE propositions 
that weak institutional arrangements undermine an organisation’s financial performance; this 
qualitative analysis generated a set of performance and institutional indicators suitable for 
quantitative analysis, providing an opportunity to triangulate the qualitative findings and to 
identify relationships not revealed by the qualitative analysis. 
 
Table 5.11 summarises a subset of the observed indicators after eliminating those that did 
not vary across the four cases, and one indicator (infagm) that correlated perfectly with 
another, less subjective, indicator of good governance (rmvebod). All of the performance 
indicators presented in Table 5.11 are reported as dummy variables, with a score of one 
indicating the presence of relatively good financial performance, and zero otherwise. 
Likewise, all indicators of property rights and governance practices underpinning financial 
performance are reported as dummy variables with a score of one indicating a good 
institutional arrangement, and zero otherwise. 
 
This section presents the results of a hierarchical cluster analysis of the performance and 
institutional indicators presented in Table 5.11. Hierarchical cluster analysis offers a suitable 
method of detecting positive relationships between binary variables when the number of 
cases is small, as the technique can be applied to variables rather than cases. Broadly 
speaking, the objective of cluster analysis is to classify a set of observations into mutually 
exclusive clusters based on a measure of their similarities (Chatfield & Collins, 1980, pp. 212-
214). A hierarchical cluster analysis of variables starts with a single cluster containing all of 
the variables and, at each successive step, merges the variables into fewer and fewer groups 
such that homogeneity within the groups, or heterogeneity between the groups, is maximised 
(Norusis, 1994, p. 100). Although there is no objective way of choosing an optimum number 
of groups, the decision is usually guided by a substantial increase in a measure of proximity 
showing the loss of homogeneity (heterogeneity) within (between) groups. 
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In this study, the (N=25) dummy variables listed in Table 5.11 were grouped into clusters by 
minimising the squared Euclidean distance within clusters. Variables within clusters are 
positively related, with the strength of these positive relationships weakening as the number 
of clusters diminishes. The results presented in Appendices 9 and 10 show that positive 
relationships between variables within clusters remained strong until the number of clusters 
dropped below four. At this stage, the agglomeration coefficient measuring the loss of 
homogeneity increased sharply from 0.679 to 1.051. 
 
Table 5.11 
Determinants of Rice Farmer Cooperative’s Performance 














Positive net equity growth neg 
Positive asset growth ag 
Less than -10% contraction in book value of shares  bookval 
Within range profitability (2019 ROE)  proe2019 
Profitability growth (ROE trend) pgroetrend 
Within range leverage (2019 debt-to-equity ratio) der2019 
Within range liquidity (2019 current ratio) cr2019 
Low level of government support lowgovsup 


















Only members can patronise the cooperative mempatr 
Members patronise the cooperative on better terms than non-members memadv 
Investment is proportional to patronage invpatr 
Members can readily exit and redeem all shares rdmall 
Members can redeem some shares without exiting the cooperative rdmpart 














Members have sufficient time to review reports sufrevw 
GA removed a director from office rmvebod 
Members do not participate in policy & strategic decision-making prtcpol 
Only members advise during AGMs advagm 
Non-members’ advice did not influence members infagm 
The BOD fired a manager  firemgr 
Directors should not be appointed to a managerial position rstrmngt 
Directors are not allowed to participate in management decisions nalwintv 
Directors did not intervene in daily operations intvday 
Manager does not have to be member mgrmem 
Manager must have tertiary qualification mstter 
Note: Adapted from Tables 5.6 and 5.10. 
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Separation of the performance and institutional indicators into different clusters would not 
support the NIE argument that good financial performance is more likely found in 
organisations that have good institutional arrangements. Conversely, a healthy mix of 
performance and institutional indicators within each cluster lends support to the NIE theory. 
Figure 5.1 shows the mix of indicators in each of the four homogenous clusters identified in 
this study. All of the clusters combine performance indicators with institutional indicators. 
This is consistent with NIE theory and lends credibility to the results of the qualitative analysis. 
The mix of indicators in each cluster also provides more nuanced information about 
relationships between particular aspects of financial performance, property rights and 
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5.5.1 Cluster 1 
Three performance indicators were included in Cluster 1 –  positive net equity growth (neg), 
positive asset growth (ag), and presence of reputation and significant markets (prerepu). This 
signals a positive relationship between growth in equity, assets and market recognition. These 
performance indicators correlated positively with two indicators of property rights (invpatr 
and mempatr) that strengthen proportionality between investment and patronage. 
Proportionality between investment and patronage addresses internal and external free-rider 
problems, encouraging both investment and patronage by aligning the interests of members 
as investors on the one hand, and as patrons on the other hand. This alignment of interests 
also reduces the cost of negotiating and enforcing supply contracts with patrons, which helps 
the cooperative to establish a good reputation for meeting the quantity and quality 
requirements of its buyers, and to establish long-term trading relationships that reduce 
uncertainty in investment plans and inefficiency in operations and resource use. 
 
The performance indicators in Cluster 1 also correlated positively with three governance 
indicators. Growth in equity, assets and market recognition combined with governance 
arrangements that curtail external influence problems (advagm), improve the quality of 
managers (mgrmem), and strengthen accountability (firemgr). The first of these governance 
indicators emphasises the importance of preventing external agencies from influencing the 
selection of directors and appointment of managers – a problem observed in development 
settings where producer organisations tend to be treated as a public good (Rosairo et al., 
2012). Conversely, the second indicator signals the importance of recruiting managers on 
merit from a pool of candidates that is not restricted to members of the cooperative. The last 
of these governance indicators measures the ability and willingness of directors to dismiss 
managers who perform poorly in growing the cooperative’s business. 
 
5.5.2 Cluster 2 
Cluster 2 included two indicators of current performance, one a measure of profitability 
(proe2019) and the other a measure of liquidity (cr2019). These performance indicators 
correlated positively with two indicators of property rights, rdmall and memadv. Cooperatives 
that respect decisions made by members to exit and redeem all of their shares (rdmall) need 
to maintain relatively high levels of liquidity to cope with redemption risk. Profitability is likely 
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to be higher in cooperatives that alleviate the external free-rider problem by offering price 
rebates only to shareholding patrons (memadv), particularly if a substantial part of their 
business is transacted with customers who are not members.   
 
Current profitability and liquidity also correlated positively with two governance indicators, 
sufrevw and rstrmngt. Giving members sufficient time to review their cooperative’s financial 
statements ahead of the AGM promotes transparency and signals competent management - 
a characteristic more likely found in profitable cooperatives. Acceptance of the view that 
directors should not be appointed to managerial positions (rstrmngt) is necessary (but not 
sufficient) to separate ownership from control, a practice that promotes accountability in 
management and which also attenuates the damaging effects of influence problems. 
 
5.5.3 Cluster 3 
Cluster 3 combined one performance indicator, pgroetrend – which signals on-going 
profitability, with two indicators of property rights (rdmpart and rdmperd) and three 
governance attributes (nalwintv, prtcpol and rmvebod). Both property rights indicators reflect 
the ability of members to realise the nominal value of some part of their shareholding before 
they exit the cooperative. While this does not resolve the horizon problem, it does encourage 
members to buy shares or at least to accept retentions imposed by the cooperative to grow 
its equity capital. Regular redemption of ‘excess’ shares (as in Cooperative C) also helps to 
align voting power with investment, thereby alleviating influence problems and reducing 
conflicts of interest that raise transaction costs and decrease profits.  
 
Two of the three governance indicators in Cluster 3, nalwintv and prtcpol, relate to effective 
separation of ownership from control, first by excluding directors from management 
decisions, and second by preventing members from participating in BOD decisions. This does 
not imply that directors should not consult members. Rather it means that board decisions 
should be centralised in the hands of accountable directors to promote efficiency in decision-
making and to curtail influence problems that lead to a misallocation of resources. The 
remaining governance indicator, rmvebod, measures the ability and willingness of members 
to hold directors accountable for BOD decisions by exercising their voice and voting power at 
a general meeting of the cooperative. 
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5.5.4 Cluster 4 
Cluster 4 included three highly correlated performance indicators, with better growth in the 
imputed value of shares (bookval) showing up in acceptable debt/equity ratios (der2019) and 
a relatively low share of assets attributed to donations (lowgovsup). These performance 
indicators combined with two governance indicators.  The first of these, intvday, refers to the 
absence of any interference by directors in the cooperative’s day-to-day operations, even in 
cooperatives that did not explicity forbid directors from participating in management 
decisions. This signals effective separation of ownership from control, and a high degree of 
trust in management. Cornforth (2004) notes that confidence in management also inspires 
managers to act decisively. Not surprising, the second governance indicator in Cluster 4, 
mstter, reflects the quality of the cooperative’s lead manager. In essence, Cluster 4 highlights 




This chapter compared the property rights and governance practices between the four 
cooperatives. Though all four cooperatives share similar institutional arrangements, one 
cooperative stood out. This cooperative introduced policies that significantly mitigated the 
effects of the free-riding problem. Results of the hierarchical cluster analysis showed that 
better performance correlated positively with propery rights and institutional arrangements 
that mitigated the free-rider, horizon and influence problems.  
 
The governance practices between the four cooperatives are also very similar as a result of 
the restrictions imposed by the Philippine Cooperative Code. However, Section 5.4 
highlighted variations in their governance practices. Better performance correlated positively 
with quality management and the adoption of governance practices that promoted 
accountability and transparency, and which clearly separated ownership from control. 
Chapter 6 concludes the research and provides recommendations for cooperative leaders, 
scholar and policymakers. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The primary purpose of the research was to examine the institutional arrangements of rice 
farmer cooperatives in the Davao del Norte province and to establish whether, as NIE 
literature suggests, these arrangements affect cooperative performance.  
 
6.1 Summary of research 
This research used multiple case studies to gather data and test these propositions. Four rice 
farmer cooperatives from the Davao del Norte province were purposefully selected. These 
cooperatives were studied and compared in-depth. Likewise, the cooperatives’ managers, the 
BOD, and members were purposefully selected and interviewed for the study. Members were 
selected using snowball sampling. To enhance the quality of the research design, semi-
structured interview schedules were developed and used during the interviews. The research 
reviewed relevant cooperative documents, including articles of cooperation, bylaws, AGM 
minutes, financial statements, and cooperative profile. All of these were used to triangulate 
the information gathered from the interviews. This technique further strengthens the 
research’s validity.  
 
The research assessed the four cooperatives’ levels of performance using financial and non-
financial measures. The measures revealed variations in the cooperatives’ levels of 
performance. This is despite the fact that all four cooperatives access similar levels of 
government support and operate in similar agricultural, climatic, and market conditions. 
Differences in the cooperatives’ performance could be attributed to their individual 
institutional arrangements. 
 
The research provides up-to-date information about the property rights structure and 
governance practices in rice farmer cooperatives in the Davao del Norte province. More 
specifically, the research tested theory-based propositions about the relationships between 
these arrangements and indicators of cooperative performance. Section 6.2 summarises the 
key observations and analysis made in Chapters Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively, and 
offers  recommendations to improve the cooperatives’ performance. The chapter ends with 
the research’s contribution to knowledge, its limitations, and recommendations for future 
study. 
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6.2 Key findings and recommendations 
The existing cooperative code in the Philippines encourages the formation of traditional 
cooperatives. The law restricts cooperative membership to patrons. It also does not 
encourage cooperatives to provide for appreciable shares and to align patronage with 
investments. As a result, cooperatives will most likely face institutional problems typical in 
most traditional cooperatives. This situation is unlikely to change much unless policymakers 
relax the Cooperative Code to legalise less traditional cooperative models such as New 
Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) or hybrid cooperatives. The  four cooperatives studied 
confront almost all of the institutional problems identified in the literature in varying degrees. 
This is attributed to the presence of property rights arrangements that create these problems. 
However, the studied cooperatives’ practices and policies reveal that Philippine cooperatives 
have adapted and instituted mechanisms that complements the current law and alleviates 
the effects of these institutional problems.  
 
For the studied cooperatives, and presumably all cooperatives in the Philippines, benefits are 
partly proportional to patronage and partly proportional to investment. This somehow 
mitigates the horizon and portfolio problems because members receive short-term returns 
on their investments. However, the conservative Cooperative Code prevents cooperatives 
from issuing a class of non-redeemable shares that can be traded at market prices. Measures 
that allow share appreciation and, consequently, share trading, better address the horizon 
and portfolio problems because the share value reflects the share’s current and potential 
earning potential of the shares. When shares are appreciable, members as investors realise 
not only short-term benefits, in the form of dividends on share capital, on their investments 
but also long-term benefits, in the form of capital gains. Share appreciation would entice risky 
and affluent members to invest more in the cooperative as share value would reflect the 
actual value of the cooperative’s equity. Without these, members are discouraged from 
investing in their cooperative and most Philippine cooperatives rely heavily on assets donated 
by the government. Given the restrictions imposed by the Philippine Cooperative Code, the 
studied cooperatives could also introduce non-voting, transferable and appreciable 
transaction rights. These rights operate similarly to delivery rights issued by NGCs that limits 
the quantity a member can deliver based on the rights they purchased upfront (Coltrain et 
al., 2000, p. 4). Since these rights are tradable and appreciable, members can opt to sell their 
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rights within the membership when they are unable to meet the transaction requirements 
attached to the rights. This solution will allow the cooperative to generate equity, reliably 
predict its operational throughput, and meet downstream contracts. Moreover, this solution 
could encourage inactive members, members who stopped patronising the cooperative’s 
businesses, to leave the cooperative and redeem there shares. 
 
The research reveals that the free-riding problem – both internal and external – is attenuated 
when members’ investments are aligned to their level of patronage. When investment is 
proportional to patronage, members are compelled to invest in the cooperative’s assets 
according to their level of usage (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1998). Thus, those who use more are 
compelled to contribute more than those those who use the assets less. As shown by the 
most successful cooperative and substantiated by the cluster analysis, the alignment of 
investment with patronage, through its per-unit retaining mechanism, promoted stable and 
reliable net equity and asset growths. Proportionality is more manageable when the 
cooperative’s business is homogenous (as in Cooperative B) than when the cooperative offers 
unrelated products and services as it is more tedious to proportionate patronage levels to 
investment for each products and services. Loan retention policies of the other three 
cooperatives, that is, retaining a percentage of a member’s borrowed money and adding it to 
that member’s share capital contributions, somehow allows these cooperatives to align a 
portion of members’ investment to patronage. However, these cooperatives could introduce 
more measures to further promote alignment of investments to patronage for their other 
business segments. For example, the service fees and interest rates charged to patrons when 
they transact with the machinery and financial services, respectively, could be differentiated 
based on the level of usage. The higher the level of usage, the lesser the fees and rates 
charged will be. As a result, members are enticed to patronise more the cooperative’s 
business because of the incremental increase in benefits. This could be implemented through 
the issuance of personalised discount cards to members. 
 
Analysis of the most successful cooperative’s property rights structure revealed the absence 
of the external free-riding problem. Non-members cannot access the cooperative’s 
businesses. Only members, who contributed to the cooperative’s capital, can enjoy the 
benefits from the use of the cooperative’s assets. As the cooperative only transacts with its 
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members, they can monitor and control the quality and quantity of the products delivered by 
the members. This close monitoring and control results in efficient operations, reliable 
downstream market relationships, better market performance and, consequently, improved 
cooperative standing. This finding is supported by the results of the hierarchical cluster 
analysis which revealed a positive relationship between the presence of intangible assets, 
market recognition, and the absence of an external free-riding problem. As a cooperative 
strives to establish and maintain its reputation, there is an increased need to control and 
monitor the quality and quantity of its operations’ throughput. The most efficient means to 
do this is by regulating those who access the cooperative’s assets, that is, by limiting access 
to members only. Cook and Iliopoulos (1998) identified a number of similar strategies 
designed to increase members’ loyalty and give the cooperative greater control of its supply 
channels.  
 
Cooperatives that choose to cater to both members and non-members face external free-
riding. As seen in the least successful cooperative in the study, the free-riding problem 
disincentivised members from staying and investing in the cooperative. Members do not feel 
any benefit from membership since they can still make use of the cooperative’s assets without 
registering. This affects the cooperative’s ability to encourage patronage and investment from 
its members which, in turn, affects its performance. As the cooperative’s performance 
declines, members become more inclined to leave. The situation is made worse when policies 
that further restrict share redemption are introduced. These policies only provide temporary 
relief to the current high redemption faced by the cooperative. However, it does not address 
the cause as to why members are exiting the cooperative. In fact, such policies are likely to 
further discourage members from investing because they cannot withdraw their investment 
at their discretion. To mitigate the effects of external free-riding, these cooperatives must 
provide members with transactional advantages (Giannakas et al., 2016). The hierarchical 
cluster analysis showed a positive relationship between good performance and the presence 
of transactional benefits for members. Transactional advantages such as better value through 
a higher buying price, cheaper service fees and lower interest rates, and preferential 
treatment for members over non-members will entice non-members to join and remain to 
the cooperative.  
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As earlier discussed, when a cooperative is performing badly, members tend to withdaw their 
equity to reduce their exposure to risks. When capital redemption rates climb, a cooperative 
further loses capital and struggles more in recovering from their losses. This will further 
dampen the cooperative’s performance. Underperforming cooperatives are likely to institute 
measures that will discourage redemption. The research revealed that the most equity-
strapped cooperative has two policies that restricts equity redemption. One, members are 
prohibited from redeeming a part of their shareholding. Second, only one member is allowed 
to leave the cooperative and redeem their shares each year. While the second policy is 
designed to protect the cooperative’s current capital base from sudden and large 
withdrawals, it can alienate members from investing more in the cooperative’s equity due to 
the uncertainty of future redemptions. The cooperative would be better off if equity 
redemption policies are designed to reduce the risks of sudden and large redemptions. 
Periodic redemption of equity is one such policy. The policy, adopted by one of the studied 
cooperatives, mandates the cooperative to redeem share capital in excess of a specified 
threshold. The primary objective of the policy is to balance out the members’ shareholding  
base. This policy reduces the effect of the influence problem by ensuring that no individual or 
group of members hold a disproportionately large share of the cooperative’s equity. The 
policy also cushions the cooperative from sudden shocks in its equity base whenever a 
member exits the cooperative. However, periodic redemption is more appealing if the 
cooperative’s mutual equity is growing through either share revaluation or issuance of bonus 
shares.  
 
The laws that regulates the cooperative movement in the  Philippines was designed to 
addressed identified causes of cooperative failure. Thus, the Philippine Cooperative Code is 
very specific on what governance structures a cooperative can adopt. The cooperative 
structure is composed of the GA, the BOD and the management team. This provision 
recognises the importance of separating ownership from control. All four cooperatives 
regularly hold AGMs. The BOD is elected by the members during the AGM. Further, only 
members can stand for elections. These processes promote accountability, as members select 
their representatives from amongst themselves. The law and the cooperatives’ amended 
bylaws provides members a proper mechanism to remove underperforming BODs. This 
mechanism further improves accountability. In addition, the election of the BOD and other 
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officials are conducted via secret ballot. This practice reduces the effects of the influence 
problem as members can vote free from pressure or coercion. The Philippine Cooperative 
Code also mandates that financial statements must be audited annually by a government-
registered external auditor and presented to and ratified by the GA during the AGM. This 
provision of the code is designed to promote accountability and transparency in the country’s 
cooperatives.  
 
Despite the specificity of the Code on a cooperative’s governance arrangements, this research 
found that the studied cooperatives’ interpretation of some provisions of the Code are 
different. These differences resulted in a variation in some of the practices adopted by the 
cooperatives. Though the Code aimed to encourage member education by requiring 
adequate time for members to be able to review annual reports, some members of the least 
performing cooperative felt that they were not given sufficient time to review the said 
reports. This is because the decision on the time period to distribute the reports is dependent 
on the cooperative officials. In addition, information dissemination varies between the 
cooperatives. One cooperative holds quarterly meeting to keep members up-to-date while 
some distribute reports during AGMs. This variation greatly affects the information that a 
member receives, and, in turn, affects a member’s ability to make informed decisions.  
 
Further, even though the Code does not restrict the candidate pool of potential managers in 
terms of their membership to the cooperative, only the most successful cooperative hired an 
outside manager. It appears that most cooperatives select their manager from their 
membership base only. However, requiring a potential manager to be a member limits the 
cooperative’s ability to recruit professional managers who have adequate training in 
overseeing agricultural enterprises. As a cooperative grows and becomes more market-
oriented, there is a need to hire professional managers. This shift in the management 
qualification is one of the observed changes among cooperatives in developed economies 
(Bijman et al., 2014).  
 
The research also found variations in the levels of participation of the members in the decision 
control processes, and of the BODs in the decision management process. In the most 
successful cooperative, influence of external actors in the decision-making are minimised 
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during the AGMs. However, they allow the GA to have greater participation in the decision-
making processes. The GA can put into deliberation and vote on the strategic and policy 
decisions already decided upon by the BOD. This means that decision-making is not 
centralised but collective. Collective decision-making aggravates the influence problem 
because coordination costs are incurred to distribute information and influence members 
(Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). Meanwhile, the least successful cooperative allowed directors 
to take on a managerial role, when the situation required. They also allow directors to 
intervene in the cooperative’s daily operations. This practice could degrade managerial 
independence and could discourage the manager from acting responsibly. The practice also 
jeopardises accountability as a result of unclear boundaries in authority. 
 
The success of a Philippine cooperative is dependent on its ability to formulate and implement 
policies that alleviates the effects of institutional problems brought about by conservative 
cooperative legislation. However, in order for these mechanisms to effectively contribute to 
the growth and sustainability of the cooperative, cooperative leaders must first identify the 
primary causes, not the symptoms, of cooperative failure and address them. 
Notwithstanding, Philippine cooperatives would benefit tremendously if the existing 
cooperative code is amended to allow hybrid forms of cooperatives. This will provide 
cooperatives more options in the design and development of their cooperatives. 
 
6.3 Contributions, limitations, and future research 
The research contributes significantly to the literature on Philippine cooperatives. To date, 
there have been no prior studies on the prevailing institutional arrangements of cooperatives 
in the Philippines. This research has provided in-depth information about the institutional 
arrangements of four rice farmer cooperatives in the Davao del Norte province. This research 
has shown that the cooperatives’ institutional arrangements are largely restricted by the 
existing cooperative law. As such, the property rights structure observed in the four 
cooperatives studied are likely to be present in most cooperatives in the country. However, 
the research has also shown that the studied cooperatives have been able to introduce a 
variety of mechanisms to mitigate the institutional problems that they face. This indicates 
that Philippine cooperatives adopt different strategies, with varying effects on performance, 
to address the similar institutional problems that they face. 
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For policymakers, this research provides up-to-date information on how the current law can 
be amended to provide cooperatives with more options when designing their institutional 
arrangements. Additionally, this research provides policymakers with better insight into the 
kind of interventions suited for specific cooperatives. As cooperatives addressed institutional 
problems differently with different outcomes, policymakers must be able to introduce 
customnised interventions that will help a specific cooperative address the causes, rather 
than the symptoms, of its institutional problems. Current government support and 
interventions are focused on input, facility, and machinery support, and on leadership and 
management capacity-building. This research has shown that cooperatives need additional 
capacity-building in defining and specifying their property rights. 
 
The results of this research is equally useful to cooperative leaders. As highlighted by this 
research, exisiting institutional arrangements affect the performance of a cooperative. A clear 
understanding of their property rights and how these aggravate or mitigate institutional 
problems will help cooperative leaders in formulating more appropriate strategies that 
focuses on the problems that significantly affect their performance. Thus, the solutions 
introduced by the BOD are less likely to provide temporary relief and more likely to sustain 
the cooperative. 
 
While this research was able to examine the institutional arrangements of rice farmer 
cooperatives, it is not without limitations. The Covid-19 pandemic meant that data had to be 
collected by research assistants living in the Philippines. As a result, information is not as 
detailed or in-depth as what the researcher would have liked. A significant amount of time 
was also needed to explain the research and its objectives to the research assistants. Although 
experienced, the research assistants also needed specific training on collecting data using the 
semi-structred interview schedules developed for the research to ensure that the interviews 
were conducted objectively and appropriately. This resulted in the research taking up more 
time than intended. 
 
Further research could examine farmer cooperatives in other parts of the country and in other 
sectors of the agriculture industry to determine whether the observed institutional 
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arrangements are unique to the province, or can be generalised to the whole country, and 
whether they are also unique to the rice sector, or can be generalised to the agriculture 
industry. In addition, further research could also unravel other strategies employed by other 
cooperatives to address the institutional problems they face and the effects of these 
strategies in mitigating these problems. Moreover, as cooperatives are required to report 
their financial statements to regulatory bodies, a time-series analysis using data from each 
cooperative’s financial statements covering their lifetime could reveal more accurate trends 
in the studied cooperatives financial performance. Such a study could identify periods of 
growth and decline and identify events during these times that could have significantly 
contributed to the cooperative’s financial position. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1  
Interview schedule 
Board of Directors 
Davao del Norte Rice Cooperative 
 
 
This research is: 
 
 Completely voluntary in nature. 
 Respondent is free to decide not to participate at any time during or after the interview. 
 
Provide contact details (Brenda.Dimas@lincolnuni.ac.nz or +63 905 305 9424) for queries 
or expression of withdrawal. 
 Responses will be aggregated for analysis only, and no personal details will be reported. 
 A summary of findings will be provided to the organisation. 
 Interview might be recorded to ease transcription (if respondent allows). 
 
We are immensely grateful to you for participating in the study. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PART I. ORGANISATIONAL PROFILE (Pre-filled up prior to interview). 
 
Name of organisation  
Date of registration  
Number of founding members  
Current number of members  
In the register  
Are there inactive members? Y N 
If yes, how many and why?  
Geographical coverage of organisation 
Barangay, specify:  
Municipality/City, specify:  
Provincial, specify:  
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PART II. INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
a. OC Owned by cooperative | L Leased to cooperative | B Borrowed by cooperative | OT Others 
b. PC Purchased by cooperative | MD Member donated physical assets (in kind) | GA Granted by an external agency | O Others 
c. O Operational/utilised | NO Non-operational/unutilised 
 
1 ASSETS HELD BY THE COOPERATIVE 
Assets Quantity  
(units | area) 
Ownership statusa 
(If not OC, proceed to Usage Status) 
Means of acquisitionb 
(Refer to Table 4.14) 
Usage 
statusb 
Remarks, if any 
Land      
      
      
      
      
      
Buildings, facilities & machinery      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Others      
      
      
      
      
  111 
a. MO Members only | MN Members and non-members 
b. BP Better prices | PR Patronage refund | D Dividend | SA Priority on service access or produce delivery | O Others
2 CURRENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
Business Operations Particulars Who can patronise the 
specific business?a  (If MO, 
proceed to Table 3) 
Do members have 
advantages? Y Yes 
| N No 
If yes, what is the 
advantage?b 
If O, what are the 
other advantages? 
Products      
Sale of farm inputs      
      
Sale of non-farm inputs      
      
Marketing of farm outputs      
      
Marketing of non-farm outputs      
      
Services      
Provision of machinery services      
Provision of farm labour services      
Provision of technical advice      
Lending      
      
      
Processing      
      
      
Others      
      
      
  112 
a. MA Manager | BOD Board of Director | GA General Assembly  
 
3 BUSINESS STRATEGY 
3.1 Does the cooperative want to expand operation on some 
of its products/services in the next five years? 
Y If yes, answer 3.2-3.4 
N If no, proceed to 4 
If yes, what products/services?  
3.2 Who identifies what products/services are for expansion?a   
3.3 Who approves what products/services are for expansion?a   
3.4 What are the reasons that 
might prevent or delay 
possible expansions? (Tick 
all that apply.) 
 Insufficient capital  
 Insufficient member support 
 Insufficient operational knowledge 
 Other reasons, specify: 
4 CAPITAL ACQUISITION 
4.1 How do the 
cooperative raise 
capital? (Rank from 
highest (from 1) to 
lowest (up to 5)) 
 Retained earnings (If selected, answer 4.2) 
 Additional member contribution (If selected, answer 4.3) 
 Borrowing from external financiers (If selected, answer 4.4) 
 Donor assistance (If selected, answer 4.5-4.6) 
 Others, specify: 
4.2 Retained earnings 
Who determines the value of earnings retained for the last fiscal year?a  
Who approves the value of earnings retained for the last fiscal year?a  
Did the cooperative increase the percentage of retained 
earnings in the last three fiscal years? 
Y  
N  
4.3 Additional member contribution 
Is the additional member contribution voluntary? Y If yes, proceed to 4.4 
N  
Who determines the value of additional member contribution?a  
Who approves the value of additional member contribution?a  




 Proportional to member’s patronage 
 Proportional to member’s shareholding 
 Allocated equally to all members 
 Others, specify: 
4.4 Borrowing from external financiers 
What percentage of the 
cooperative’s capital 
requirement last year was 
acquired from external 
financiers? 
Institution Individual  
% % Lender 
% % Investors 
% % Donors 
% % Others, specify: 
Are external financiers 
represented during 
board meetings or 
AGMs? (Tick all that 
apply.) 
BOD meetings AGM  
  No 
  Yes, they attend meetings as observers 
  Yes, they attend meetings as advisors 
  Yes, they attend meetings as participants 
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a. G National Government Agency | L Local Government Unit | N Non-government Organisation 
b. FS Financial subsidy | TA Tangible assets | CB Capacity building | SL Supply chain linkage 
c. PM Participation in management | PD Participation in the BOD decision-making | AC Advisory capacity 
only | O Others | N None 
4.5 Donor assistance 




If yes, what organisation facilitated its establishment?  
What percentage of the cooperative’s initial financial 
capital was provided by the facilitating organisation? 
% Grant, loan or shareholding? 
Did the facilitating 
organisation provide 
the cooperative with 
any physical assets? 
Y 
If yes, what assets 
were donated or 







4.6 Other external organisations who provided capital 
Can you disclose the external organisations who 
provided capital assistance to the cooperative? 
Kind of 
organisationa 




    
    
    
    
5 MEMBERSHIP QUALIFICATIONS AND BENEFITS 
5.1 Can a member of the 
cooperative be a: 
 natural person? 
 household? 
 legal entity? 
5.2 What financial contribution 
must be made to be a full 
member: 
 pay an initial fee to join? 
 pay an annual subscription fee? 
 buy shares?  
 other, specify: 
5.3 Does the cooperative provide 
services to: 
 members who are not fully paid up? 
 non-members?  
If yes, do members who are fully paid-up get these services 
at a better price than other users?  
Y  
N  
5.4 Are members required to satisfy a minimum patronage 
requirement to continue enjoying membership benefits? 
Y  
N  
5.5 What percentage of the membership did not patronise the business last year? % 












  one vote each at a general assembly meeting? 
  more votes than other members who make less use of the 
cooperative? 
  more votes than other members who contribute less 
capital to the cooperative? 
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6 SHAREHOLDING OWNED IN THE COOPERATIVE  
6.1 Do members own shares in the cooperative? Y If yes, answer the rest of Table 6 
N If no, proceed to Table 7 
If yes, does the cooperative issue:  just one type of share? 
 more than one type of share? 
Complete the table below. (Y for Yes | N for No | D for Don’t know.) Share A Share B Share C 
6.2 What name(s) do you give to these shares? 
 
   
6.3 Are these shares recorded in a register (list of members with 
corresponding number of shares)? 
   
6.4 Did members pay for these shares?    
If yes, must the cooperative redeem (i.e., buy) these shares if 
the shareholder leaves the cooperative?  
   
If yes, must the cooperative redeem these shares if the 
shareholder wants to withdraw part of his/her shares? 
   
If shares are redeemable, has the cooperative ever increased 
their share price or issued bonus shares?  
   
If shares are redeemable, did the cooperative redeem any 
shares in the past year or two? 
   
If shares were redeemed in the past year or two, was it at 
nominal price? 
   
If shares are not redeemable, are members allowed to 
trade them with other members? 
   
If shares are not redeemable, does the cooperative 
facilitate trading of shares among members? 
   
6.5 Is the number of shares held by a member linked to the amount 
of business they do with the cooperative? 
   
6.6 Is there some minimum number of shares a member must buy?    
6.7 Is there some maximum number of shares a member can buy?    
6.8 Can firms or individuals who do not use the cooperative’s 
services buy any of these shares? 
   
If yes, are these non-patrons allowed to vote at a general 
assembly meeting? 
   
If yes, is there any limit on non-patron voting rights to 
ensure that patrons stay in control of the cooperative?  
   
Complete the rest of this table indicating amounts where possible. 
6.9 What is the nominal share price (PhP/share)? 
 
   
6.10 How many shares does the typical patron member own?    
6.11 If a dividend was paid, what was the size of the most recent 
dividend paid (PhP/share)? 
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a. CA Cash| USC Payment for unpaid share capital | ASC Subscription for additional share capital | O 
Others, specify 
b. VD Voted in decision-making | AB Served as an advisor to the GA | AO Acted as an observer 
c. Y Yes | NM No, perform more than their role | NL No, perform less than their role 
 
6.12  How were the dividends paid?a    
6.13  If the cooperative sold shares to non-patrons, what percentage of its total 
shareholding is owned by these non-patrons? 
% 
6.14  If the cooperative sold shares to a non-patron who is also a 
business partner, what key service does this partner provide? 
 
6.15  What percentage of the cooperative’s total shareholding does this partner own?  
7 ANNUAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY (AGM) 
7.1 Was the Annual General Assembly meeting 
consistently conducted over the last five years? 
Y  
N  
7.2 When was the last Annual General Assembly meeting?  
7.3 Did non-members attend the last Annual General 
Assembly meeting? 
Y If yes, complete Table 7.4 
N If no, proceed to 7.5 
7.4 Non-Member attendance at the last Annual General Assembly meeting 
Who are the non-members that 
attended? 
What is their role in the 
meeting?a 
Did they perform their expected 
role?b 
   
   
   
   
   
7.5 How many members came along during the last Annual General Assembly meeting?  
7.6 Did the members received prior notice of the last 
Annual General Assembly meeting? 
Y If yes, answer 7.7-7.8 
N If no, proceed to 7.9 
7.7 How many days was the notice circulated prior to 
the last Annual General Assembly meeting? 
 Less than 14 days 
 Between 15–30 days 
 Between 31–60 days 
7.8 How was the 
notice circulated? 
 Written notice 
 Mobile communication device 
 Word of mouth through cluster leaders 
 Others, specify: 
7.9 Circulation of Reports 
Kind of reports Are reports circulated prior to the 
Annual General Assembly 
meeting?  Y Yes | N No 
Is the report externally 
reviewed?  
Y Yes | N No 
Minutes of Previous AGM   
Annual reports   
Financial statements   
Others, specify:   
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a. MA Manager | BOD Board of Director | GA General Assembly | O Others 
8 ELECTORAL PROCEDURE 
8.1 Were there any elections held during the last 
AGM? 
Y If yes, proceed to 8.3 
N If no, answer 8.2 first 
8.2 Why not? (Tick all 
that apply.) 
 No position is up for elections 
 There is no contest to the incumbent official(s) 
 There is only one candidate for the vacant position(s) 
 Others, specify: 
8.3 How many director positions were up for elections during the last AGM?  
8.4 Who nominated the 
candidates for director 
positions during the last 
AGM? (Tick all that apply.) 
 Members 
 External support (GO/NGO): 
 Strategic partner/investor: 
 Others, specify: 
8.5 When were the 
candidates 
nominated? 
 A member can raise hand to nominate during AGM 
 A member/cluster group nominated a candidate prior to AGM 
 Others, specify: 





the director positions? other concerns?  
  Via show of hands 
  Via secret ballot 
  Both above, as the need arises 
  Others, specify: 
9 BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
9.1 How many directors does the BOD have?  
9.2 How many years is a director’s term of office?  
9.3 How many terms can an individual serve as a director?  
9.4 What are the 
qualifications to 
become a director? 
 Minimum years being an active member: 
 Minimum years of formal training: 
 Minimum years of actual experience in business: 
 Others, specify: 
9.5 Are there non-members acting as 
advisory directors? 




9.6 Who can remove a director from office?a  
Was there an instance that a director was 
removed from office? 
Y If yes, answer 9.7 
N If no, proceed to 9.8 
9.7 Why?  
9.8 How do the directors 
settle disagreements 
during meetings? 
 Majority vote 
 Chairperson has veto power 
 Other, specify: 
9.8 Were the directors remunerated 
last year? 
 No 
 Yes, some: 
 Yes, all of them 
9.9 Who determines the value of the remuneration given to the directors?a  
9.10 Who approves the value of the remuneration given to the directors?a  
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10 MANAGEMENT TEAM 
10.1 How many members does the management team have?  




 Minimum years being an active member: 
 Minimum years of formal training: 
 Minimum years of actual experience in business: 
 Others, specify: 
10.3 How is the manager’s salary 
calculated? 
 As determined by BOD 
 As determined by GA 
 As prescribed by local & national laws 
 As determined by previous years’ earnings 
 Others, specify: 
10.4 Who selected the current manager?a  
10.5 Who appointed the current manager?a  
10.6 Can a current director be appointed as member 
of the management team? 
Y  
N  
10.7 Do any of the directors engage in the 
cooperative’s day-to-day operations? 




10.8 Who can remove a manager from the management team?a  
Is there an instance that a member of the 
management team was removed? 
Y If yes, answer 10.9 
N If no, proceed to 10.10 
10.9 Does the manager (or member of the 
management team) attend board 
meetings? 
 Regularly 
 Only when requested by the BOD 
 No 
10.10 To whom does the manager directly report to?a  




minutes of board 
meetings? 
 
Members Non-members  
  Yes 
  No, must secure approval of Chairperson 
  No, must secure approval of BOD 
  No, must secure approval of Manager 
11 DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION-MAKING  
Who makes the FINAL decision on the 





Manager Remarks  
(Cut-off value) 
Amendment to constitution and bylaws     
Formulation and modification of policies     
Purchase of assets     
Expansion of current or new strategies      
Contracting with external parties     
Day-to-day business operations     
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PART III. RESPONDENT’S PROFILE 
 
Questionnaire identification number  
RESPONDENT PROFILE 
Name  
Contact information  
Years in farming  
Type of farminga  
Farm area in hectare  
Farm ownershipb  
Distance of farm to nearest coop facilities  
Years registered as member  
Are you a founding member? Y N 
Years as holding office in the cooperative  






What other farmer organisations are you a 
member of? 
Have you been or currently are an official of this 






a. F Full-time | P Part-time 
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Appendix 2  
Interview schedule 
Manager 
Davao del Norte Rice Cooperative 
 
 
This research is: 
 
 Completely voluntary in nature. 
 Respondent is free to decide not to participate at any time during or after the interview. 
 
Provide contact details (Brenda.Dimas@lincolnuni.ac.nz or +63 905 305 9424) for queries 
or expression of withdrawal. 
 Responses will be aggregated for analysis only, and no personal details will be reported. 
 A summary of findings will be provided to the organisation. 
 Interview might be recorded to ease transcription (if respondent allows). 
 
We are immensely grateful to you for participating in the study. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PART I. ORGANISATIONAL PROFILE (Pre-filled up prior to interview). 
 
Name of organisation  
Date of registration  
Number of founding members  
Current number of members  
In the register  
Are there inactive members? Y N 
If yes, how many and why?  
Geographical coverage of organisation 
Barangay, specify:  
Municipality/City, specify:  
Provincial, specify:  
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PART II. INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 
a. OC Owned by cooperative | L Leased to cooperative | B Borrowed by cooperative | OT Others 
b. PC Purchased by cooperative | MD Member donated physical assets (in kind) | GA Granted by an external agency | O Others 
c. O Operational/utilised | NO Non-operational/unutilised 
1 ASSETS HELD BY THE COOPERATIVE 
Assets Quantity  
(units | area) 
Ownership statusa 
(If not OC, proceed to Usage Status) 
Means of acquisitionb 
(Refer to Table 4.14) 
Usage 
statusb 
Remarks, if any 
Land      
      
      
      
      
Buildings, facilities & machinery      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Others      
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a. MO Members only | MN Members and non-members 
b. BP Better prices | PR Patronage refund | D Dividend | SA Priority on service access or produce delivery | O Othe
2 CURRENT BUSINESS OPERATIONS 
Business Operations Particulars Who can patronise the 
specific business?a  (If 
MO, proceed to Table 3) 
Do members 
have advantages? 
Y Yes | N No 
If yes, what is the 
advantage?b 
If O, what are the 
other advantages? 
Products      
Sale of farm inputs      
Sale of non-farm inputs      
Marketing of farm outputs      
Marketing of non-farm outputs      
Services      
Provision of machinery services      
Provision of farm labour services      
Provision of technical advice      
Lending      
      
      
Processing      
      
      
Others      
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a. MA Manager | BOD Board of Director | GA General Assembly  
3  BUSINESS STRATEGY 
3.1 Does the cooperative want to expand operation on 
some of its products/services in the next five years? 
Y If yes, answer 3.2-3.7 
N If no, proceed to 4 
If yes, what products/services?  
If yes, are the potential expansion/s achievable during 
the proposed time frame (5 years)? 
Y  
N  
3.2 Who identifies what products/services are for expansion?a   
3.3 Who approves what products/services are for expansion?a   
3.4 Were you consulted in any 
stages of the development 
of potential expansion(s)? 
 Yes, through informal discussions with the directors  
 Yes, through formal discussions with the directors 
 Yes, through formal discussions during the AGM 
 No 
3.5 Are the desired 
expansion(s):  
(Tick all that 
apply) 
 Cater to the farming interests of farming members? 
 Suited to the current business environment? 
 Adaptable to the business operations of the cooperative? 
 Aligned with the vision, mission and goals of the cooperative? 
3.6 What are the reasons that 
might prevent or delay 
possible expansions? (Tick 
all that apply.) 
 Insufficient capital  
 Insufficient member support 
 Insufficient operational knowledge 
 Other reasons, specify: 
3.7 How difficult or easy is it to: Difficult Moderate Easy 
discuss current business strategies with directors?    
make recommendations about business strategies to directors?    
access minutes of the board meetings?    
4 DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION-MAKING  
Who makes the FINAL decision on the 





Manager Remarks  
(Cut-off value) 
Amendment to constitution and bylaws     
Formulation and modification of policies     
Purchase of assets     
Expansion of current or new strategies      
Contracting with external parties     
Day-to-day business operations     
Operational expenditures     
5 CAPITAL ACQUISITION 
5.1 How do the 
cooperative raise 
capital? (Rank from 
highest (from 1) to 
lowest (up to 5)) 
 Retained earnings (If selected, answer 5.2) 
 Additional member contribution (If selected, answer 5.3) 
 Borrowing from external financiers (If selected, answer 5.4) 
 Donor assistance (If selected, answer 5.5-5.6) 
 Others, specify: 
5.2 Retained earnings 
Who determines the value of earnings retained for the last fiscal year?a  
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a. MA Manager | BOD Board of Director | GA General Assembly  
b. G National Government Agency | L Local Government Unit | N Non-government Organisation 
c. FS Financial subsidy | TA Tangible assets | CB Capacity building | SL Supply chain linkage 
d. PM Participation in management | PD Participation in the BOD decision-making | AC Advisory capacity 
only | O Others | N None 
Who approves the value of earnings retained for the last fiscal year?a  
Did the cooperative increase the percentage of retained 
earnings in the last three fiscal years? 
Y  
N  
5.3 Additional member contribution 
Is the additional member contribution voluntary? Y If yes, proceed to 5.4 
N  
Who determines the value of additional member contribution?a  
Who approves the value of additional member contribution?a  




 Proportional to member’s patronage 
 Proportional to member’s shareholding 
 Allocated equally to all members 
 Others, specify: 
5.4 Borrowing from external financiers 
What percentage of the 
cooperative’s capital 
requirement last year was 
acquired from external 
financiers? 
Institution Individual  
% % Lender 
% % Investors 
% % Donors 
% % Others, specify: 
Are external financiers 
represented during 
board meetings or 
AGMs? (Tick all that 
apply.) 
BOD meetings AGM  
  No 
  Yes, they attend meetings as observers 
  Yes, they attend meetings as advisors 
  Yes, they attend meetings as participants 
5.5 Donor assistance 




If yes, what organisation facilitated its establishment?  
What percentage of the cooperative’s initial financial 
capital was provided by the facilitating organisation? 
% 
Grant, loan or 
shareholding? 
Did the facilitating 
organisation provide 
the cooperative with 
any physical assets? 
Y 
If yes, what assets 
were donated or 







5.6 Other external organisations who provided capital  
Can you disclose the organisations who provided 
capital assistance to the cooperative? 
Kind of 
organisationb 
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6 MEMBERSHIP QUALIFICATIONS AND BENEFITS 
6.1 Can a member of the 
cooperative be a: 
 natural person? 
 household? 
 legal entity? 
6.2 What financial 
contribution must be 
made to be a full 
member: 
 pay an initial fee to join? 
 pay an annual subscription fee? 
 buy shares?  
 other, specify: 
6.3 Does the cooperative 
provide services to: 
 members who are not fully paid up? 
 non-members?  
If yes, do members who are fully paid-up get these services at a 
better price than other users? 
Y  
N  
6.4 Are members required to satisfy a minimum patronage 
requirement to continue enjoying membership benefits? 
Y   
N  
6.5 What percentage of the membership did not patronise the business last year? % 












  one vote each at a general assembly meeting? 
  more votes than other members who make less 
use of the cooperative? 
  more votes than other members who contribute 
less capital to the cooperative? 
7 SHAREHOLDING OWNED IN THE COOPERATIVE 
7.1 Do members own shares in the cooperative? Y If yes, answer the rest of Table 7 
N If no, proceed to Table 8 
If yes, how many types of shares do you own?  Just one type of share 
 More than one type of share 
Complete the table below. (Y for Yes | N for No | D for Don’t know.) Share A Share B Share C 
7.2 What name(s) do you give to these shares? 
 
   
7.3 Are these shares recorded in a register (list of members with 
corresponding number of shares)? 
   
7.4 Did members pay for these shares?    
If yes, must the cooperative redeem (i.e., buy) these shares if 
the shareholder leaves the cooperative? 
   
If yes, must the cooperative redeem these shares if the 
shareholder wants to withdraw part of his/her shares? 
   
If shares are redeemable, has the cooperative ever 
increased their share price or issued bonus shares? 
   
If shares are redeemable, did the cooperative redeem any 
shares in the past year or two? 
   
If shares were redeemed in the past year or two, was it at 
nominal price? 
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a. CA Cash| USC Payment for unpaid share capital | ASC Subscription for additional share capital | O 
Others, specify 
b. VD Voted in decision-making | AB Served as an advisor to the GA | AO Acted as an observer 
c. Y Yes | NM No, perform more than their role | NL No, perform less than their role 
If shares are not redeemable, are members allowed to 
trade them with other members? 
   
If shares are not redeemable, does the cooperative 
facilitate trading of shares among members? 
   
7.5 Is the number of shares held by a member linked to the 
amount of business they do with the cooperative? 
   
7.6 Is there some minimum number of shares a member must buy?    
7.7 Is there some maximum number of shares a member can buy?    
7.8 Can firms or individuals who do not use the cooperative’s 
services buy any of these shares? 
   
If yes, are these non-patrons allowed to vote at a general 
assembly meeting? 
   
If yes, is there any limit on non-patron voting rights to 
ensure that patrons stay in control of the cooperative? 
   
Complete the rest of this table indicating amounts where possible. 
7.9 What is the nominal share price (PhP/share)? 
 
   
7.10 How many shares does the typical patron member own?    
7.11 If a dividend was paid, what was the size of the most recent 
dividend paid (PhP/share)? 
   
7.12 How were the dividends paid?a    
7.13 If the cooperative sold shares to non-patrons, what percentage of its total 
shareholding is owned by these non-patrons? 
% 
7.14 If the cooperative sold shares to a non-patron who is also a business 
partner, what key service does this partner provide? 
 
7.15 What percentage of the cooperative’s total shareholding does this partner own? % 
8  ANNUAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY (AGM) 
8.1 Was the Annual General Assembly meeting 
consistently conducted over the last five years? 
Y  
N  
8.2 When was the last Annual General Assembly meeting?  
8.3 Did non-members attend the last Annual General 
Assembly meeting? 
Y If yes, complete Table 8.4 
N If no, proceed to 8.5 
8.4  Non-Member attendance at the last Annual General Assembly meeting 
Who are the non-members that 
attended? 
What is their role in the 
meeting?b 
Did they perform their expected 
role?c 
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8.5 Presence of informal interest subgroups (Y Yes | N No) 
Are you aware of informal subgroups within the cooperative?  
Do informal subgroups affect decision-making in the cooperative?  
Do informal subgroups affect your ability to manage the business?  
8.6 How many members came along during the last AGM?  
8.7 Did the members received prior notice of the last 
Annual General Assembly meeting? 
Y If yes, answer 8.8-8.10 
N If no, proceed to 8.11 
8.8 How many days was the notice circulated prior to 
the last Annual General Assembly meeting? 
 Less than 14 days 
 Between 15–30 days 
 Between 31–60 days 
11.9 Was the notice period long enough for you to 
prepare for the AGM? 
 Enough time  
 Not enough time 
11.10 How was the 
notice circulated? 
 Written notice 
 Mobile communication device 
 Word of mouth through cluster leaders 
 Others, specify: 
11.11 Circulation of Reports Y Yes | N No 






Are reports circulated prior to the AGM?      
Was the circulation time enough for members to review 
the report? 
   
Is the report externally reviewed?    
9 ELECTORAL PROCEDURE 
9.1 Were there any elections held during the last 
AGM? 
Y If yes, answer the rest of Table 9 
N If no, proceed to Table 10 
9.2 Why not? (Tick all 
that apply.) 
 No position is up for elections 
 There is no contest to the incumbent official(s) 
 There is only one candidate for the vacant position(s) 
 Others, specify: 
9.3 How many director positions were up for elections during the last AGM?  
9.4 Who nominated the 
candidates for director 
positions during the last 
AGM? (Tick all that apply.) 
 Members 
 External support (GO/NGO): 
 Strategic partner/investor: 
 Others, specify: 
9.5 When were the 
candidates 
nominated? 
 A candidate is nominated during AGM 
 A candidate is nominated prior to the AGM 
 Others, specify: 
9.6 During the 
AGM, how did 
the members 
vote for: 
the director positions? other concerns?  
  Via show of hands 
  Via secret ballot 
  Both above, as the need arises 
  Others, specify: 
  127 
a. MA Manager | BOD Board of Director | GA General Assembly | O Others 






10 BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
10.1 How many directors does the BOD have?  
10.2 How many years is a director’s term of office?  
10.3 How many terms can an individual serve as a director?  




 Minimum years being an active member: 
 Minimum years of formal training: 
 Minimum years of actual experience in business: 
 Others, specify: 
10.5 Are there non-members acting 
as advisory directors? 




10.6 Who can remove a director from office?a  
Was there an instance that a director was 
removed from office? 
Y  
N  
11 MANAGEMENT TEAM  
11.1 How many members does the management team have?  





 Minimum years being an active member: 
 Minimum years of formal education: 
 Minimum years of formal training: 
 Minimum years of actual experience in business: 
 Others, specify: 




 As determined by BOD 
 As determined by GA 
 As prescribed by local & national laws 
 As determined by previous years’ earnings 
 Others, specify: 
11.4 Who appointed the current manager?a  
11.5 To whom does the manager directly report to?a  
Complete the table below. (Y for Yes | N for No | D for Don’t know) 
11.6 Can a current director be appointed as member of the management team?  
11.7 Do any of the directors engage in the cooperative’s day-to-day operations?  
If no, can directors intervene in the management of the cooperative’s day-to-day 
operations? 
 
11.8 Who can remove a manager from the management team?a  
Was there an instance that a member of the management team was removed?  
11.9 Does the manager (or member of the 
management team) attend board 
meetings? 
 Regularly 
 Only when requested by the BOD 
 No 
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PART III. RESPONDENT’S PROFILE 
 
Questionnaire identification number  
RESPONDENT PROFILE 
Name  
Contact information  
Years in farming  
Type of farminga  
Farm area in hectare  
Farm ownershipb  
Distance of farm to nearest coop facilities  
Years registered as member  
Are you a founding member? Y N 
Years as holding office in the cooperative  






Are you a member of other farmer organisations? Y N 
If yes, what other farmer organisations are you a 
member of? 
Have you been or currently is an official of 








a. F Full-time | P Part-time 
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Appendix 3  
Interview schedule 
Members 
Davao del Norte Rice Cooperative 
 
This research is: 
 
 Completely voluntary in nature. 
 Respondent is free to decide not to participate at any time during or after the interview. 
 
Provide contact details (Brenda.Dimas@lincolnuni.ac.nz or +63 905 305 9424) for queries 
or expression of withdrawal. 
 Responses will be aggregated for analysis only, and no personal details will be reported. 
 A summary of findings will be provided to the organisation. 
 Interview might be recorded to ease transcription (if respondent allows). 
 
We are immensely grateful to you for participating in the study. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PART I. RESPONDENT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COOPERATIVE 
 
Name of organisation  
Distance of farm to nearest coop facilities  
Years registered as member  
Are you a founding member? Y N 
What are your 
main reasons 
for joining the 
cooperative? 
(Select and rank 
only four with 1 
being the 
highest and 4 
the lowest.) 
 To market farm outputs 
 To market non-farm outputs 
 To access farm inputs at favourable prices 
 To access non-farm inputs at favourable prices 
 To access farm-related services (e.g. provision of machinery & labour) 
 To access financing service for farm (e.g. lending) 
 To access non-farm related services 
 To access investment opportunities 
 To access employment opportunities (work in operations) 
 To help fellow farmers improve income 
 Others, specify: 
Have you held any position in the cooperative? Y N 







  130 
PART II. INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIP 
a. D Distance of cooperative facilities is nearest to the business | P Price offered by the cooperative is better | N No competitor provides the product/services |  
S Support the business operations of the cooperative | O Others 
b. E Excellent | VS Very satisfactory | S Satisfactory | US Unsatisfactory | P Poor | NR No response | NA Not applicable 
c. HU High user | AU Average user | LU Low user | NR No response 
1 USE OF COOPERATIVE SERVICES 
Farm products 
and inputs 
Particulars Which service(s) 
do you use? 
(Tick all that 
apply) 
What share (%) of your 
farming expenses/sales 
is transacted through the 
cooperative? 
Is patronage size 
dependent on 
shareholding size? 
Y Yes | N No 
Why do you transact 
this farming 
operation with the 
cooperative?a 
How satisfied are you 
with the quality of 
service provided by 
the cooperative?b 
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a. D Distance of cooperative facilities is nearest to the business | P Price offered by the cooperative is better | N No competitor provides the product/services |  
S Support the business operations of the cooperative | O Others 
b. E Excellent | VS Very satisfactory | S Satisfactory | US Unsatisfactory | P Poor | NR No response | NA Not applicable 
c. HU High user | AU Average user | LU Low user | NR No response 
 
1 USE OF COOPERATIVE SERVICES (continuation) 
Other farm 
services 
Particulars   Which 
service(s) do 
you use? (Tick 
all that apply) 
What share (%) of your farming 
expenses/sales is transacted through 
the cooperative? 
 Is patronage size 
dependent on 
shareholding size?  
Y Yes | N No 
Why do you transact 
this farming 
operation with the 
cooperative?a 
How satisfied are you 
on the quality of 
service provided by 
the cooperative?b 







       
       
       
       
       




       
       
       




       
       
Lending        
        
Others        
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2 PARTICIPATION IN BUSINESS STRATEGY 




If yes, are the vision, mission, and goals of the cooperative 
aligned with your farming goals and interests? 
Y  
N  
2.2 Are you aware if the cooperative wants to expand operation 
on some of its products/services in the next five years? 
Y  
N If no, proceed to 2.3 
If yes, what products/services?  
Were you consulted in 
any stages of the 
development of 
potential expansion(s)? 
 Yes, through informal discussions with manager 
 Yes, through informal discussions with the directors 
 Yes, through formal discussions in the AGM 
 No 




2.3 How difficult or easy is it to: Difficult Moderate Easy 
discuss current business strategies with directors?    
make recommendations about business strategies to directors?    
access minutes of the board meetings?    
get clarification about decisions made during board meetings?    
discuss business operations with the manager?    
make recommendations about business operations to the manager?    
access documents about the current financial position of the 
cooperative? 
   
3 PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES (Y Yes | N No) 




voting for approval/ 
disapproval of:  
amendments to constitution and bylaws?   
formulation and modification of policies?   
purchase of assets by the cooperative?   
expansion of current or new strategies?   
contracting with the cooperative’s business partners?   
day-to-day business operations of the cooperative?   
4 SHAREHOLDING OWNED IN THE COOPERATIVE 
4.1 Do you own shares in the cooperative? 
 
Y If yes, answer the rest of Table 4 
N If no, proceed to Table 5 
If yes, how many types of shares do you own?  Just one type of share 
 More than one type of share 
Complete the table below. (Where applicable, Y for Yes | N for No | D 
for Don’t know. Indicate amounts if possible) 
Share A Share B Share C 
4.2 What type of shares do you own?    
4.3 Are these shares recorded in a register?    
4.4 Is the number of shares you own linked to the amount of 
business you do with the cooperative? 
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a CA Cash| USC Payment for unpaid share capital | ASC Subscription for additional share capital | O 
Others, specify 
b MAS Major shareholder | AS Average shareholder | MIS Minor shareholder | NR No response 
4.5 Have you fully paid up the required minimum shareholding? (If 
yes, answer 4.6 – 4.9; if no, proceed to 4.10) 
   
4.6 Will the cooperative redeem (i.e., buy back) these shares if you 
leave the cooperative?  
   
4.7 Will the cooperative pay you more than the nominal share price if 
they buy back the share? 
   
What is your total shareholding for FY 2019?     
4.8 Can you sell your shares to another member?    
If yes, do you negotiate your own price?    
4.9 Do you want to increase the number of shares you currently 
own? 
   
Do you want to reduce the number of shares you currently own?    
4.10 Did the cooperative declare dividends during the last AGM?    
If a dividend was paid, what was the size of your FY 2019 payout?    
How was your dividends paid?a    
4.11 How do you rank your shareholding compared to other 
members?b 
   
4.12 Are new members paying the same share price as you did when 
you registered? 
   
4.13 Should new members pay the same share price as you did?    
5 ANNUAL GENERAL ASSEMBLY (AGM) 
5.1 Was the Annual General Assembly meeting 
consistently held over the last five years? 
Y  
N  
5.2 When was the last Annual General Assembly meeting? (Year)  
5.3 Did you (or your proxy) attend the last 
Annual General Assembly meeting? 
Y If yes, proceed to 5.5 
N If no, answer 5.4 then proceed to Table 7 
5.4 Why not? (Tick 
all that apply.) 
 
 Member of the minority 
 No faith in the processes of the AGM 
 No time or resources to attend the AGM 
 Others, specify: 
5.5 Presence of informal interest subgroups  (Y Yes | N No | D Don’t know) 
Are you aware of informal subgroups within the cooperative?  
If yes, are you a member of any informal subgroup?  
If yes, are your farming interests addressed better through the informal subgroup?  
5.6 Attendance of non-members (Y Yes | N No | D Don’t know) 
Did non-members attend the last AGM meeting?  
Did non-members advise on cooperative matters during the last AGM?  
If yes, did the advice of these non-members affected your decision in votes?  
5.7 Did you receive prior notice of the last Annual 
General Assembly meeting? 
Y If yes, answer 5.8-5.9 
N If no, proceed to 5.10 
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a. YA Yes, accurately | NB No, below perception | NA No, above perception  
5.8 Was the notice period long enough for you to 
prepare for the AGM? 
 Enough time  
 Not enough time 
5.9 How was the notice 
circulated? 
 Written notice 
 Mobile communication device 
 Word of mouth through cluster leaders 
 Others, specify: 
5.10 Circulation of Reports (Y Yes | N No | D Don’t know) 








Did you receive a copy of the report prior the AGM?      
If yes, was the circulation time enough for you to review the 
report? 
   
If yes, did you find the report easy to understand?    
If yes, did the report reflect your current perception of the 
cooperative’s performance?a 
   
If yes, did the report influence your decisions during the AGM?     
6 ELECTORAL PROCEDURE 
6.1 Were any elections held during the last AGM? Y If yes, proceed to 6.2 
N  
If no, why not? (Tick all that 
apply?  
Then go to Table 7 
 No position was up for election 
 There was only one candidate for the vacant position(s) 
 Others, specify: 
6.2 How many director positions were up for elections during the last AGM?  
6.3 Who nominated the 
candidates for director 
positions during the last 
AGM? (Tick all that apply.) 
 Members 
 External support agency (GO/NGO): 
 Strategic partner/investor: 
 Others, specify: 
6.4 When were the 
candidates 
nominated? 
 A candidate was nominated during AGM 
 A candidate was nominated prior to the AGM 
 Others, specify: 
6.5 Was the nomination process fair? Y If yes, proceed to 6.7 
N If no, answer 6.6 
6.6 Why not? (Tick all 
that apply.) 
 
 Nomination process is complex  
 Incumbent(s) dominate the nomination 
 Influential groups within the cooperative dominate the nomination 
 External agencies influence the nomination 
 Others, specify: 
6.7 During the AGM, 








  Via show of hands 
  Via secret ballot 
  Others, specify: 
  135 
a. MA Manager | BOD Board of Director | GA General Assembly | O Others, specify 
b. C Chairperson | BOD Board of Director | GA General Assembly | O Others, specify | D Don’t know 
 
 
7 BOARD OF DIRECTORS (Indicate D for Don’t know) 
7.1 How many directors does the BOD have?   
7.2 How many years is a director’s term of office?  
7.3 How many terms can an individual serve as a director?  




 Minimum years being an active member: 
 Minimum years of formal training: 
 Minimum years of actual experience in business: 
 Others, specify: 
Complete the table below. (Y for Yes | N for No | D for Don’t know) 
7.5 Do the directors have adequate qualifications to direct the cooperative?  
7.6 Do the current directors represent your interests in the cooperative?  
7.7 Are there non-members acting as advisory directors?  
If yes, what organisation(s) do they represent?  
If yes, do the advisory directors represent your interests in the cooperative?  
7.8 Who can remove a director from office?a  
Was there an instance that a director was removed from office?  
7.9 Can members readily access the 
minutes of board meetings? 
 Yes 
 No, must secure approval  
8 MANAGEMENT TEAM (Indicate D for Don’t know) 
8.1 How many members does the management team have?  
8.2 What are the 
qualifications to 
become a manager? 
 Minimum years being an active member: 
 Minimum years of formal training: 
 Minimum years of actual experience in business: 
 Others, specify: 
Complete the table below. (Y for Yes | N for No | D for Don’t know) 
8.3 Does the current manager have adequate expertise to manage the 
cooperative? 
 
8.4 Who appointed the current manager?b  
8.5 To whom does the manager directly report to?b  
8.6 Can a current director be appointed as a member of the management team?  
8.7 Do any of the directors manage the cooperative’s day-to-day operations?  
If no, can directors intervene in the management of the cooperative’s day-to-
day operations? 
 
8.8 Who can remove a manager from the management team?b  
Was there an instance that a member of the management team was 
removed? 
 
8.9 Does the manager (or member of 
the management team) attend 
board meetings? 
 Yes 
 Only when requested by the BOD 
 Don’t know 
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PART III. RESPONDENT’S PROFILE 
 
Questionnaire identification number  
RESPONDENT PROFILE 
Name  
Contact information  
Years in farming  
Type of farminga  
Farm area in hectare  
Farm ownershipb  
What are the sources of 
your household income? 
(Rank from highest (from 
1) to lowest (up to 6)) 
 
 Farming (with farm under cooperative operations)  
 Own off-farm business 
 Employment in the cooperative 
 Employment in government sector 
 Employment in private sector 
 Others, specify: 
Are you a member of other farmer organisations? Y N 
If yes, what other farmer organisations are you a 
member of? 
Have you been or currently is an official of 







a. F Full-time | P Part-time 
b. O Owned | LO Leased out | LI Leased in | ST Share tenancy | O Others 
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Appendix 4  
Letter request for assistance and information 
 
 




Head of Office 
Name of Government Office 
Province of Davao del Norte 
 
Dear Mr. Head of Office, 
 
Request for Assistance and Information 
 
Brenda Dimas is currently a student at Lincoln University in New Zealand. She has a scholarship 
administered by the NZ Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade. The scholarship provides funding for 
two years of study. During her two years of study, she undertakes a one-year taught programme 
followed by one year of research. A requirement of the scholarship is that the research she undertakes 
should be in her home country. 
 
She is now in the second year of her programme conducting research on the ‘Factors influencing the 
performance of rice farmer organisations in Davao del Norte, Philippines’. To assist her in the 
collection of data, she has a team of survey assistants, led by Charissa Mae Palma-Sharp, to conduct 
the interviews with the study respondents from the farmer organisations in the attached. 
 
Dependent on the information collected, she, and her team of survey assistants, may wish to ask for 
further information and assistance from your office. The help that you could provide in terms of 
advising on the information that is available and the provision of the assistance would be invaluable 
and greatly appreciated. Please be assured that any information relating to individuals, including 
famers, will be treated as strictly confidential and will remain anonymous in her thesis and in any other 
publications resulting from her research. 
 
The purpose of the research study is to be of benefit to both individuals and organisations within the 
rice industry of the Philippines, to facilitate improving their performance and thus production and 
trade opportunities that may be available. 
 
 




Dr Alison Bailey 
Professor of Farm Management 
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Appendix 5  
Letter invitation to cooperative to participate in the study 
 





Name of Cooperative 
Municipality or City of Main Office 
Province of Davao del Norte 
 
Dear Mr. Chairperson, 
 
Invitation to Participate in Study 
 
Brenda Dimas is currently a student at Lincoln University in New Zealand. She has a scholarship 
administered by the NZ Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade. The scholarship provides funding for 
two years of study. During her two years of study, she undertakes a one-year taught programme 
followed by one year of research. A requirement of the scholarship is that the research she undertakes 
should be in her home country. 
 
She is now in the second year of her programme conducting research on the ‘Factors influencing the 
performance of rice farmer organisations in Davao del Norte, Philippines’. To assist her in the 
collection of data, she has a team of survey assistants, led by Charissa Mae Palma-Sharp, to conduct 
interviews with selected farmer-organisations.  
 
She would like to invite your organisation to participate in the study. Your organisation’s participation 
would contribute invaluably to the achievement of the objectives of the study and would be greatly 
appreciated. In participating in the study, she would like to access information about the organisation 
such as the Constitutions and Bylaws, Vision, Mission and Goals, Profile, Minutes of the last 3 AGM, 
Financial Statements for the last 3 years, Organisational Chart and List of Members. Her team of survey 
assistants will also conduct interviews with selected officials and members. 
 
Please be assured that any information relating to the organisation and individuals will be treated as 
strictly confidential and will remain anonymous in her thesis and in any other publications resulting 
from her research. 
 
The purpose of the research study is to be of benefit to both individuals and organisations within the 
rice industry of the Philippines, to facilitate improving their performance and thus production and 
trade opportunities that may be available. 
 
 




Dr Alison Bailey 
Professor of Farm Management 
T: (64) 3 423 0226, E: alison.bailey@lincoln.ac.nz 
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Appendix 6  
Letter invitation to respondents to participate in the study 
 
 






Invitation to Participate in Study 
 
Brenda Dimas is currently a student at Lincoln University in New Zealand. She has a scholarship for 
two years of study administered by the NZ Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade. During her two years 
of study, she undertakes a one-year taught programme followed by one year of research. She is now 
in the second year of her programme conducting research on the ‘Factors influencing the performance 
of rice farmer organisations in Davao del Norte, Philippines’. The purpose of the research is to 
investigate the internal factors that affect the success or failure of farmer organisations and the degree 
of effect on their performance. To assist her in the collection of data, she has a team of survey 
assistants, led by Charissa Mae Palma-Sharp, to conduct interviews on selected farmer-organisations.  
 
You are invited to participate in the study. This research is completely voluntary and you are free to 
decide not to participate at any time either during or after the interview. All responses will be 
aggregated for analysis only, and no personal details will be reported in any resulting publications. 
Further, a summary of findings will be provided to your organisation. 
 
If you have any question about the survey or the study, feel free to contact Brenda Dimas by email at 
Brenda.dimas@lincolnuni.ac.nz or the principal survey assistant, Charissa Mae Palma-Sharp, at 0905 
305 9424. 
 
We are immensely grateful to you for participating in the study. 
 
 
We thank you for your help in this matter, 
 
 
Dr Alison Bailey 
Professor of Farm Management 
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Appendix 7  


















neg 0 1 0 1 
ag 1 1 0 1 
bookval 0 1 1 1 
proe2019 1 1 1 0 
pgroetrend 1 0 0 0 
der2019 0 1 1 0 
cr2019 1 1 0 0 
lowgovsup 0 1 1 0 


















mempatr 0 1 0 0 
memadv 1 1 0 0 
invpatr 0 1 0 0 
rdmall 1 1 1 0 
rdmpart 0 0 1 0 














sufrevw 1 1 1 0 
rmvebod 0 0 1 0 
prtcpol 0 0 1 0 
advagm 0 1 0 0 
infagm 1 1 0 1 
firemgr 0 1 0 0 
rstrmngt 1 1 1 0 
nalwintv 0 0 1 0 
intvday 0 1 1 0 
mgrmem 0 1 0 0 
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Appendix 8  




Cluster Variable Attribute 
1 
neg Positive net equity growth 
ag Positive asset growth 
prerepu Presence of intangible assets (reputation) and significant markets 
mempatr Only members can patronise the cooperative 
invpatr Investment is proportional to patronage 
advagm Only members advise during AGMs 
firemgr The BOD fired a manager 
mgrmem Manager does not have to be member 
2 
proe2019 Within range profitability (2019 ROE)  
cr2019 Within range liquidity (2019 current ratio) 
memadv Members patronise the cooperative on better terms than non-members 
rdmall Members can readily exit and redeem all shares 
sufrevw Members had sufficient time to review reports 
rstrmngt Directors should not be appointed to a managerial position 
3 
pgroetrend Profitability growth (ROE trend) 
rdmpart Members can redeem some shares without exiting the cooperative 
rdmperd Periodic redemption of excess member capital 
rmvebod GA removed a director from office 
prtcpol Members did not participate in policy & strategic decision-making 
nalwintv Directors are not allowed to participate in management decisions 
4 
bookval Less than -10% contraction in book value of shares 
der2019 Within range leverage (2019 debt-to-equity ratio) 
lowgovsup Low level of government support 
intvday Directors did not intervene in daily operations 
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Appendix 9  








Stage Cluster First Appears 
Next Stage Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 
24 1 4 1.567 23 20 0 
23 1 3 1.298 22 19 24 
22 1 5 1.051 21 18 23 
21 1 2 .679 17 0 22 
20 4 13 .667 0 11 24 
19 3 6 .533 12 14 23 
18 5 25 .400 16 0 22 
17 1 8 .286 0 15 21 
16 5 7 .000 0 3 18 
15 8 9 .000 0 13 17 
14 6 10 .000 0 0 19 
13 9 11 .000 0 7 15 
12 3 12 .000 0 10 19 
11 13 14 .000 0 9 20 
10 12 15 .000 0 5 12 
9 14 16 .000 0 8 11 
8 16 17 .000 0 4 9 
7 11 18 .000 0 6 13 
6 18 19 .000 0 2 7 
5 15 20 .000 0 0 10 
4 17 21 .000 0 0 8 
3 7 22 .000 0 1 16 
2 19 23 .000 0 0 6 
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Appendix 10  
Dendogram of the cluster analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
